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Conditional on the quality of a paper, are women held to higher writing standards in aca-
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1 Introduction
Ladies, our papers aren’t published that often in “top-four” economics journals. In 2015, the average
share of female authors per paper was 15 percent. Only eight percent were majority female-authored.
Just four percent were written entirely by women. Between 2015–2017, the Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics did not publish a single exclusively female-authored paper. In several recent years, Econometrica
and the Journal of Political Economy have not either.
These statistics are uncomfortable, but their causes are myriad: lower publishing rates, career
choices, motherhood and, possibly, bias. In lab and field experiments women are subject to tougher
standards. Their qualifications and ability are underestimated (Foschi, 1996; Grunspan et al., 2016;
Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Reuben et al., 2014). Female-authored manuscripts are evaluated more
critically (Goldberg, 1968; Krawczyk and Smyk, 2016; Paludi and Bauer, 1983). When collaborating
with men, women are given less credit (Heilman and Haynes, 2005; Sarsons, 2019).
Although earlier studies haven’t found much evidence of gender bias in peer review (see, e.g., Blank,
1991; Borsuk et al., 2009; Gilbert et al., 1994; Lloyd, 1990), they tend to analyse a single indicator
(acceptance rates) in a specific context (publication outcomes). In this paper, I ask a different question.
Men’s and women’s manuscripts may be published at comparable rates, but are they scrutinised and
evaluated by comparable standards? For example, if women are stereotypically assumed less capable at
math, logic and reasoning than men and generally need more evidence to rate as equally competent,
some referees may inspect their papers more closely, demand more revisions and have less patience
deciphering their complicated, dense writing.
Complicated, dense writing is my focus. In the English language, clearly written prose is better
prose, all things equal. Thoughtful word choice and simple sentence structure make text easier to un-
derstand, more interesting to read and expose inconsistencies long-winded writing often hides. Journal
editors tend to agree. Econometrica asks authors to write “crisply but clearly” and to take “the extra ef-
fort involved in revising and reworking the manuscript until it will be clear to most if not all of our
readers” (Econometrica submission guidelines, June 2016).1
To measure an article’s writing clarity, I apply five highly tested “readability” formulas to 9,122
article abstracts published in the American Economic Review (AER), Econometrica (ECA), Journal of
Political Economy (JPE) andQuarterly Journal of Economics (QJE).2 To capture gender, I use each paper’s
proportion of female authors (see Section 2.1 for a justification), but also replicate most analyses using
alternative ways to represent a paper’s gender composition (see Appendix J).3
First, I find female-authored abstracts are 1–6 percent more readable than those by men. Women
write better despite adjusting for other dimensions of quality—including citations, author prominence,
seniority and individual fixed effects—accounting for English fluency and adding editor, journal, year
and primary and tertiary JEL category dummies.
Second, the gender gap in readability is 2–3 times larger in the published version of a manuscript
compared to its pre-submission version, even after conditioning on quality. Assuming authors do
not make post-submission changes to their text unless requested by referees, these estimates suggest
female-authored abstracts become 2–5 percent more readable because of peer review.
Third, the portion of the gap formed in peer review reversed direction in journals that blinded ref-
erees to authors’ identities before the internet. Although standard errors are large and sample sizes
small, this evidence tentatively suggests that blind review can mitigate the impact of gender under
1The American Economic Review rejected Robert Lucas’s paper “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” for insufficient
readability; one referee wrote “If it has a clear result, it is hidden by the exposition” (Gans and Shepherd, 1994, p. 172). I
additionally analysed 721 posts on Shit My Reviewers Say. A quarter deal with writing quality, document structure or word
choice/tone.
2Abstract readability is highly correlated with the readability of other sections in a paper (see Appendix B.3 and Figure B.4).
3Where possible, I show results (a) on the subset of solo-authored papers; (b) on the subset of papers authored by a single
gender; (c) using a binary variable equal to one if the most senior author was female; (d) using a binary variable equal to one
if at least one author is female; and (e) using a binary variable equal to one if at least half of all authors are female.
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certain circumstances. It also supports the hypothesis that editorial/refereeing bias is at least partially
responsible for women’s better writing.
Fourth, I do not find evidence that men compensate for their lower quality writing by raising
quality along another dimension. Better writing by female economists could arguably compensate for
some other advantage present in men’s papers. But as long as men and women are equally capable
researchers and similarly informed conditional on controls, the cost to both genders of implementing
their respective publication strategies should be equal—otherwise, women could reduce the cost of
producing a paper while holding acceptance rates constant by adopting a strategy marginally closer to
men’s (or visa versa). A rough test of this hypothesis using submit-accept times from Econometrica and
the Review of Economic Studies (REStud) suggests this isn’t the case. The cost to men of producing
a paper appears to be much lower than the cost to women: female-authored papers spend three to
six months longer in peer review compared to observably equivalent male-authored papers. The effect
persists across a range of specifications and accounts for, among other things, citations, readability,
author seniority, motherhood, childbirth and field.
Finally, it does not appear that women are rewarded for their better writing. Recent evidence at a
set of four semi-overlapping journals suggests female-authored papers are not accepted at higher rates
after conditioning on similar co-variates (Card et al., 2019).
Combined, these results suggest women spend too much time rewriting old papers and not enough
time writing new papers, relative to men. The lack of a gender gap under blind review points to external
factors beyond their control. But women’s better writing could also be driven—or at least exacerbated—
by internal factors such as higher risk-aversion (for a review, see Croson and Gneezy, 2009), lower
confidence (see, e.g., Coffman, 2014; Exley and Kessler, 2019), a tendency to update too much when
faced with negative signals (Möbius et al., 2014), be more easily swayed by the opinions of others (Born
et al., 2019) or exert more effort on low stakes tasks (Schlosser et al., 2019) and those do not yield
obvious benefits (Babcock et al., 2017).
In order to determine wither external or internal factors primarily drive gender differences in read-
ability, I model an author’s decision-making process. Reviewers are assumed to accept papers only when
their readabilities surpass author-specific minimum thresholds. Thresholds depend on non-readability
aspects of papers—e.g., more novel research is subject to lower thresholds—as well as referees’ and
editors’ objectives, idiosyncratic preferences and biases and relative weight in determining outcomes.
Authors then choose the actual readability of each of their papers in order to maximise a subjective
expected utility that: (i) fixes their intrinsic preference for writing clearly over time; (ii) permits them
to form misspecified beliefs about the relative importance of writing well; and (iii) allows the cost of
writing to decline with experience.
The model suggests that if women improve their writing over time and are not commensurately
rewarded with higher acceptance rates, then a gender readability gap between equivalent, experienced
authors is primarily the result of holding women to higher writing standards. The intuition is simple.
Assuming intrinsic preferences are fixed over time, authors improve their own writing only when they
believe better writing leads to higher acceptance rates. Although poor information and oversensitivity
may cause mistaken beliefs and mistaken beliefs can initially lead to suboptimal readability choices,
authors correct such mistakes as they gain experience in peer review. Thus, a sufficiently experienced
author writes more clearly than her inexperienced self only when writing clearly really does improve
the probability her paper is accepted. If she also writes more clearly than an equivalent, experienced
male author whose papers are accepted at rates no lower than hers, then higher standards—either in
the form of biased referees or biased referee assignment—explain the difference (Theorem 1).
Theorem 1 establishes conditions sufficient to demonstrate double standards are present in aca-
demic peer review: (1) experienced women write better than equivalent men; (2) women improve
their writing over time; (3) female-authored papers are accepted no more often than equivalent male-
authored papers. Estimates from pooled subsamples at fixed publication counts suggest (1) and (2)
hold. On average, women’s writing gradually gets better but men’s does not; between authors’ first and
third published articles, the readability gap increases by up to 12 percent. Although my data do not
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identify Condition (3), female-authored papers are accepted less often than equivalent male-authored
papers at a semi-overlapping set of journals (Card et al., 2019).
To interpret the relationship as causal, however, requires that Theorem 1’s conditions hold for the
same author. I therefore restrict the sample to authors with three or more top-four publications and
match observably similar male and female economists based on characteristics—including citations
and field—that predict the topic, novelty and quality of their research. Within-person readability
comparisons determine if Condition (2) was satisfied for each author in a matched pair. Between-
person comparisons after authors have gained experienced in peer review establishes whetherCondition
(1) was satisfied for the male or female member.
Conditions (1) and (2) were satisfied for the same author in 68 percent of matched pairs; in almost
three-quarters of those, the member who satisfied them was female. Using a conservative estimate
derived from the model, I estimate higher writing standards cause senior female economists to write
at least 5–7 percent more clearly than they otherwise would.
I conclude by showing suggestive evidence that women navigate higher standards by altering their
behaviour. Guided by the model, I tease out the direct effect of higher standards—readability changes
made in peer review—from its “feedback” effect—readability changes made before peer review in an-
ticipation of those higher standards—by comparing papers pre- and post-review as authors’s gain ex-
perience in the process. In authors’ earliest papers, the direct effect dominates. In fact, there is no
significant gender difference between draft readabilities in men’s and women’s first top publications; it
emerges entirely in peer review. In later papers, however, women write well upfront; the gap chiefly
materialises before peer review.
These final results suggest women do not initially expect higher standards; instead, they learn about
them over time and adapt their ex ante writing style accordingly. Consequently, papers by junior female
economists likely experience the toughest review. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find a significantly
smaller—albeit still positive—gender gap in peer review times for senior women.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of my knowledge, I am
the first to suggest and document empirical evidence that women are held to higher standards in the
peer review process (as opposed to its outcome). Higher standards have been recently corroborated
using citations as a proxy for manuscript quality (Card et al., 2019; Grossbard et al., 2018; Hengel and
Moon, 2019).4 They also align with research on employee performance reviews, teaching evaluations
and online comments: women receive more abusive feedback, less credit for intelligence and creativity
and are expected to be more organised, prepared and clear (see, e.g., Boring, 2017; Correll and Simard,
2016; Gardiner et al., 2016; Mengel et al., 2017; Wu, 2019).
Second, this paper proposes a novel explanation for academia’s “Publishing Paradox”, “Leaky Pipe-
line” and general promotion gap. Higher standards cause collateral damage to women’s productivity:
spending more time revising old research means there’s less time for new research; fewer papers results
in fewer promotions, possibly driving women into fairer fields.5 They may also explain why so few
women publish entirely female-authored papers, despite being the only work tenure committees give
them full and fair credit for (Sarsons, 2019).
Third, my conclusions relate to a more general debate about gender differences in labour market
outcomes.6 Higher standards impose a quantity vs. quality trade-off that characterises female output
4Data from a field journal and 35 economics and finance journals also find female-authored manuscripts are subject to greater
scrutiny and spend longer under review (Alexander et al., 2018; Hengel andTol, 2018). A review-time gap was not, however,
present in a set of journals that semi-overlap with those analysed here (Card et al., 2019).
5A similar idea was independently proposed in the philosophy literature (Bright, 2017). It was also informed by extensive
research on editorial patterns (Card and DellaVigna, 2013; Card et al., 2019; Casnici et al., 2016; Clain and Leppel,
2018; Ellison, 2002), bias in editorial decisions (Abrevaya and Hamermesh, 2012; Bransch and Kvasnicka, 2017; Card and
DellaVigna, 2017; Card et al., 2019) and female academics’ lagging productivity and underrepresentation (Bayer and Rouse,
2016; Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2017; Ductor et al., 2018; Ginther and Kahn, 2004; Teele and Thelen, 2017).
6Traditional hypotheses focus on obvious discrimination (Goldin and Rouse, 2000), motherhood (Bertrand et al., 2010)
and differences in behaviour (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010). Contemporary theories tend to stress inflexible work-
ing conditions (Goldin, 2014a; Goldin and Katz, 2016), preferences (for a review, see Blau and Kahn, 2017) and policy
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in many professions—e.g., doctors, real estate agents and airline pilots (for a discussion, see Hen-
gel, 2017). Their downstream effects may contribute to several employment phenomena, including
women’s tendencies to concentrate in certain sectors and occupations (Blau and Kahn, 2017; Cortés
and Pan, 2016), under-negotiate pay (Babcock and Laschever, 2003) and apply only to jobs they feel
fully qualified for (Mohr, 2014). They may also reinforce work habits—e.g., conscientiousness, tenacity
and diligence—that correlate with quality and connote “femininity”: for example, female physicians
consult longer with patients (Roter and Hall, 2004), female politicians fundraise more intensely (Jenk-
ins, 2007), female faculty commit fewer instances of academic misconduct (Fang et al., 2013) and
female lawyers make fewer ethical violations (Hatamyar and Simmons, 2004).
Fourth, this paper joins an emerging body of economic research studying how the experience and
anticipation of discrimination affects choices and behaviour. Earlier theoretical work focused on the
impact discrimination has on investment in education and occupational choice (see, e.g., Coate and
Loury, 1993; Goldin, 2014b; Lundberg and Startz, 1983). More recent empirical research explores
how stereotypes negatively impact performance (Bordalo et al., 2016; Carlana, 2019; Coffman, 2014;
Glover et al., 2017; Lavy and Sand, 2015). My results suggest that rational responses to discrimination
can distort productivity measurement (see also Parsons et al., 2011) and blur the line between biased
treatment and voluntary choice.
Finally, this paper makes a related methodological contribution. Discrimination is generally iden-
tified from the actions (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Neumark et al., 1996) and/or learning
processes (e.g., Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Fryer et al., 2013) of those who discriminate. But repeat-
edly observing authors’ choices also exposes bias by editors and/or referees. In particular, multiple
choices made under changing conditions reveals information about agents’ intrinsic preferences and
knowledge of underlying processes. Using this information, one can isolate group differences in the
observed equilibrium from those that would have occurred in a non-discriminatory counterfactual one.7
For example, assuming preferences are fixed over time, earlier choices provide an upper bound on the
impact intrinsic preferences play in gender readability gaps; assuming authors update beliefs about the
relationship between readability and acceptance rates means later choices are made with more accurate
beliefs. Under modest assumptions, a similar strategy can be used in a variety of circumstances to
credibly test for the existence of discrimination and identify—or at least bound—the effect it has on
the long-term decision processes of those who experience it.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following order. Section 2 describes the data, the
gender representation of articles published in top economics journals and readability scores. Analyses
and results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
The data include every English-language article published with an abstract in AER, ECA, JPE and
QJE between January 1950 and December 2015 (inclusive). The largest sample is from Econometrica
which consistently published abstracts with its articles prior to 1950. JPE added them in the 1960s
and QJE in 1980. AER came last in 1986. Unless otherwise mentioned, observations exclude the May
issue of AER, Papers & Proceedings (P&P). Appendix B.2 displays data coverage by journal and decade.
For textual input, I use abstracts. Abstract readability is strongly positively correlated with the
readability of other sections of a paper (see Figure B.4 and Hartley et al. (2003) and Plavén-Sigray et
al. (2017)). Their structure is standardised in a manner optimal for computing readability scores. Most
have also been converted to accurate machine readable text therefore curbing errors in transcription.
See Appendix B.3 for further discussion.
design (Antecol et al., 2018).
7This idea is conceptually related to the infra-marginality problem. See Anwar and Fang (2006), Anwar and Fang (2015),
and Knowles et al. (2001) for discussions in the context of racial discrimination.
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Figure : The representation of women in top economics journals
Notes. Graphs illustrate the representation of female authors in articles published in top-four economics journals. Figure on the left is the average share of
female authors per paper broken down by primary JEL category (5,216 articles); figure on the right displays the evolution of papers’ gender composition over
time (6,176 articles; estimates are five-year moving averages).
For the analysis in Section 3.2, I collected draft abstracts from NBER Technical and Working
Paper Series. To match published articles with their NBER drafts, I used citation data from RePEc
and searched NBER’s database directly for unmatched papers authored by NBER family members.
1,986 published articles were eventually matched to 1,988 NBER working papers—approximately
one-fifth of the data.8 Descriptive statistics are shown in Section 3.2.2.
The analysis in Section 3.4 compiles submit-accept times at Econometrica (1970–2015) andREStud
(1976–2015), a fifth highly respected economics journal; AER, JPE and QJE do not make disaggre-
gated data on their revision process publicly available. I obtained the data from journals’ online archives
or extracted it from digitised articles using the open source command utility pdftotext. Section 3.4
displays and discusses basic summary statistics.
Other variables used in the analysis include editor fixed effects, dynamic institution fixed effects,
primary and tertiary JEL fixed effects, controls for author prominence—total lifetime number of top-
five (top-four plus REStud) articles for the most prolific co-author—and seniority—total number of
top-five articles at time of publication for the most-prolific co-author—English fluency dummies, ci-
tation counts (asinh), and controls for motherhood and childbirth (Section 3.4, only). See Appendix C
for further information on how each was calculated.
2.1 Gender
Authors were assigned a gender using GenderChecker.com’s database of male and female names. Au-
thors with unisex first names, first names not in the database or those identified only by initial(s) were
assigned a gender either by me, a research assistant or at least three separate Mechanical Turk workers
based on a visual inspection of photos on faculty websites, Wikipedia articles, etc. or personal pro-
nouns used in text written about the individual. In situations where the author could not be found but
several people with the same first and last name were and all shared the same gender, the author was
also assigned that gender. For the remaining cases, I emailed or telephoned colleagues and institutions
associated with the author.
8The mapping is not one-for-one because a small number of working papers were eventually published as multiple articles
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Figure : Relationship between readability and ratio of female authors
Notes. Binned scatter plot of abstract readability against the ratio of female authors on papers with at least one female author (1,166
articles; sample excludes three articles with six or more authors, only one of which was female). Estimates control for whether the
paper was solo- or co-authored (resulting in a small proportion of articles having a female ratio above one).
Determining the “gender” of a paper is not nearly as straightforward. For solo-authored manu-
scripts—of which there are 4,016 in the sample—gender corresponds to the sex of the author. Unfor-
tunately, top economics journals have collectively published just 266 by women. Only a slightly larger
number were written entirely—or even mostly—by women (Figure 1).9
Instead, I represent an article’s gender using its proportion of female authors. First, this allows me
to take advantage of the information contained in the much larger sample of papers authored by at
least one woman (1,172). Second, a gender readability gap—if it exists—is presumably a function of
(i) the probability a passage of text was written and/or revised by a female co-author; and (ii) referees’
beliefs about female authors’ contributions to the writing and/or revision of a co-authored paper. Prior
research suggests co-authors—regardless of seniority—share responsibility for writing and (especially)
revising collaborative work (see, e.g., Hart, 2000; Kumar and Ratnavelu, 2016). Thus, the intersection
of (i) and (ii) is likely positively related to the ratio of female authors on a paper.10
Figure 2 corroborates this hypothesis. It plots papers’ abstract readability against their ratio of
female authors. The slope of the regression line is positive, relatively large (6.26 points on the Flesch
Reading Ease scale) and highly statistically significant.
For robustness, however, I repeat most analyses (a) on the sample of solo-authored papers, only; (b)
comparing papers with a senior female co-author to entirely male-authored papers; (c) on the subset
of papers authored by a single gender; (d) using a binary variable equal to one if at least one author is
female; and (e) using a binary variable equal to one if at least half of all authors are female. Standard
errors from (a) and (c) tend to be larger; those from (b), (d) and (e) usually smaller. In general, however,
results do not meaningfully change (Appendix J).
9312 papers in the sample were authored entirely by women. Women made up more than 50 percent of all authors in
another 47. In 35 observations, a woman was the lead author—i.e., the first author was female in a paper with authors listed
non-alphabetically or in which contributions were explicitly noted.
10In Appendix H, I find evidence suggesting the relationship is increasing and convex.
6
Table : Textual characteristics per sentence, by gender
Men Women Difference
No. characters 134.83 131.39 −3.44**
(0.43) (1.31) (1.38)
No. words 24.19 23.39 −0.80***
(0.08) (0.24) (0.25)
No. syllables 40.69 39.16 −1.53***
(0.13) (0.40) (0.42)
No. polysyllabic words 4.70 4.40 −0.30***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
No. difficult words 9.39 9.03 −0.36***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.11)
Notes. Sample 8,800 articles. Figures are means of textual characteristics (per sentence) by
sex. Male means are of exclusively male-authored papers (7,948 articles); female means are
for majority female-authored papers (female ratio at or above 50 percent) (852 articles). Last
column subtracts male means from female means. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and
* difference statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
2.2 Readability scores
To measure writing clarity, I use the five most common, widely tested and reliable readability for-
mulas for adult-level material: Flesch Reading Ease, Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG (Simple
Measure of Gobbledegook) and Dale-Chall (see Figure B.1, Appendix B). Appendix B.1 reviews the
literature on readability score validity. Appendix B.2 breaks abstract readability down by publication
year and primary JEL classification. Appendix B.3 discusses measurement error and the impact it
potentially has on results and conclusions.
The Flesch Reading Ease formula ranks passages of text in ascending order—i.e., more readable
passages earn higher scores. The other four formulas, however, generate grade levels estimating the
minimum years of schooling necessary to confidently understand an evaluated text—and so more read-
able passages earn lower scores. In order to simplify interpretation, Imultiple the four grade-level scores
by negative one. Thus, higher scores universally correspond to clearer writing throughout this paper.
To calculate the scores, I wrote the Python module Textatistic. Its code and documentation are
available on GitHub; a brief description is provided in Appendix B.4. For added robustness, I also
re-calculate scores and replicate most results using the R readability package (Appendix J).
3 Analyses and results
3.1 Gender differences in readability
Table 1 compares textual characteristics betweenmale- and female-authored papers. It suggests women
write shorter, simpler sentences: they contain fewer characters, fewer syllables, fewer words and fewer
“hard” words. Differences are highly statistically significant.
Table 2 presents coefficients from 40 separate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of read-
ability scores on the ratio of female authors. Column (1) includes journal and editor fixed effect.11
Columns (2) and (3) add journal, year and journal-year interaction dummies. Column (4) introduces
controls for paper j ’s number of co-authors (Nj) and the dynamic institution effects described in Ap-
pendix C. Column (5) adds a dummy variable capturing English fluency; it also controls for article
quality (citations (asinh)), co-author prominence (max. T5) and seniority at the time of publication
11The coefficients on the journal dummies in (2) are presented in Appendix D. Compared to AER, all five scores agree that
Econometrica is harder to read; four out of five scores suggest JPE is, too, while QJE is easier.
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Table : Gender differences in readability, article-level analysis
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.90* 0.87* 0.83* 0.89* 1.14** 0.80 0.79 0.99
(0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.55) (0.55) (0.70)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.21* 0.24* 0.26** 0.26*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Gunning Fog 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.40** 0.38*** 0.37**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
SMOG 0.20** 0.20** 0.20** 0.21** 0.24*** 0.25** 0.23** 0.24*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
Dale-Chall 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.12** 0.13** 0.12** 0.15**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3
Year effects 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 31 31 31 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
JEL (tertiary) effects 3
Notes. Sample 9,117 articles in (1)–(5); 5,211 articles in (6) and (7); 5,774 articles—including 563 from AERPapers&Proceedings (see Footnote 12)—in
(8). Figures represent coefficients from 40 separate OLS regressions of readability scores on the ratio of female authors. Coefficients in (6) are estimated
using the controls in (5) but on the sample from (7). Quality controls denoted by 31 include citation count (asinh), max. T5 fixed effects (author
prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority). Standard errors clustered on editor in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
(max. t5). Columns (6)–(8) are estimated on the sample of articles published after 1990. (7) and (8)
include fixed effects for primary and tertiary JEL categories, respectively.12
Results in Table 2 suggest that abstracts written by women score about one point higher on the
Flesch Reading Ease scale; according to the four grade-level measures, they take about 2–3 fewer
months of schooling to understand. Percentage-wise, women write about 1–2 percent better than
men.
Appendix D.2 explores field in more detail; Appendix H analyses readability at the author-level.
Conditional on other explanatory variables, I find little evidence that field drives results in Table 2.
After accounting for author-specific heterogeneity, the gender gap in readability is 2–6 percent.
3.2 The causal impact of peer review
3.2.1 Identification. Comparing abstracts pre- and post-review make it possible to isolate gender
differences in readability pre-existing peer review from those incurred during it—and therefore identify
the immediate effect of gender inside peer review. In this section, I present two different methodologies
that estimate this effect.
The first strategy simply regresses each paper’s change in score on its gender composition. To
understand it, note that the readability of a published paper depends on its earlier draft readability as
12Due to small sample sizes, column (8) includes 561 articles from AER P&P, coded as a separate journal. Papers published
in AER P&P are selected and edited by the American Economic Association’s president-elect with the help of a Program
Committee (see www.aeaweb.org for more details). P&P does not publish abstracts in its print version; only select years
(2003 and 2011–2015) and papers were available online when I collected the data (first in early 2015 and then updated in
early 2016). Excluding these articles does not impact results or conclusions: coefficients are similar to those in column (8),
but standard errors are somewhat higher.
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well as factors that affect writing clarity any time after it was initially drafted:
RjP = RjW + β0P + β1P female ratioj + θP XjP + µjP + εjP , (1)
where RjP and RjW are readability scores for working (W ) and published (P ) versions of paper j,
respectively. β1P is the coefficient of interest and reflects the particular impact female ratioj has in
peer review. XjP and µjP are P -specific observable and unobservable components, respectively. εjP
is P ’s error term.
Correlation betweenRjW and female ratioj biases OLS estimates of β1P . Equation (2) eliminates
the distortion by subtracting RjW from both sides of Equation (1):
RjP −RjW = β0P + β1P female ratioj + θP XjP + µjP + εjP . (2)
Assuming zero partial correlation between female ratioj and µjP , OLS generates an unbiased estimate
of β1P .13
An alternative strategy based on Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) separately estimates gender dif-
ferences in the draft and final versions of papers using generalised least squares (GLS). The contem-
poraneous effect of peer review is identified post-estimation by subtracting coefficients. To implement
this set-up, I need to additionally define the relationship between readability scores and the gender
composition of a paper before peer review:
RjW = β0W + β1W female ratioj + θW XjW + µjW + εjW , (3)
where β1W reflects female ratioj ’s impact on readability prior to peer review; XjW and µjW are version-
invariant observable and unobservable components, respectively; εjW is versionW ’s error term. Equa-
tion (4) then defines a general structure for potential correlation between µjW and observable variables
in both Equation (3) and Equation (1):
µjW = γ + η female ratioj + δW XjW + δP XjP + ωj , (4)
where ωj is uncorrelated with female ratioj , XjW and XjP . Substituting Equation (4) into Equa-
tion (3) generates the following reduced form representation of RjW :
RjW = β̃0W + β̃1W female ratioj + θ̃W XjW + δP XjP + ε̃jW , (5)
where β̃0W = β0W + γ, β̃1W = β1W + η, θ̃W = θW + δW and ε̃jW = εjW + ωj . RjP ’s reduced
form is similarly found by substituting Equation (5) into Equation (1):
RjP = (β̃0W + β0P ) + (β̃1W + β1P ) female ratioj + θ̃W XjW + θ̃P XjP + µjP + ε̃jP , (6)
where θ̃P = θP + δP and ε̃jP = ε̃jW + εjP . Equation (5) and Equation (6) are explicitly estimated
via feasible GLS (FGLS). β1P is identified post-estimation by subtracting reduced form coefficients.
Both OLS estimation of Equation (2) and FGLS estimation of Equation (5) and Equation (6)
require zero partial correlation between µjP and female ratioj to obtain a valid β1P . Roughly restated,
non-peer review factors must be either independent of its timing or unrelated to gender.14 Section 3.2.4
evaluates this assumption.
13Note that Equation (2) implicitly controls for all factors—e.g., research field—that impact draft readability but are not
otherwise affected by peer review.
14This phrasing is slightly inaccurate but convenient for exposition. Zero correlation between female ratioj and µjP does not
preclude biased estimates of β1P when µjP is correlated with other explanatory variables that are, in turn, correlated with
female ratioj by some factor independent of µjP . Unbiasedness instead requires zero partial correlation between µjP and
female ratioj .
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No. sentences 6.45 5.07 −1.374*** 6.77 5.06 −1.711*** −0.337**
(0.06) (0.04) (0.057) (0.15) (0.08) (0.139) (0.149)
No. characters 860.09 647.26 −212.826*** 907.36 635.97 −271.385*** −58.558***
(7.56) (4.93) (7.523) (18.53) (10.31) (18.439) (19.597)
No. words 155.34 115.31 −40.034*** 164.45 113.63 −50.813*** −10.779***
(1.39) (0.90) (1.393) (3.42) (1.91) (3.428) (3.630)
No. syllables 256.36 192.68 −63.682*** 269.02 187.78 −81.242*** −17.560***
(2.25) (1.48) (2.242) (5.54) (3.08) (5.504) (5.843)
No. polysyllabic words 28.31 21.76 −6.557*** 28.93 20.63 −8.308*** −1.751***
(0.29) (0.19) (0.257) (0.71) (0.41) (0.627) (0.668)
No. difficult words 58.37 44.48 −13.897*** 60.32 42.37 −17.949*** −4.052***
(0.54) (0.35) (0.507) (1.30) (0.74) (1.204) (1.315)
Flesch Reading Ease 41.40 41.11 −0.298 42.51 43.08 0.564 0.862*
(0.28) (0.19) (0.193) (0.66) (0.43) (0.452) (0.500)
Flesch-Kincaid −13.65 −13.40 0.249*** −13.53 −13.00 0.531*** 0.282**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.052) (0.15) (0.11) (0.122) (0.134)
Gunning Fog −17.32 −17.06 0.252*** −17.13 −16.58 0.547*** 0.295**
(0.07) (0.05) (0.057) (0.18) (0.13) (0.140) (0.149)
SMOG −15.16 −15.02 0.138*** −15.02 −14.70 0.327*** 0.189*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.037) (0.13) (0.09) (0.095) (0.097)
Dale-Chall −10.85 −10.93 −0.082*** −10.71 −10.70 0.003 0.085**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.016) (0.06) (0.04) (0.037) (0.042)
Notes. Sample 1,566 published articles authored entirely by men (1,567 NBER working papers); 272 published articles authored by at least 50 percent
women (273 NBER working papers). Figures are means of textual characteristics by sex for NBER working papers and published articles. Penultimate
columns in each panel subtract working paper figures from published article figures for men (first panel) and women (second panel); difference-in-differences
(female less male) shown in the final column. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * difference statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
3.2.2 Summary statistics. Draft abstracts were collected from NBER Technical and Working Paper
Series (see Section 2). NBER series were used as the exclusive data source for two reasons. First,
approximately one-fifth of articles in my data were originally part of an NBER series, making it the
largest single source of draft papers. Second, authors release their manuscripts as NBER working
papers at about the same time they submit them to a journal (see Ellison, 2002; Goldberg, 2015, and
Figure E.1).
Table 3 compares textual characteristics between a paper’s draft and final versions. It suggests
abstract text is altered during peer review. According to the first panel, draft abstracts are longer—
more characters, words and sentences—and denser—more syllables, polysyllabic words and difficult
words. The biggest changes are made to female-authored papers: figures in column six are 20–30
percent higher (in absolute value) than those in column three. The second panel of Table 3 suggests
peer review improves readability, although results are less clear for male-authored papers.
3.2.3 Results. Table 4’s first column displays β1P from OLS estimation of Equation (1). Condi-
tional on draft readability, published female-authored papers are more readable than published male-
authored papers. Moreover, published article readability positively correlates with draft readability:
coefficients on RjW (shown in Appendix E.1) are positive and significant—but only about 0.8. The
less than unit value suggests µjP exerts downward pressure on RjW ’s coefficient, thereby artificially
inflating first column figures.
Table 4‘s remaining columns show results from the two strategies presented in Section 3.2.1 to
deal with this bias. The FGLS strategy estimates the coefficient on female ratioj separately among the
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Flesch Reading Ease 1.31** 2.21** 3.15*** 0.94 0.94
(0.58) (0.98) (1.21) (0.59) (0.60)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.52*** 0.32 0.76*** 0.44** 0.44**
(0.17) (0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.19)
Gunning Fog 0.51*** 0.44* 0.85*** 0.41** 0.41**
(0.19) (0.24) (0.30) (0.19) (0.20)
SMOG 0.30** 0.32** 0.56*** 0.24** 0.24*
(0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12)
Dale-Chall 0.18*** 0.32*** 0.44*** 0.13** 0.13**
(0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,709 NBER working papers; 1,707 published articles. Estimates exclude 279 pre-internet double-blind
reviewed articles. Column one displays coefficients on female ratio (β1P ) from estimating Equation (1) directly via OLS
(see Appendix E.1 for coefficients on RjW ); standard errors clustered by editor in parentheses. Columns two and three
display β̃1W and β̃1W + β1P from FGLS estimation of Equation (5) and Equation (6), respectively; standard errors
clusterd by year and robust to cross-model correlation in parentheses. Their difference (β1P ) is shown in column four.
Column five displays β1P from OLS estimation of Equation (2); standard errors clustered by year in parentheses. Quality
controls denoted by 32 include citation count (asinh), max. T5 (author prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority). ***,
** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
sample of working papers (column two) and published articles (column three). The impact of gender on
the readability gap formed in peer review is the difference between them (column four). Combined,
results in columns 2–4 suggest women’s better writing is indeed caused by peer review: the gender
readability gap is 2–3 times larger in papers’ published versions than it was in their pre-print versions;
percentage-wise, immediate peer review accounts for about 30–60 percent of the final gap.
The OLS strategy regresses each paper’s change in score on its gender composition. As discussed in
Section 3.2.1, this specification has the added benefit of completely removing the impact of confound-
ing factors—e.g., research field—that are constant between versions. Coefficients on female ratioj are
shown in Table 4’s fifth column. Their magnitudes and standard errors almost perfectly mirror FGLS
estimates.
As shown in Appendix E.1, the relationship between citations and the change in readability between
draft and final versions of a paper is either negative or zero.15 Although we do not observe how many
citations papers would have received had they not gone through peer review, these results tentatively
suggest that the revisions women are asked to make in peer review may not improve the quality of their
papers.
Double-blind review. To estimate the impact double-blind review had on the gender readability
gap, I add the dummy variable blindj and its interaction with female ratioj to Equation (2):
RjP −RjW =β0P + β1P female ratioj + β2P blindj + β3P female ratioj × blindj
+ θP XjP + µjP + εjP ,
(7)
15Citations and abstract readability do, however, (generally) positively correlate (see Appendix B).
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Blind (β1P + β3P ) −1.52 −0.57 −0.55 −0.37 −0.12
(2.93) (0.67) (0.79) (0.57) (0.17)
Non-blind (β1P ) 0.94 0.44** 0.41** 0.24* 0.13**
(0.60) (0.19) (0.20) (0.12) (0.05)
Difference (β3P ) −2.46 −1.00 −0.96 −0.61 −0.25
(3.01) (0.72) (0.83) (0.59) (0.17)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,988 NBER working papers; 1,986 published articles. Columns display marginal effects on female ratio
for papers undergoing non-blind (β1P ) and blind (β1P +β3P ) review from OLS estimation of Equation (7). Standard
errors clustered by year in parentheses. Quality controls denoted by 32 include citation count (asinh), max. T5 (author
prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
where blindj is equal to 1 if article j was subjected to an official policy of double-blind review before
Google incorporated in 1998.16
Table 5’s first two rows display marginal effects of female ratio under non-blind (β1P ) and blind
(β1P+β3P ) review fromOLS estimation of Equation (7). They suggest a smaller—possibly negative—
gap under blinded peer review. Marginal effects in single-blind reviewed papers are identical to figures
in Table 4.
Table 5‘s final row reports differences between effects (β3P ). Their consistent positive direction
provides some (weak) evidence that masking authors’ identities reduces peer review’s impact on the
gender readability gap. The effect, however, did not survive the internet. In Appendix E.3, I analyse
the policy’s post-internet impact. Gender differences are positive regardless of a journal’s official review
policy, suggesting that double-blind review is effective only as long as authors are not identifiable by
other means.
3.2.4 Robustness. Timing independence is the principle assumption required to causally link the
readability gap to the peer review process. Post-submission, manuscripts probably only change because
of peer review—either because referees request specific changes or authors believe, possibly mistakenly
(see Section 3.3), that they will be requested in a future revision. Thus, timing independence is ar-
guably only violated during the narrow timeframe after a manuscript is released as an NBER Working
Paper but before it is submitted to a top-four journal. As Appendix E.4 illustrates, only a small propor-
tion of papers are exposed to this window: most manuscripts—and especially most female-authored
16Three notes on this definition. First, double-blind review was likely less effective after the internet was adopted (for anecdo-
tal evidence, see, e.g., Goldberg, 2014). I therefore only evaluate the impact of blind review pre-internet. See Appendix E.3
for an analysis of the policy’s post-internet impact. Second, from 1 May 1987 to 31 May 1989, half of all papers submit-
ted to AER were evaluated by single-blind review; the remaining half were subjected to double-blind review (for details
on the trial, see Blank, 1991). Referees correctly identified at least one author in 45.6 percent of double-blind reviewed
papers—indicating that only about a quarter of the manuscripts were truly blind reviewed. I therefore classify every paper
published during the trial as having undergone single-bind review. (Note that excluding these observations has almost
no impact on results.) Third, as discussed in Blank (1991), a final publication date may substantially lag the actual review
date. Nevertheless, results are unchanged when including only AER articles published post May 1989 and all QJE articles
published before June 2005 were evaluated under double-blind review (Econometrica and JPE have never blinded referees
to authors’ identities). Thus, misclassification errors of this kind are unlikely to substantially bias estimates presented in
Table 5.
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manuscripts—are submitted to peer review at the same time or before they are released as NBER Work-
ing Papers.
Another concern is that gender differences in how authors conform to abstract word limits may bias
results in Table 4. To investigate this possibility, I exclude the 642 observations—about 40 percent of
the sample—with NBER abstracts longer than the official word limit of the journals in which they
were eventually published. Results are presented in Appendix E.5. Coefficient magnitudes are similar
to those in Table 4; standard errors are somewhat larger.
Finally, in an effort to maximise sample sizes, estimates in the first three columns of Table 4 omit
field controls. Including them slightly increases standard errors; they otherwise make little difference
(see Appendix E.2). Estimates in the final column implicitly account for field already (see Footnote 13).
3.3 Distinguishing between causal mechanisms
3.3.1 Theoretical framework. The previous section suggests that female-authored abstracts become
2–5 percentmore readable because of peer review. Two causal mechanisms could explain this link: either
(i) women voluntarily write better papers—e.g., because they’re more sensitive to referee criticism or
their papers are more innovative and therefore harder to understand—or (ii) better written papers are
women’s response to higher standards imposed by referees and/or editors.
To distinguish between (i) and (ii), I develop a simple model of an author’s decisionmaking process.
It follows an author—denoted by i—who publishes several articles in prestigious academic journals over
the course of his career. Each article is roughly equivalent in terms of topic, novelty and quality, but
may vary on readability.
At stage 0, author i drafts his tth paper and submits it for peer review. Upon receipt, the journal’s
editorial office assigns the manuscript to a group of referees. The (finite) set of all potential review
groups is represented by Σ; µi is the set of strictly positive probability measures on Σ. Σ and µi are
known to i.
r̃s0i is the readability threshold below which review group s ∈ Σ rejects any paper by author i. I
assume it depends on other qualities of i’s papers—e.g., methodological rigour, data, originality, policy
relevance, etc. If i‘s papers are strong in these characteristics, r̃s0i will be low (and vice versa). r̃s0i may
also reflect reviewers’ objectives, idiosyncratic preferences and relative weight in determining outcomes.
For example, an editor who does not care about readability and is willing to override the opinion of
referees will implement a lower r̃s0i (all else equal).
Conditional on non-readability characteristics such as topic, novelty and overall quality, s rejects




where r0it is manuscript t’s draft readability. i is otherwise granted a “revise and resubmit” (R&R), yet
could still be rejected at stage 1 if the readability of his revised manuscript, Rit = r0it + r1it, does not




where R̃si = r̃s0i + r̃s1i. All rejections and acceptances are final. R̃si ̸= r̃s0i to account for different
standards at different stages of peer review. r0it, r1it, r̃s0i and r̃s1i are non-negative; the latter two are
independent.
To aid the revision process, s writes a referee report from which i forms expectations about R̃si by
assigning subjective probabilities πs1it(R) to allR. Unfortunately, the concept of readability is complex,
some referees write insufficiently detailed reports and inattentive or hypersensitive authors misconstrue
even perfectly clear advice. This renders i’s interpretation of the report imprecise and potentially biases
his subsequent expectations about R̃si .
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Conditional on r0it, I assume referee reports by s for i are the same for all t and that each is
distinctive enough for i to distinguish s inΣ.17 Consequently, author i’s stage 1 choice ofRit maximises
his (immediate) subjective expected utility given s,
Πs1it(Rit)ui + ϕi|r0it(r1it)− cit|r0it(r1it). (8)
Πs1it(Rit) is the cumulative sum of πs1it(R) for all R ≤ Rit; ui is the utility of having a paper accepted
in a prestigious journal.18
ϕi|r0it(r1it) = ϕi(Rit) − ϕi(r0it) and cit|r0it(r1it) = cit(Rit) − cit(r0it) are the satisfaction and
cost, respectively, i derives from making changes r1it at time t given the paper’s initial readability
r0it. ϕi is increasing and concave in its arguments, cit increasing and convex—marginally higher Rit
generates proportionally less satisfaction but needs more effort when the paper is already well written.
Thanks to learning, the cost of writing clearly may fall over time (dcit/dt ≤ 0); however, it converges
uniformly to the limiting function ci—i.e., learning is “smooth” over t.
Authors’ decisions at stage 0 are myopic; i’s choice of r0it maximises his initial subjective expected




1it dµi + ϕi(r0it)− cit(r0it), (9)
where Πs0it(r0it) is the cumulative sum for all r ≤ r0it of author i’s subjective probabilities πs0it(r)
about r̃s0i; vs1it is Equation (8) evaluated at the optimal r1it.
Authors update subjective probabilities (i) using relevant information from their own experience in
peer review; and (ii) by observing others’ readability choices and publication outcomes. When evidence
from (i) contradicts evidence from (ii), (i) takes precedence. These assumptions imply, at a minimum,
that i updates Πs0it and Πs1it based on conclusive evidence derived from the choices and outcomes of
equivalent peers (Definition 1) and knowledge acquired from his own experience in peer review.
Definition 1. Equivalent authors write papers that are identical with respect to topic, novelty and quality.
Equation (8) and Equation (9) incorporate a variety of factors that potentially affect authors’ read-
ability choices—editorial standards conditional on other qualities in the paper (r̃s0i and R̃si ); ambition
(ui); the cost of drafting and revising manuscripts (cit); an otherwise unexplained intrinsic satisfaction
from writing readable papers (ϕi). Poor information, overconfidence and sensitivity to criticism are not
explicitly included, on the assumption that people do not want to be poorly informed, overconfident
or excessively sensitive. These factors nevertheless enter Equation (8) and Equation (9)—and hence
influence choices—via the subjective expectations authors form about r̃s0i and R̃si .
A single Rit cannot, therefore, establish if and to what extent i’s choices are motivated by (a)
preferences and costs specific to him (ui, ϕi, cit), (b) conditional editorial standards and/or referee
assignment outside his control (r̃s0i, R̃si , µi) or (c) miscellaneous confounding factors mopped up by
Πs0it and Πs1it. Since i’s preferences and limiting cost function (ci) are time independent, however,
observing an increase in his choice of readability at two separate t distinguishes (a) from the combined
impact of (b) and (c):19 i may be more sensitive to criticism and he might prefer writing more clearly;
nevertheless, he improves readability today relative to yesterday only when he believes it boosts his
chances of publishing. Moreover, because (c) does not reflect activities or states the author enjoys, its
17Should s review a future paper by i, i would recognise it as the same group that reviewed his earlier paper. This does not
imply that the report reveals individual referees’ identities.
18Authors probably care about getting their papers accepted and they may care about writing well, but their marginal utility
from the intersection of the two events—i.e., higher utility from writing well only because the paper is published in a
top-four journal (as opposed to a top field journal or second-tier general interest journal)—is assumed to be negligible.
19The analysis in Section 3.2 similarly establishes that (b) and/or (c) are significant factors driving the choice of Rit. It
cannot, however, distinguish between them (although the double-blind review analysis points to (b)).
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impact on choices declines with experience—i.e., authors may miscalculate referee expectations and
misconstrue their reports, but with experience they correct those mistakes.
I capture this idea in Theorem 1, where 1s0i(r) and 1s1i(R) are indicator functions equal to 1 if
r ≥ r̃s0i andR ≥ R̃si , respectively, and ΣAit is the collection of s ∈ Σ for which 1s0i(r0it)1s1i(Rit) = 1.
Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Consider two equivalent authors, i and k, that satisfy the following three conditions.
Condition 1. (r0kt, Rkt) ≤ (r0it, Rit) for all s ∈ ΣAit and t > t′ and there existsK ′ > 0 such that for at
least one s ∈ ΣAit and no t > t′, ||(r0it, Rit)− (r0kt, Rkt)|| < K ′.
Condition 2. For at least one t′′ < t′, (r0it′′ , Rit′′) < (r0it′ , Rit′) and there existsK ′′ > 0 such that for no













1k(Rkt) dµk for all t > t′.





















Theorem 1‘s three conditions are sufficient to verify discrimination is present in academic publish-
ing. That is, when female authors’ unconditional probability of acceptance is no higher than men’s
(Condition 3), their current papers are more readable than their past papers (Condition 2) and also
persistently more readable than men’s papers (Condition 1) then either editors assign women “tougher”
referees—i.e., those with higher r̃s0i and/or R̃si—or they apply higher standards to women’s writing—
i.e., r̃s0k < r̃s0i and/or R̃sk < R̃si for at least one s ∈ Σ.
Measuring higher standards. Theorem 1 principally relies on two identifying assumptions: (i) i and
k satisfy Definition 1 at time t′; (ii) t′ is sufficiently large—i.e., any errors in i’s beliefs about r̃0i and
R̃i are on a path converging to zero. Corollary 1 assumes a more specific belief structure at t′ in order
to (conservatively) measure discrimination’s impact on readability choices.
Let es0it and es1it be i’s time t error in beliefs about r̃s0i and R̃si , respectively, and define s as the review
group in ΣAit for which i believes r̃s0i is highest. If i and k are equivalent at t > t′ and esnit = esnkt at
stages n = 0, 1, then Corollary 1 shows that Rit − Rkt is smaller in magnitude than the true value of
stage 1 discrimination by s (R̃si − R̃sk) or stage 0 discrimination by s (r̃s0i − r̃s0k).
Corollary 1. Fix s and t > t′ and suppose (i) i and k are equivalent authors such that i satisfies Conditions
1–3 (Theorem 1) relative to k; (ii) esnit = esnkt for stages n = 0, 1; and (iii) ΣAit ⊂ ΣAkt . Then




R̃si − R̃sk if r0it < Rit
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Figure : Readability of authors’ t4th top-four publication
Notes. Binned scatter plot of abstract readability for authors’ first, second, …, t4th, … top-four publication. Sample 1,306 female
observations (767 disctinct female authors) and 14,759 male observations (6,109 distinct male authors).
Corollary 1 conservatively measures the impact of discrimination on i’s readability. It also exposes
the toxic influence of a single biased s: i’s time t readability choice depends on discrimination at stage
1 by the group of referees that actually reviewed his paper (s) as well as discrimination at stage 0 by
another review group that (probably) didn’t (s).
Corollary 1 adds two stronger conditions to Theorem 1. First, i and k must be comparably ex-
perienced by time t.20 Second, if s′ ∈ ΣAit then s′ ∈ ΣAkt . This second condition might not be
satisfied if, e.g., i’s utility of acceptance exceeds that of k’s so he works harder to appease the demands
of a particularly tough group of reviewers. Nevertheless, i’s unconditional acceptance rate is not higher
than k’s (Condition 3), so there must also exist some other s′′ that applies higher standards to i’s work
than it does to k’s (thus, s′′ ∈ ΣAkt but s′′ ̸∈ ΣAit). However, Equation (10) may not fully counteract
the first effect relative to the second (see the proof in Appendix A). Equation (11) does. It therefore
conservatively estimates Dik when ΣAit ̸⊂ ΣAkt :
Dik ≡ Rit − max {Rit′′ , Rkt} ≤ Dik, (11)
where t′′ < t is defined in Condition 2 of Theorem 1.21
3.3.2 Empirical results.
Descriptive evidence. In this section, I show suggestive, non-causal evidence that female authors
satisfy Theorem 1’s three conditions relative to male authors.
Consider first Condition 3: female-authored papers are accepted nomore often thanmale-authored
papers. The articles I evaluate in this paper have already been published, precluding gender analysis of
acceptance rates. Nevertheless, the topic has been extensively studied elsewhere. A recent study of four
journals that semi-overlap with my own suggests exclusively male- and female-authored manuscripts
20Corollary 1 actually applies under the weaker esnit ≤ esnkt, n = 0, 1 (see its proof in Appendix A).
21Equation (11) does come with a cost: its conservative bias is much larger than the one generated by Equation (10).
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receive a revise and resubmit decision 8 and 6 percent of the time, respectively (Card et al., 2019).
Blank (1991) found that 12.7 and 10.6 percent of male- and female-authored papers were accepted
at the AER, respectively. A study of JAMA’s editorial process indicated that 44.8 percent of referees
accept male-authored papers as is or if suitably revised; 29.6 percent summarily reject them. Corre-
sponding figures for female-authored papers were 38.3 and 33.3 percent, respectively (Gilbert et al.,
1994). Studies from other disciplines find female-authored papers subjected to single-blind peer re-
view are accepted less often than would be expected by chance (Handley et al., 2015; McGillivray and
De Ranieri, 2018). There appear to be no gender differences in acceptance rates to NBER’s Summer
Institute (Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2017). Desk rejection rates may actually be higher for
female-authored papers submitted to the field journal Energy Economics (Tol, 2018). Ceci et al. (2014)
provide a more comprehensive research review on the subject. Their conclusion: “When it comes to
actual manuscripts submitted to actual journals, the evidence for gender fairness is unequivocal: there
are no sex differences in acceptance rates.” (Ceci et al., 2014, p. 111).
My data better identify Conditions 1 and 2. As their careers advance, women write more clearly:
their average readability scores are 1–5 percent higher than the readability of their first papers, their
latest papers 1–7 percent higher; for aman, however, his average and last papers aremore poorly written
than his first (Appendix F.1, Table F.1). Figure 3 suggests a similar story. It plots an author’s Flesch
Reading Ease score against t4, where t4 = 1 for his first top-four publication, t4 = 2 for his second,
etc. As t4 increases, men’s and women’s readability diverges.
Table 6 tests the significance of that divergence, conditioning on confounders. It presents marginal
effects on co-authoring with women for female authors (β1) from estimating Equation (12) on sub-
samples of authors where t4 = 1, t4 = 2, etc.:
Rjit4 = β0 + β1 female ratioj + female ratioj × malei + θXj + εit4 , (12)
where Rjit4 is the readability score for article j, author i’s t4th top-four publication. Gender enters
twice—the binary variable malei and female ratioj—to account for i’s sex and the sex of his co-authors.
Xj is a vector of observable controls and εit is the error term.22
All figures in Table 6 agree—women write better—but the magnitude and significance of that dif-
ference increases as t4 increases. Between t4 = 1 and t4 = 2, the gap marginally widens but is not
significant; after that, it triples (at least); the increase is significant (p < 0.05) for all five scores (Ap-
pendix F.2, Table F.2). At higher publication counts, figures are less precisely estimated and somewhat
smaller than in column 3—but still noticeably larger than estimates in columns 1 and 2.23
Estimation strategy. Evidence in the previous section suggests women satisfy Theorem 1’s three
conditions relative to men, on average. Yet the set of women to satisfy one condition is conceivably
orthogonal to sets that satisfy others; for Theorem 1 to apply, they must overlap.
To address this concern, I restrict the sample to authors with three or more top-four publica-
tions and match observably similar male and female economists based on characteristics—including
citations and field—that predict the topic, novelty and quality of their research. In addition to ex-
plicitly accounting for author equivalence—the primary conditional independence assumption behind
Theorem 1—matched pair comparisons: (i) identify the gender most likely to satisfy all conditions si-
multaneously; and (ii) generate (conservative) estimates of the effect higher standards have on authors’
readability (Corollary 1).
Holding acceptance rates constant, Theorem 1 rules out confounding factors—e.g., sensitivity to
criticism and individual preferences—by comparing readability between equivalent authors experienced
in peer review (Condition 1) and within authors before and after gaining that experience (Condition 2).
I consider authors “experienced” by t4 = 3. Authors with one or two top-four publications are probably
22Data used in Figure 3 and Table 6 were disaggregated to the author-level by duplicating each article Nj times. To account
for duplicate articles, regressions in Table 6 are weighted by 1/Nj .
23Only 40 female authors have 4–5 publications in the data; 28 have six or more.
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Table : Gender gap in readability at increasing t4
t4 = 1 t4 = 2 t4 = 3 t4 = 4–5 t4 ≥ 6 All
Flesch Reading Ease 0.45 1.49* 4.99*** 3.01 2.31 1.88**
(0.68) (0.84) (1.13) (1.96) (2.14) (0.73)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.08 0.14 0.96*** 0.66* 0.47 0.23
(0.15) (0.19) (0.22) (0.40) (0.37) (0.15)
Gunning Fog 0.22 0.32 1.30*** 0.95** 0.66 0.45**
(0.17) (0.24) (0.27) (0.44) (0.43) (0.19)
SMOG 0.14 0.24 0.86*** 0.70** 0.47 0.35***
(0.12) (0.17) (0.19) (0.35) (0.30) (0.13)
Dale-Chall 0.07 0.11 0.38*** 0.29* 0.39* 0.19***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16) (0.23) (0.07)
No. observations 6,875 2,826 1,675 1,906 2,773 12,006
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 33 33 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. β1 from FGLS estimation of Equation (12). First column restricts sample to authors’ first top-four publication
(t4 = 1), second column to their second (t4 = 2), etc. Regressions weighted by 1/Nj (see Footnote 22). Standard errors
(in parentheses) adjusted for two-way clustering (editor and author) and cross-model correlation. Final column estimates
from an unweighted population-averaged regression; error correlations specified by an auto-regressive process of order one and
standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for one-way clustering on author. Quality controls denoted by 31 include citation
count (asinh), max. T5 fixed effects (author prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority); 33 includes citation count (asinh)
and max. t5, only. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
tenured and well-established in their fields. By publication three, all frequently referee (and some edit)
prestigious economics journals. I assume this accumulated experience means equivalent authors are
equally accurate about r̃0i3 and R̃i3; remaining errors are no longer gender specific: esni3 = esnk3,
n = 0, 1 (Corollary 1).24
To account for equivalence, I match every female author with three or more top-four publications
(121) to her closest male counterpart (1,554). Matches were made using a Mahalanobis procedure
with the following co-variates: (1) maximum citation count over t4; (2) institutional rank at t4 = 1;
(3) fraction of papers published per decade; (4) fraction of papers published by each journal; and (5)
number of articles per primary JEL category.25 Co-variate balance pre- and post-match are shown in
Appendix F.3. Appendix F.4 lists each matched pair.
Under ideal circumstances,Ri3−Ri1 measures the impact experience has on readability, conditional
on gender; Ri3 − Rk3 measures gender’s impact conditional on experience. Because of co-authoring,
however, article gender is neither fixed over t4 conditional on i, nor is its difference constant between
i and k, conditional on t4.26 To account for this, I create a counterfactual R̂it that captures i’s t4th
paper readability had it only been co-authored with members of i’s same sex. It is reconstructed at
female ratio equal to 1 for women and 0 for men using errors and coefficients from OLS estimation of
24Nevertheless, esnit − esnkt converges to 0 as t tends to infinity. Thus, Dik will consistently predict the direction of Dik for
a sufficiently large t even when errors remain gender-specific.
25Two notes on co-variate choice. First, I eschew mean, median and minimum citation counts in favour of the maximum on
the assumption that an author’s “quality” is principally a function of his best paper. Second, most people are at top ranked
institutions by t4 = 3; by matching on t4 = 1 institution, I try to pair authors with similar career paths. The robustness of
results to these and other co-variate choices are discussed in a following section.
26One way authors can meet higher standards is by co-authoring with better writers. Thus, co-authorship by itself is not a
confounding factor.
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Table : Dik, Equation (10)
Discrimination against
women (Dik > 0)
Discrimination against
men (Dik < 0)
Mean, all
observations
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (1) (2)
Flesch Reading Ease 13.46 11.06 60 −8.37 8.70 20 5.03*** 3.99***
(1.14) (1.23)
Flesch Kincaid 2.87 2.18 65 −2.66 2.46 19 1.15*** 1.00***
(0.26) (0.27)
Gunning Fog 3.50 2.76 62 −2.61 2.89 21 1.37*** 1.18***
(0.31) (0.33)
SMOG 2.73 1.96 54 −1.40 1.94 24 0.87*** 0.71***
(0.22) (0.23)
Dale-Chall 1.38 0.93 62 −0.94 0.69 22 0.53*** 0.43***
(0.11) (0.12)
Notes. Sample 121 matched pairs (109 and 121 distinct men and women, respectively). First and second panels display conditional
means, standard deviations and observation counts ofDik (Equation (10)) from subpopulations of matched pairs in which the woman
or man, respectively, satisfies Conditions 1 and 2. Third panel displays mean Dik over all observations. To account for the 30–40
percent of pairs for which Theorem 1 is inconclusive, (1) sets Dik = 0, while (2) sets Dik = R̂i3 − R̂k3 if R̂i3 < R̂k3 (i
female, k male) and zero, otherwise. Male scores are subtracted from female scores; Dik is positive in panel one and negative in panel
two. Dik weighted by frequency observations are used in a match; degrees-of-freedom corrected standard errors in parentheses (panel
three, only). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Equation (13) in the gender and time appropriate subsample of authors:27
R̂it = αtgi + βtgi female ratioit + ε̂it, (13)
where gi = m, f if i is male or female, respectively and ε̂it is the estimated error term. Regression
output from Equation (13) is shown in Appendix F.5. To adjust for the degrees of freedom lost when
generating R̂it, standard errors in subsequent calculations are inflated by 1.05.
As long as ε̂it does not partially correlate with a paper’s ratio of female authors conditional on t and
gi, then R̂it provides an unbiased prediction of Rit.28 The validity and robustness of this and other
assumptions relevant to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are discussed in a following section.
Results. Table 7 tests if Conditions 1 and 2 are both satisfied within each matched pair. Its first and
second panels display the mean and standard deviation of Dik (Equation (10)) and observation counts
from the set of matched pairs in which one member satisfies both conditions. In the first panel, the
female member does, suggesting discrimination against women. In the second, it’s the male member
(indicating discrimination against men). Male scores are subtracted from female scores, so Dik is, by
definition, positive in panel one and negative in panel two.
Evidence of discrimination was present in 68 percent of matched pairs. In almost three-quarters
of those, the member discriminated against was female. Moreover, Dik is (on average) 1.5 times as
large (in absolute value) when discrimination is against women.
Figure 4 displaysDik ’s distribution across the five scores. In the absence of systemic discrimination
against women (or men), Dik would symmetrically distribute around zero. It does not. When men
are discriminated against, Dik clusters closer to zero. When women are discriminated against, Dik is
more spread out. Furthermore, instances of obvious discrimination are predominately against women:
Dik is five times more likely to be one standard deviation above zero than below it.
27More specifically, I separately estimate Equation (13) in the following four subsamples: (i) female authors at t4 = 1; (ii)
male authors at t4 = 1; (iii) female authors at t4 = 3; (iv) male authors at t4 = 3. I then generate R̂it using the appropriate
coefficients and errors for each author: (i) R̂i1 = α1f + β1f + ε̂i1 for a female i at t4 = 1; (ii) R̂i1 = α1m + ε̂i1 for a
male i at t4 = 1; etc.
28That is female ratioit cannot act as a collider on the causal chain from higher standards to greater readability, conditional
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Figure : Distributions of Dik, Equation (10)
Table 7’s final panel averages Dik over all observations. To account for the 30–40 percent of pairs
for which neither member satisfies both Conditions 1 and 2, (1) sets Dik = 0, whereas (2) sets Dik =
R̂i3− R̂k3 if R̂i3 < R̂k3 (i female, k male) and zero, otherwise.29 Mean Dik is positive and significant
in both columns for all five scores. On average, first column figures suggest that higher standards cause
senior female economists to write (at least) seven percent more clearly than they otherwise would.
Appendix F.6 replicates Table 7 using Dik from Equation (11). Estimates are, by definition,
smaller—they suggest higher standards cause female economists to write (at least) five percent more
clearly than they otherwise would—but conclusions are unchanged.
Robustness. Conclusions drawn from Table 7 and Figure 4 are principally predicated on two as-
sumptions: (1) i and k are equivalent at t4 = 3; and (2) t4 = 3 is sufficiently large. If either is violated,
discrimination against women cannot be inferred from an overrepresentation of matched pairs with
Dik > 0.
Assumption (1) depends on match accuracy. Post-match co-variates are well balanced (see Ap-
pendix F.3). They remain well balanced—and similar to the matched population—when restricted to
pairs satisfying Dik ̸= 0. To facilitate further scrutiny, Appendix F.4 lists the names of economists in
each pair. Matches using alternative variables (e.g., minimum citation counts, mean institutional rank
or fraction of articles per primary JEL category) and specifications (e.g., propensity score matching)
generate similar figures and conclusions.30
Assumption (2) demands a “sufficiently large” t4. For diagnosing discrimination, “sufficiently large”
means t′ < 3 and the difference in i and k’s error in beliefs at t4 = 3 is smaller than Dik. Fifty percent
of women with three or more top publications satisfy Conditions 1 and 2 when compared to equivalent
men. Among them, Dik is far from zero: these women write, on average, 21 percent more clearly than
equivalent men with identical experience. I believe it is unlikely that half of all female economists with
29That is, if the experienced man writes more readably than the experienced woman, then the effect is always attributed to
discrimination against men; if the experienced woman writes more readably than the experienced man, however, the effect
is attributed to discrimination against women only if Condition 2 is likewise satisfied.
30See Hengel (2017, pp. 30–33) for propensity score matches from a probit model performed with replacement and using a
wider array of co-variates; results from alternative matching algorithms are available on request.
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three top publications—plus many more second-tier publications and substantial experience refereeing
and editing themselves—make mistakes of this magnitude.
To generate the counterfactual R̂it (Equation (13)), I assume unobserved co-author characteristics
do not partially correlate with female ratioit, conditional on i’s gender and experience. To test the
robustness of this assumption, Table J.27 (Appendix J.5) replicates Table 6 on exclusively, majority and
senior female-authored papers. I have also repeated the analyses shown in Table 7 and Figure 4 without
adjusting for female ratioit (Appendix F.8) and on subsets of matched pairs in which the woman’s
t4 = 1 and t4 = 3 papers are solo- or exclusively female-authored (16), majority female-authored (20)
or at least 50 percent female-authored (76). Although sample sizes for the latter three analyses are
small, they also find Dik ̸= 0 in about 70–75 percent of matched pairs; most of those (70 percent)
indicate discrimination against the female member; the impact across all five scores also averages about
7 percent.
Moreover, experience appears to be the only t4-varying factor driving within i changes in readabil-
ity. Table 6 and additional analyses in a 2016 version of this paper (Hengel, 2016, pp. 23–24) show
an identical pattern despite controlling for a large array of potential confounders. In a 2017 version,
I reconstructed R̂it using several t4-varying factors (number of co-authors, institutional rank, institu-
tional rank of the highest ranked co-author, t4 for the most experienced co-author, publication year
and dummies for each journal) (Hengel, 2017, pp. 30, 61); Appendix F.7 adds JEL classification codes
to Equation (13). In Table J.27 (Appendix J.5), I restrict Table 6’s analysis to solo-authored papers or
those co-authored by members of the same sex. In all instances, women’s readability is consistently
shown to increase with t4; when comparable results are estimated, they are similar to those presented
in Table 7 and Figure 4.
Finally, causal interpretation technically requires that three additional criteria are also met. As-
suming discrimination against i: (i) i’s acceptance rate is no more than k’s; (ii) i’s draft readability is
at least as high as k’s; and (iii) i’s draft readability at t4 = 3 is at least as high as his draft readability
at t4 = 1. As already discussed, (i) rules out the possibility that i is appropriately rewarded (relative
to k) for writing more clearly. (ii) and (iii) eliminate situations in which women write more clearly
during peer review in order to compensate for poorer writing—and consequently higher desk rejection
rates—before peer review.
Unfortunately, my data do not perfectly identify acceptance rates nor do I have t4 = 1 and t4 = 3
draft readability scores for every matched pair. Nevertheless, the data I do have and prior research
strongly suggest (i)–(iii) not only hold on average, but do not exert upward bias on my estimate of Dik,
more generally. First, I reviewed the literature on gender neutrality in journals’ acceptance rates earlier
in this section. To recap, women are not accepted more often than men. Results and conclusions are
similar when I attempt to adjust for acceptance rates explicitly by also requiring that T5i ≤ T5k for
matched pairs classified as discrimination against i (Appendix F.6). As shown in Section 3.2, women’s
draft papers are indeed more readable than men’s. Section 3.5 provides further confirmation. Figure 6
plots the readability of women’s and men’s draft and published papers over increasing t4. Women’s
drafts are more readable than men’s drafts at t4 = 3 and their own drafts at t4 = 1.
3.4 The time-cost of peer review
“Writing simply and directly only looks easy” (Kimble, 1994, p. 53).
Good writing takes time (Hartvigsen, 1981; Kroll, 1990): skilled writers spend longer contem-
plating a writing assignment, brainstorming and editing; they also write fewer words per minute and
produce more drafts (Faigley and Witte, 1981; Stallard, 1974). As a consequence, higher writing
standards—and, indeed, higher standards applied more generally (see, e.g., Card et al., 2019; Hengel
and Moon, 2019)—should result in female authors spending longer in peer review.
On the other hand, better writing by female economists could perfectly offset some unobservable
advantage present in men’s papers, conditional on quality. In this case, the time-cost of publishing a
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Figure : Distribution of review times at Econometrica and REStud
Notes. Histograms of time spent under review for papers published in Econometrica (left) and REStud (right). Blue bars represent papers written only by men
(2,398 for Econometrica; 1,580 for REStud). Pink bars are papers written only by women (48 for Econometrica; 64 for REStud).
paper will instead be gender neutral—since if it weren’t, women could reduce their time spent in review
by adopting a strategy marginally closer to men’s (or visa versa).31
To formalise this idea, consider male and female researchers who use strategies xm, xf ∈ X to
produce papers of identical quality Q ∈ Q. Let q represent the function mapping X onto Q and
define q−1(Q), as the set of strategies in X that achieve the same Q.
If men and women are held to identical standards in peer review, then both will accrue identical
rewards, conditional on Q, i.e.,
am(xm, Q) = af (xf , Q) = a(x,Q), (14)
where x is any strategy in q−1(Q) and ag(xg, Q) is the acceptance rate for gender g ∈ m, f given
strategy xg and quality Q.32 Moreover, if men and women are also equally capable researchers, then
neither side should have to exert more effort, conditional on acceptance rate (and, hence, Q)—i.e.,
given Equation (14), there must exist some x̂m, x̂f ∈ q−1(Q) such that
cm(x̂m) = cf (x̂f ), (15)
where cg(xg) is the cost to gender g of implementing the strategy xg.
In the absence of higher standards, Equation (15) implies that men’s and women’s time-cost of
review should be equal, conditional on Q. Figure 5 and the analysis in Section 3.4.1 do not support
this hypothesis. Figure 5 displays histograms of time (in months) between dates exclusively male- and
female-authored papers are first submitted to and their final revisions received by the editorial offices
of Econometria and REStud (mixed-gendered papers are excluded). Women’s review times dispropor-
tionately cluster above the mean: their articles are five times more likely to experience delays above the
75th percentile than they are to enjoy speedy revisions below the 25th.
3.4.1 Estimation strategy and results. For more precision on gender differences in the time-cost of
review—and in order to condition explicitly on quality—I build on a model by Ellison (2002):
revision durationj =β0 + β1 female ratioj + β2 motherj + β3 birthj
+ β4 max t5j + β5 no. pagesj + β6Nj + β7 orderj
+ β8 no. citationsj + β9 fleschj + θXj + εj ,
(16)
31Note that Section 3.3.2 addresses this issue by making a selection-on-observables assumption—i.e., experienced female
authors are matched to experienced male authors based on observable characteristics (including citations and field) meant
to capture non-readability differences between their papers. One purpose of the present section is to test (indirectly) the
robustness of this assumption.
32Higher standards come from accepting male-authored papers more often than female-authored papers, conditional on
Q—i.e., am(x,Q) > af (x,Q)—rewarding men’s strategies more than women’s strategies even though they both generate
identical Q—i.e., a(xm, Q) > a(xf , Q)—or both.
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Table : Revision duration at Econometrica, full control set
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female ratio 5.379*** 6.928*** 6.895*** 5.811*** 6.922*** 9.609*** 9.595***
(1.755) (2.088) (2.088) (2.035) (2.085) (2.602) (2.602)
Max. t5 −0.131*** −0.133*** −0.132*** −0.132*** −0.130*** −0.126*** −0.133***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.045)
No. pages 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.235*** 0.222***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.043)
Nj 1.161*** 1.115*** 1.102*** 1.140*** 1.111*** 1.433*** 1.294***
(0.297) (0.290) (0.294) (0.288) (0.292) (0.393) (0.407)
Order 0.208*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.203*** 0.466*** 0.467***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.145) (0.142)
No. citations (asinh) −0.397** −0.420** −0.409** −0.395* −0.420** −0.657 −0.659*
(0.197) (0.196) (0.196) (0.197) (0.196) (0.399) (0.386)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.018 −0.016 −0.016 −0.018 −0.016 −0.034 −0.037
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028)
Mother −7.866** −12.299*** −22.286*** −22.331***
(3.498) (3.625) (6.070) (6.472)
Birth −3.836 7.362 16.072** 15.742**
(4.642) (4.912) (6.478) (6.742)
Constant 13.854*** 13.991*** 14.006*** 13.892*** 14.018*** 16.239*** 17.076***
(1.202) (1.219) (1.215) (1.208) (1.212) (2.448) (2.298)
R2 0.288 0.291 0.290 0.288 0.290 0.128 0.146
No. observations 2,622 2,607 2,622 2,622 2,622 1,278 1,278
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Coefficients from OLS estimation of Equation (16); (2) excludes papers authored only by women who gave birth (9 articles) and/or had a
child younger than five (15 articles) at some point during peer review; (6) and (7) exclude papers published before 1990. Standard errors clustered
by submission year in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
where motherj and birthj are binary variables equal to 1 if article j ’s authors were all mothers to
children younger than five and gave birth, respectively, at some point during peer review,33 max . t5j
is the number of prior papers published in a top-five economics journal by article j ’s most prolific co-
author, no. pagesj refers to the page length of the published article, orderj is the order in which article
j appeared in an issue, no. citationsj are the number of subsequent papers citing j, fleschj is its Flesch
Reading Ease score and Xj captures additional fixed effects.34 I first estimate Equation (16) on data
from Econometrica. I then re-estimate it excluding readability, institution, motherhood and childbirth
controls—which I do not have for papers published in REStud—on the entire sample and each journal
separately.
Table 8 displays results for Econometrica. All models include editor, acceptance year and institution
fixed effects.35 Column (1) does not control for motherhood or childbirth; (2) drops papers authored
entirely by womenwho had children younger than five and/or gave birth during peer review; (3) controls
formotherhood but not childbirth; (4) controls for childbirth but notmotherhood; (5) controls for both
33If one co-author goes on maternity leave or has young children, I assume another co-author manages the revision process
unless she, too, faces similar family commitments.
34Equation (16) controls for all significant factors (plus readability) identified by Ellison (2002). Because authors’ English
fluency is not significant in his regressions, it is excluded. (Including it has no impact on β1.)
35See Appendix G.1 for results controlling for years of submission and publication, instead.
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+ REStud Econometrica REStud
Econometrica
+ REStud
Female ratio 5.18*** 1.62 3.26*** 7.70*** 3.39** 5.29***
(1.76) (1.16) (1.01) (2.29) (1.52) (1.28)
Max. t5 −0.12*** −0.11* −0.12*** −0.13*** −0.06 −0.10**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
No. pages 0.20*** 0.14** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.06 0.17***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Nj 1.15*** −0.10 0.71** 1.30*** 0.18 0.99**
(0.30) (0.49) (0.27) (0.41) (0.66) (0.37)
Order 0.20*** −0.08 0.08 0.47*** 0.03 0.21*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
No. citations (asinh) −0.30 −0.64*** −0.43*** −0.43 −1.20** −0.84***
(0.19) (0.23) (0.16) (0.38) (0.44) (0.30)
Constant 12.74*** 23.93*** 16.96*** 14.83*** 30.81*** 21.64***
(1.16) (1.81) (0.90) (2.02) (3.03) (1.47)
R2 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.14 0.13
No. observations 2,622 1,812 4,434 1,278 1,068 2,347
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Accepted year effects 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3 3 3
Notes. Coefficients from OLS estimation of Equation (16). Third and sixth column estimates pool data from Econometrica and REStud ; the
other four columns were separately estimated on data from each journal. Standard errors clustered by submission year in parentheses. ***, ** and
* statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
childbirth and motherhood; (6) and (7) restrict the sample to papers published after 1990; (7) includes
fixed effects for primary JEL categories.
Every paper published in Econometrica undergoes extensive review, but the consistently large and
highly significant coefficient on female ratio suggests women bear the brunt of it. The average male-
authored paper takes about 18.5 months to complete all revisions; papers by women need almost seven
months longer.
Results pooling data from both journals and on each alone without readability, institution, moth-
erhood and childbirth controls are shown in Table 9. Estimates from Econometrica (columns one and
four) coincide with those shown in Table 8. Women take 2–3 months longer in review at REStud
(columns two and five). When observations from both journals are combined, female-authored papers
take, on average, 3–5 months longer in peer review (columns three and six).
Remaining coefficients in Table 8 and Table 9 largely correspond to earlier estimates by Ellison
(2002). Longer papers take more time to review, as do papers with more co-authors and (generally)
those that appear earlier in an issue. Authors with an established publication history, highly cited papers
and more readable papers enjoy faster reviews, although the latter effects are only noisily estimated.
Giving birth slows down review; having a young child may have the opposite effect.36
Appendix G.3 re-estimates column (5) in Table 8 and the third column of Table 9 using a quantile
regression model in order to account for a potential rightward-skew in review times (see Figure 5).
Appendix G.2 replicates Table 8, column (5) altering the age-threshold on motherj . The gender gap
36This result is consistent with Ginther and Kahn (2004), who find that women with children are more productive than male
and childless female doctoral recipients 10 years after receiving their Ph.D. I would interpret it with caution, however,
given (i) counter-intuitive results, (ii) obtaining an unbiased estimate of β2 was not this study’s objective and (iii) motherj














Figure : Readability of authors’ t4th top-four publication (draft and final)
Notes. Flesch Reading Ease marginal mean scores for male (blue) and female (pink) authors’ t4 = 1, t4 = 2, etc. top-four
publications. Hollow circles denote draft readability; solid diamonds denote readability in published versions of the same papers.
See Table 10 for point estimates, standard errors and further estimation details.
is not driven by outliers—the coefficient on female ratio is positive and significant across the entire
distribution—nor does it depend on the precise definition of motherhood.
3.5 Understanding how women respond to higher standards
Women can respond to higher standards in two different ways: immediately (direct effect) and pre-
emptively (feedback effect). As emphasised in Section 3.3.1, the weight of each effect likely depends
on authors’ information about—hence experience with—the peer review process.
To illustrate the evolution of the relative importance of each, I compare papers pre- and post-review
as authors’ publication counts rise (Equation (17)):
Rjitm = β0 + β1 female ratioj + β2 female ratioj × t4it + β3 t4it + θXj + εj , (17)
where m = W,P for working papers and published articles, respectively, t4it is author i’s number of
top-four papers at time t and Xj is a vector of observable controls.37
3.5.1 Results. Results are shown in Figure 6 and Table 10. In Figure 6, hollow circles denote draft
readability; solid diamonds reflect readability in the final, published versions of those same papers.
Dashed lines trace readability as papers undergo peer review (direct effect) and correspond to estimates
in the first panel of Table 10. Table 10’s second panel shows the effect of female ratio (β2) for each
version of a manuscript. Figures in the final row represent gender differences in the direct effect.38
Figure 6 and Table 10 suggest that gender differences in the direct effect of peer review start off
large, positive and significant; as t4 increases, they gradually go away. For the feedback effect, however,
37As in Section 3.3.2, data are disaggregated to the author-level by duplicating each articleNj times; to account for duplicate
articles, regressions are weighted by 1/Nj . Results and conclusions based on unweighted regressions—or by replacing t4it
with max. t4j and not duplicating articles—are very similar to those presented here.
38The difference between final row estimates at t4 = 1 and t4 = 3 is weakly statistically significant (standard error 0.66).
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Table : Readability of authors’ t4th top-four publication (draft and final)
t4 = 1 t4 = 2 t4 = 3 t4 = 4–5 t4 ≥ 6
PredictedRjP −RjW
Women 1.52** 1.05* 0.64 −0.15 −0.67
(0.64) (0.61) (0.71) (0.91) (1.19)
Men −0.31* −0.20* −0.03 −0.25 −0.20
(0.18) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.19)
Marginal effect of female ratio
Published article 1.82* 2.27*** 2.73*** 3.19*** 3.65**
(1.02) (0.74) (0.76) (1.07) (1.50)
Draft paper −0.01 1.02 2.06** 3.09*** 4.12***
(1.22) (0.94) (0.84) (0.97) (1.27)
Difference 1.83*** 1.25* 0.68 0.10 −0.47
(0.70) (0.67) (0.79) (1.01) (1.28)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 4,289 observations; 1,988 and 1,986 distinct NBER working papers and published articles,
respectively; 1,839 distinct authors. Panel one displays magnitude of predicted RjP −RjW (the direct effect
of peer review) for women and men over increasing publication counts (t4). Panel two estimates the marginal
effect of an article’s female ratio (β1+β2×t4), separately for draft papers and published articles. Figures from
FGLS estimation of Equation (17). Quality controls denoted by 32 include citation count (asinh), max. T5
(author prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority). Standard errors clustered by editor and robust to cross-
model correlation in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
the pattern is reversed: although the readability gap in published articles is statistically significant and
relatively stable at every t4, it increasingly forms before submission. Differences in draft readability
contribute nothing to the gap at t4 = 1. That rises to 40 percent at t4 = 2 and 70 percent at t4 = 3.
By t4 = 4–5 and t4 = 6+, both sexes largely address referee concerns before peer review.
3.5.2 Interpretation. A number of tentative conclusions about the gender readability gap—and in-
formative about gender differences in preferences and beliefs—can bemade fromFigure 6 andTable 10.
First, inexperienced men and women seem to make similar choices in draft readability. This sug-
gests identical initial preferences for and beliefs about the impact of writing well. In one important
sense, however, men are still better informed: the standards they believe apply actually do; junior
women appear to mistakenly assume similar standards apply to them, too.
Second, experienced men and women seem to sacrifice time upfront in order to improve their odds
in peer review. By anticipating referees’ demands, authors can partially insure themselves against rejec-
tion and/or excessively long review. The price is having to spend more time revising a manuscript before
submitting it. Assuming choices by senior economists express optimal trade-offs with full information,
Figure 6 implies little—if any—gender differences in these insurance preferences. Nevertheless, higher
standards mean the price of that insurance is greater for women than it is for men.
Finally, Figure 6 suggests the direct effect of peer review dominates when women have less expe-
rience; the feedback effect dominates when women have more experience. This pattern of behaviour
implies that women initially underestimate referees’ thresholds but learn about them over time and
adapt their ex ante writing style accordingly.
This last observation suggests inexperienced female economists go through the toughest review,








Junior women Senior women Difference
Review length
Figure : The effect of experience on women’s review times
Notes. Sample 5,019 observations satisfying max. t5j = t5i; 4,436 distinct articles and 2,429 distinct authors (166 female). Blue dots are the coefficients
on female ratio corresponding to separate FGLS estimations of Equation (11) on authors for whom t5i = 1 (junior) and t5i > 1 (senior), respectively.
The yellow dot is their difference. Vertical grey lines correspond to 90 percent confidence intervals. Regressions weighted by 1/Nj .
review by re-estimating Equation (16) on sub-samples of junior (t5 = 1) and senior (t5 > 1) authors.39
Results are displayed in Figure 7. They suggest papers by junior women do indeed take longer in review;
the gender gap is significantly smaller—albeit still positive—for senior women.
4 Conclusion
Most raw numerical counts suggest women produce less than men: female real estate agents list fewer
homes (Seagraves and Gallimore, 2013); female lawyers bill fewer hours (Azmat and Ferrer, 2017);
female physicians see fewer patients (Bloor et al., 2008); female academics write fewer papers (Ceci
et al., 2014). When evaluated by narrowly defined quality measures, however, women often outper-
form: houses listed by female real estate agents sell for higher prices (Salter et al., 2012; Seagraves
and Gallimore, 2013); female lawyers make fewer ethical violations (Hatamyar and Simmons, 2004);
patients treated by female physicians are less likely to die or be readmitted to hospital (Tsugawa et al.,
2017).
As I show in this paper, female economists surpass men on another dimension: writing clarity.
Using five well-known readability scores, I analyse every article abstract published in a top four eco-
nomics journal since 1950. Abstracts written by women are 1–6 percent more readable. A comparison
of published papers to their pre-reviewed drafts suggests the immediate impact of peer review directly
explains at least forty percent of this gap.
Why? Either women voluntarily improve their writing during peer review—e.g., because they’re
more sensitive to criticism—or better written papers are women’s response to higher standards imposed
by referees and/or editors. To theoretically distinguish between hypotheses, I construct a dynamic
model of an author’s decision-making process. To empirically test it, I exploit within- and between-
individual readability changes among well-published economists. My results suggest higher standards
cause experienced women to write at least 5–7 percent more clearly than they otherwise would.
Higher standards hurt women’s productivity and labour market outcomes. Work that is evaluated
more critically at any point in the production process will be systematically better (holding prices fixed) or
39Three notes on estimation. First, in Section 3.3.2, I define “experienced” as t4 = 3. However, most female-authored
papers published in Econometrica and REStud are by women with no (or only one) previous top publication; only 24 have
two or more previous papers and were the most senior co-author on a t4 > 2 paper. Second, to eliminate confounding by
more senior co-authors, I restrict the sample to authors satisfying max. t5j = t5i. (Including these observations does not
substantially impact results or conclusions). Third, because the sample includes data from REStud, readability, institution,
motherhood and childbirth controls are not included. See the August 2018 version of this paper for results that control for
these factors (based on data from Econometrica alone).
27
systematically cheaper (holding quality fixed). This will reduce women’s wages and distort measurement
of their productivity. For example, if judges require better writing in female-authored briefs, female
attorneys must charge lower fees and/or under-report hours to compete with men; billable hours and
client revenue will decline, making female lawyers appear less productive than they truly are.
Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions for addressing higher standards. But least intrusive—and
arguably most effective—is simple awareness and constant supervision. I hope journals are challenged
to address the tougher standards they likely impose on women, open to policies that transparently
monitor them and supportive of research that helps us better understand them.
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A Proofs for Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
The proof of Theorem 1 follows directly from Lemma 5, at the end of this section. The proof of
Lemma 5 relies on a series of additional lemmas stated and proved below. It is followed by a proof of
Corollary 1. Throughout,
• {(r0it, Rit)} represents the sequence of readability choices made by author i for all t;
• Without loss of generality, cit(0) and ϕi(0) are 0;
• R⋆i is defined as the R that solves ϕ′i(R) = c′i(R);
• t > t where t is large enough that
∣∣cit(r)− ci(r)∣∣ is inconsequential for all r ∈ R;1
• Review group s is referred to as “state s”.
Lemma 1. {(r0it, Rit)} is bounded.
Proof. Consider the sequence of initial readability choices, {r0it}. I first show that R⋆i ≤ r0it for all
t. Recall r0it is chosen to maximise the author’s subjective expected utility in Equation (9). It satisfies











dµi + ϕ′i(r0it)− c′i(r0it) = 0, (A.1)
where vs1it represents Equation (9) evaluated at the optimal r1it.
ϕi|r0it(r1it) = ϕi(Rit)− ϕi(r1it) and ci|r0it(r1it) = ci(Rit)− ci(r0it). Thus,
∂vs1it
∂r0it
= πs1it(Rit)ui + ϕ
′




+ c′i(r0it)− ϕ′i(r0it). (A.2)
Since ϕ′i(R⋆i ) = c′i(R⋆i ), ∂vs1it/∂r0it = ∂vs1it/∂r1it when evaluated at r0it = R⋆i . The left hand side












vs1it is non-negative;2 optimising behaviour at stage 1 implies ∂vs1it/∂r1it ≥ 0: either an r1it exists
that satisfies ∂vs1it/∂r1it = 0, or the author chooses r1it = 0 and ∂vs1it/∂r1it = πs1it(Rit)ui is non-
negative. Thus, Equation (A.3) is non-negative. Since c′i(r) < ϕ′i(r) for all r < R⋆i , the left-hand side
of Equation (A.1) is strictly positive for all r < R⋆i , so r0it must be at least as large as R⋆i .
I now show that {r0it} is bounded from above. As r0 tends to infinity, authors choose not to make












1it are some upper bounds on the author’s subjective probability of receiving an R&R
and then being accepted in state s at time t. Since both are no more than 1, ui is finite and ϕi(r)−ci(r)







1it dµi + ϕi(r0)− ci(r0)
}
= −∞. (A.5)
1That is, I assume throughout the proof that t is large enough for ci to be a sufficiently close approximation of cit.
2Equation (8) evaluated at r1it = 0 is non-negative. Since r1it maximises Equation (8), vs1it is likewise non-negative.
1
Similarly, because Πs0it(r0it)Πs1it(Rit) ≤ 1 for all s and ϕi(r) and ci(r) are finite at all r <









1it dµi + ϕi(r0it)− ci(r0it)
}
< ∞,
so {r0it} is bounded.
It remains to show that {Rit} is likewise bounded. Since r1it ≥ 0 and Rit = r0it + r1it, Rit
is bounded below by r0it, which, as just shown, is itself bounded. Additionally, the author opts for
r1it = 0 if Equation (8) is less than 0 for all r1it > 0. Since R⋆i ≤ r0it and Πs1it(Rit) ≤ 1
Πs1it(Rit)ui + ϕi(Rit)− ϕi(r0it)− ci(Rit) + ci(r0it)
≤ ui + ϕi(Rit)− ci(Rit). (A.6)
Equation (A.6) is strictly decreasing in R for all R ≥ R⋆i . The author will not choose any R strictly
greater than the one that equates Equation (A.6) to 0. Thus, {Rit} is bounded from above.
Because {r0it} and {Rit} are bounded, the sequence {(r0it, Rit)} inR2 is likewise bounded. Thus,
all is proved.
Lemma 2. r0i ≤ r0it and Rsi ≤ Rsit for all t > t′′.
Proof. Bounded infinite sequences have at least one cluster point and at least one subsequence that
converges to each cluster point (Bolzano-Weierstrass). Let {(r0it, Rq
⋆
it )} denote the complete subse-



















= {(r0it, Rit)} .
Fix state s. BecauseΣ is finite, {(r0it, Rs
⋆
it )} likewise forms a bounded infinite sequence and there-
fore converges to at least one cluster point. Fix one such cluster point, (r0i, Rsi ), and let {(r0it, Rsit)}
denote the subsequence of {(r0it, Rs
⋆
it )} that converges to it.
Consider first the proposition that Rsi ≤ Rsit for all t > t′′. By way of a contradiction, assume
Rsit < R
s













Let πs1i denote the terminal value of πs1it as t tends to ∞. πs1i is finite; thus, {πs1it} itself converges:
if R̃si < Rsi , then πs1it(Rsit) = 0 for all t > t′′, where t′′ has been redefined to assure R̃si ≤ Rsit; if
Rsi ≤ R̃si and πs1i(Rsi ) = ∞, then πs1i(R) = 0 for all R > Rsi , a contradiction.3
Convergence by {πs1it} and {Rsit} means
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣πs1it+1(Rsit+1)− πsit(Rsit)∣∣∣ = 0.

























i )− ϕ′′i (Rsi )
)
, (A.8)
3The assumption that i updates subjective probabilites based on knowlege acquired from his own experience in peer review
implies that, if i is accepted at stage 1 in time t′ for review group s, then Πs1it(R) = 1 for all t > t′ and R ≥ Rit′ ;
otherwise, Πs1it(R) = 0 for all t > t′ and R ≤ Rit′ . Similarly, if i receives an R&R at stage 0 in time t′ for review group
s, then Πs0it(r) = 1 for all t > t′ and r ≥ r0it′ ; otherwise, Πsit(r) ≤ Πsit′(r) for all t > t′, r ≤ r0it′ and s ∈ Σ.
2
where Rsit → Rsi guarantees that for all (sufficiently small) ε > 0 there exists Rsit+1 = Rsit + ε.
ui > 0, c′′i (R) > 0 and ϕ′′i (R) < 0 by assumption; thus, Equation (A.8) is strictly positive. According
to Equation (A.8), {πs1it} does not converge, a contradiction.
Consider now the proposition that r0i ≤ r0it for all t past some t′′. As before, I proceed with a
contradiction. Suppose r0it < r0i for all t > t′, where t′ is large enough that r̃q0i ̸∈ (r0it′ , r0i) for all
q ̸= s and rs1it+1 ≤ rs1it for all s ∈ Σ.












= c′i(r0it)− ϕ′i(r0it) (A.9)














is the marginal change in expected stage 1 subjective utility in all states q ̸= s.



























= c′i(r0it)− ϕ′i(r0it). (A.11)
By themonotone convergence theorem, {vs1it} and {Πs0it} converge.5 If r̃s0i < r0i, thenπs0it(r0it) =










where Ωt = (r0it−1, r0it]. πs0i(r0i) = ∞ implies limΠs0it = ∞, which is impossible given Πs0it, by
definition, is a bounded function. Hence, {πs0it} is likewise convergent, so
lim
t→∞



































4If rs1it > 0 and rs1it+1 = 0, redefine t′ as t′ + 1. rs1it+1 ≤ rs1it+1 for all t > t′ precludes rs1it = 0 and rs1it+1 > 0.
5∂vs1it/∂r0it ≥ 0 and vs1it is bounded below by zero and above by ui + max{ϕi(R⋆i ) − ci(R⋆i ), 0}. πs0it(r0it) ≥ 0 since
r0it < r0it+1 (by assumption) and Πs0it is bounded by 0 and 1 (by definition).
3
For the moment, assume there exists t′′ such that for all r ∈ (r0it′′ , r0i), K is constant.6 Thus,
changes over time to the left-hand sides of Equation (A.10) and Equation (A.11) converge to 0. Yet










is strictly less than 1, where Πs0i is the finite limit of {Πs0it}, while
lim
t→∞








ϕ′i(r0it + ε)− ϕ′i(r0it)
)
= c′′i (r0i)− ϕ′′i (r0i)
is strictly greater than 0, where convergence of {r0it} guarantees that for all (sufficiently small) ε > 0
there exists r0it+1 = r0it + ε.7 Thus, a contradiction.
Although the contradiction depends on the existence of t′′, the finite sum of convergent sequences
is also convergent. Thus, for any finite number of states in which πq0it ̸= 0 changes to the left-hand sides
of Equation (A.10) and Equation (A.11) converge to 0 while changes to their right-hand sides do not.
Because the number of states is finite by assumption, this establishes the general contradiction.
Lemma 3. Πs0it(r0it) → 1s0i(r0i) and Πs1it(Rsit) → 1s1i(Rsi ).
Proof. As established in Lemma 2, Rsi ≤ Rsit for all t > t′′. If Rsi < R̃si then Rsit < R̃si for all t > t′′
where t′′ has been redefined to satisfy the latter inequality. Thus, the paper is rejected for all t > t′′
and Πs1it(R) = 0 for all R ≤ Rsit′′ and t > t′′. If R̃si ≤ Rsi , then R̃si ≤ Rsit for all t > t′′ (again t′′
redefined to satisfy this inequality). Thus, the paper is accepted for all t > t′′. Πs1it+1(R) = 1 for all
R ≥ Rsit and t > t′′; Πs1it(Rsit) converges to 1 at the limit.
Also from Lemma 2, r0i ≤ r0it for all t > t′. If r0i < r̃s0i, then the paper is rejected at stage 0 for
all t > t′, where t′ is defined so that r0it < r̃s0i for all t > t′. Define t′′ > t′ such that for all t > t′′,
the probability of having reached state s is 1; thus, Πsit(r0it) = 0 for all t > t′′. If r̃s0i ≤ r0i, then
redefine t′′ so that r̃s0i ≤ r0it for all t > t′′. The paper is accepted, s is revealed and Πs0it+1(r) = 1 for
all r ≥ r0it and t > t′′; Πs0it(r0i) converges to 1 at the limit. Thus, all is proved.
Lemma 4. There exists a unique cluster point of {(r0it, Rs
⋆
it )} for every s⋆ ∈ Σ.
Proof. Suppose {(r0it, Rs
⋆
it )} has two cluster points: (r′0i, Rs′i ) and (r′′0i, Rs′′i ). Denote their respective
convergent subsequences by {(r′0it, Rs′it)} and {(r′′0it, Rs′′it )}. Given the concavity of ϕi and convexity
of ci, a unique readability at each stage maximises Equation (8) and Equation (9) for fixed Πs0it and
Πs1it. Thus, r′0i0 = r′′0i0 and Rs′i0 = Rs′′i0 at time 0.
Assume at time t the author has chosen r′0il = r′′0il and Rs′il = Rs′′il for all l < t; thus, Πs′0it(r) =
Πs′′0it(r) and Πs′1it(R) = Πs′′1it(R) for all r and R, so the author chooses r′0it = r′′0it and Rs′it = Rs′′it
at time t as well. By the axiom of induction, {(r′0it, Rs′it)} = {(r′′0it, Rs′′it )} for all t so (r0i, Rsi ) is
unique.8 Since the choice of s was arbitrary, there exists a unique cluster point of {(r0it, Rs
⋆
it )} for
every s⋆ ∈ Σ.
Lemma 5. Consider two equivalent authors, i and k, such that
6Effectively, this assumes πq0it(r) = 0 for all r ∈ (r0it′′ , r0i) and q ̸= s and (i) Π
q
0it(r) = 0 for all q in which r0i < r̃
q
0i; (ii)




it) = 0 for all q in which r̃
q
0i < r0i; and (iii) r̃
q
0i ̸= r0i for any q. Collectively, these assumptions




1it} in every state q ̸= s and no change to the author’s marginal stage 1 objective
function given a small increase in r in any state but s.
7Although the change in 1−µsiΠs0it(r0it) between time t and t+1 converges to 0, it cannot converge faster than c′i(r0it)−
ϕ′i(r0it) unless πs0it(r0i) = ∞, which Equation (A.12) shows is not possible.
8Note that r0it is chosen before s is realised, meaning r0i is the unique cluster point of {r0it} regardless of s.
4
1. for at least one t′′ < t′, (r0it′′ , Rit′′) < (r0it′ , Rit′) and there existsK ′′ > 0 such that for no t > t′,
||(r0it, Rit)− (r0it′′ , Rit′′)|| < K ′′; and
2. (r0kt, Rkt) ≤ (r0it, Rit) for all s ∈ ΣAit and t > t′ and there exists K ′ > 0 such that for at least
one s ∈ ΣAit and no t > t′, ||(r0it, Rit)− (r0kt, Rkt)|| < K ′.










Proof. Suppose for the moment that ΣAit contains only state q and assume r0kt = r0it. Since q is the





















kt) ≤ 1s0i(r0it)1s1i(Rsit) = 1 for s = q. (A.14)
If I show that the inequality in Equation (A.14) is strict, then Equation (A.13) is true. By way of a













(Lemma 4). Together with R⋆i ≤ r0it′′ < R
q





i + ε) < 1.
9 (A.15)
Meanwhile, author i observes author k’s prior readability choices, publication history and paper





= µqi , (A.16)
where NAk and Nk are author k’s accepted and total paper counts, respectively. Because i updates Πs1it






i + ε) = 1,
a contradiction.
Similar proofs by contradiction show that the inequality in Equation (A.14) must also be strict
when Rqkt = R
q
it and r0kt < r0it in state q and when ΣAit contains more than one state.


















and define δs0ik and δs1ik as the difference in readability standards applied to authors i and k by review
group s in time t at stage 0 and 1, respectively:
δs0ik ≡ r̃s0i − r̃s0k and δs1ik ≡ R̃si − R̃sk.
9That is, Πq0i(R) = 1 for all R ≥ R
q
i . Because he chose R
⋆
i ≤ Rit′′ < Rqi at some earlier date, the author’s marginal
benefit from a higher R is decreasing when the probability of acceptance remains constant. Thus, if he optimally chooses
Rqi > max{Rit′′ , R
q
k}, it must be because there is no smaller R that satisfies Equation (A.7). This is only possible if there
is a jump discontinuity in Πq0i at R
q
i , as illustrated in Equation (A.15).
10The assumption that i updates subjective probabilities based on conclusive evidence derived from the choices and outcomes
of equivalent peers implies that, if i observes with probability 1 that in state s an equivalent author k receives an R&R at
r0k, then Πs0it(r) = 1 for all r ≥ r0k. Similarly, if i observes with probability 1 that in state s, k is accepted at Rk, then
Πs1it(R) = 1 for all R ≥ Rk.
5
I first show that Equation (10) conservatively estimates Dik when ΣAit ⊂ ΣAkt . Let r0it < Rit.
From Equation (A.17) and the definition of δs1ik,








≤ R̃si − R̃sk + e1it − e1kt
= δs1ik + e1it − e1kt, (A.18)
where sk is the review group in ΣAkt for which r̃s0k is highest. When Rit = r0it, however, Equa-
tion (A.17) and the definition of δs0ik instead imply:




















− r̃sk0k − e0kt, (A.19)
where si is the review group in ΣAit for which r̃s0i is highest. From Theorem 1’s second condition,
Rit′′ < Rit for some t′′ < t. Thus, Rit′′ < r0it. Because R⋆i is a lower bound on r0it for all s and t
(Lemma 1), R⋆i < r0it; Equation (A.19) is equivalent to
Rit −Rkt ≤ r̃si0i − r̃
sk
0k + e0it − e0kt




0k + e0it − e0kt. (A.20)




0k (by definition); Equa-
tion (A.20) implies Rit −Rkt ≤ δsi0ik if Rit = r0it. Meanwhile, Equation (A.18) implies Rit −Rkt ≤
δs1ik if r0it < Rit.
It remains to show that Equation (10) conservatively estimates Dik under Theorem 1’s weaker
Condition 3. Let Rit′′ ≤ Rkt. Differences in i and k’s preferences might influence readability—
but only up to Rit′′ . Rit′′ < Rit is motivated by i’s desire to increase his acceptance rate. Since i’s
unconditional acceptance rate is identical to k’s, any s′ in ΣAit but not in ΣAkt—e.g., because i’s utility
of acceptance is higher or cost of writing lower—is perfectly offset by some other s′′ such that—because
s′′ discriminates against i—s′′ is in ΣAkt but not in ΣAit . Thus, Rit − Rkt remains a conservative
estimate Dik.
Now let Rkt < Rit′′ . Since i’s unconditional acceptance rate at Rit is identical to k’s at Rkt, k’s
acceptance rate at Rit′′ must be at least as high as i’s at Rit. Without loss of generality, assume they
are identical. Preferences are time independent, so holding acceptance rates constant, i prefers Rit′′ to
Rit. A time t choice of Rit over Rit′′ reveals a higher probability of acceptance for the former—and
a necessarily lower probability of acceptance for i than k at Rit′′ . Given i and k are equivalent, this




Advanced vocabulary and complicated sentences are the two strongest predictors of text difficulty (Chall
and Dale, 1995). Hundreds of readability formulas exploit this relationship. In this paper, I concen-
trate on the five most widely used, tested and reliable formulas for adult reading material: Flesch
Reading Ease, Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG (Simple Measure of Gobbledegook) and Dale-
Chall (DuBay, 2004). Each are listed in Figure B.1.
Score Formula
Flesch Reading Ease 206.84− 1.02× wordssentences − 84.60×
syllables
words













Dale-Chall 3.64 + 0.05× wordssentences + 15.79×
difficult words
words
Figure B.: Calculating and interpreting readability scores
Notes. Left-hand table displays formulas used to calculate readability scores. Polysyllabic words refer to words with three or more syllables; difficult words
are those not found on a list of 3,000 words understood by 80 percent of fourth-grade readers (aged 9–10) (Chall and Dale, 1995). The graphic on the right
provides a rough guide for interpreting the scores (adapted from Flesch, 1949).
The Flesch Reading Ease formula ranks passages of text in ascending order—i.e., more readable
passages earn higher scores. The other four formulas generate grade levels estimating the minimum
years of schooling necessary to confidently understand an evaluated text—and so more readable pas-
sages earn lower scores. To minimise confusion, I multiply the four grade-level scores by negative one.
Thus, higher numbers universally correspond to clearer writing throughout this paper.
The constants in each formula vary widely as do the components used to rank vocabulary. Because
of these differences, grade-level scores rarely generate identical figures. Nevertheless, all five scores
produce similar rankings. The yellow box plot in Figure B.2 summarises 169 inter-score correlations
found in 26 studies. The median is 0.87.
Readability scores correlate with (i) oral reading fluency, (ii) human judgement, (iii) reading com-
prehension tests and (iv) the cloze procedure.11 The dark blue box plots in Figure B.2 summarise 167
correlations in 38 published cross-validation studies.
Other studies have validated readability scores against surrogate measures of reading comprehen-
sion. More readable high school and college-level correspondence courses have higher completion
rates (Klare and Smart, 1973). More readable academic journals enjoy larger readerships (Richardson,
1977; Swanson, 1948); their most readable articles win more awards (Sawyer et al., 2008) and are
downloaded more often (Guerini et al., 2012).
More readable abstracts are also (generally) cited more frequently (see Dowling et al. (2018) and
McCannon (2019) and Figure B.2). They are also more likely to be published in top-five and other
higher ranking journals (Marino Fages, 2020). In a blog post, Lukas Püttmann compares abstract
readability to page views of VoxEU.org columns: more readable columns are viewed three percent more
often (Püttmann, 2017). Evidence from other studies linking readability and citations is, however,
weaker (Berninger et al., 2017; Laband and Taylor, 1992; Lei and Yan, 2016). My own data suggest a
positive relationship in papers published after 1990—and particularly those published post–2000—but
no relationship before that (Figure B.2).
11Oral reading fluency is generally measured as the number of words read aloud correctly per minute. The cloze procedure
ranks passages of text according to average readers’ ability to correctly guess randomly deleted words.
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Figure B.: Readability score validity
Notes. Top figure displays box plots of correlations between alternative measures of text difficulty and the Flesch Reading Ease, Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog,
SMOG and Dale-Chall readability scores. It includes 336 correlations found in 55 mostly peer reviewed papers. (See Appendix B.5 for the list of included
studies and information on how they were selected.) Bottom figures plot abstracts’ Flesch Reading Ease scores against their articles’ citation counts (inverse
hyperbolic sine (asinh) transformation) for the samples of top-four (excluding AER Papers & Proceedings) articles published before 1990 (left; 3,732 articles)
and post-2000 (right; 3,410 articles). Each point represents the mean (in both dimensions) of roughly 170–180 observations. †Includes two studies which
assessed readability using the Readability Assessment INstrument (RAIN), a comprehensive framework based on 14 variables, e.g., coeherence, writing style,
illustrations and typography.
Thanks to high predictive power and ease of use, readability formulas are widely employed in edu-
cation, business and government. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission encourages clearer
financial disclosure forms benchmarked against the Gunning Fog, Flesch-Kincaid and Flesch Reading
Ease scores (Cox, 2007). The formulas have also guided readability assessments of, inter alia, standard-
ised test questions (Chall et al., 1983; Chall et al., 1977), medical inserts (e.g., Wallace et al., 2008),
technical manuals (e.g., Hussin et al., 2012; Klare and Smart, 1973), health pamphlets (e.g., Foster and
Rhoney, 2002; Meade and Byrd, 1989) and data security policies (Alkhurayyif and Weir, 2017).
In research, readability scores are considered objective proxies for “complexity”. Enke (2018) con-
trols for language sophistication using the Flesch Reading Ease formula in a study of moral values in
U.S. presidential elections. Spirling (2016) employs the same score to show that British parliamentar-
ians simplified speeches to appeal to less educated voters in the wake of the Great Reform Act. Legal
research has found that judges are more reliant on legislative history when interpreting complex legal
statutes, as measured by the Flesch-Kincaid formula (Law and Zaring, 2010). In finance, the scores
have linked clarity of financial communication to better firm and market financial health (Biddle et
al., 2009; Jansen, 2011; Li, 2008), larger investment and trading volume (De Franco et al., 2015;
Lawrence, 2013; Miller, 2010; Thörnqvist, 2015) and lower demand for—albeit higher reliability of—
outside research by sell-side analysts (Lehavy et al., 2011).12
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Figure B.: Readability by year and JEL code
Notes. Figure on the left displays five-year moving averages of abstracts’ Flesch Reading Ease (left axis) and −1 × Dale-Chall (right axis) readability scores.
Sample restricted to the years 1987–2015 (6,176 articles). Figure on the right displays abstracts’ Flesch Reading Ease scores averaged over primary JEL
classifications. Data only available after 1990 (5,216 articles).
B.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure B.3 breaks down the sample’s abstract readability by publication year and primary JEL classifi-
cation. Table B.1 displays data coverage by journal and decade.
The left-hand graph in Figure B.3 displays readability scores (Flesch Reading Ease and −1 ×
Dale Chall) between 1987–2015. Neither scores have changed drastically over the roughly 30-year
period. The right-hand graph in Figure B.3 shows the Flesch Reading Ease broken down by primary
JEL classification. There is some slight evidence that papers in Economic History are better written
whereas those in quantitative methods less so. Otherwise, the score does not appear to differ much by
field.
Table B.: Article count, by journal and decade
Decade AER ECA JPE QJE Total
1950–59 120 120
1960–69 343 184 527
1970–79 660 633 1 1,294
1980–89 180 648 562 401 1,791
1990–99 476 443 478 409 1,806
2000–09 693 520 408 413 2,034
2010–15 732 384 181 251 1,548
Total 2,081 3,118 2,446 1,475 9,120
Notes. Included is every article published between January 1950 and Decem-
ber 2015 for which an English abstract was found (i) on journal websites or
websites of third party digital libraries or (ii) printed in the article itself. Papers
published in the May issue of AER (Papers & Proceedings) are excluded. Final
row and column display total article counts by journal and decade, respectively.
B.3 Measurement error
Readability scores fail to capture many elements relevant to reading comprehension, including gram-
mar—e.g., active vs. passive tense (Coleman, 1964; Coleman, 1965)—legibility—e.g., typeface or
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layout—and content—e.g., coherence, organisation and general appeal (Armbruster, 1984; Kemper,
1983; Kintsch and Miller, 1984; Meyer, 1982). Nevertheless, “long sentences generally correspond to
complex syntactic structures, infrequent words generally refer to complex concepts, and hard texts will
generally lead to harder questions about their content” (Kintsch and Miller, 1984, p. 222).
Still, readability scores’ low causal power raises legitimate concerns about measurement error. As
long as this error does not partially correlate with the variable of interest (gender), the analytical results
I present in this paper attenuate toward zero (classical measurement error). Unfortunately, they are
systematically biased in an unknown direction if it does (non-classical measurement error).
Sources of non-classical measurement error are threefold: (a) grammatical, spelling and transcrip-
tion errors in the textual input; (b) errors in the estimates of vocabulary complexity and sentence length
introduced by automating their calculation; or (c) embodied in the jump from using these two variables
to infer readability.
Conditional on accurate calculation, readability scores combine very precise estimates of vocabulary
complexity with almost perfectmeasures of sentence length (for a discussion, seeChall andDale, 1995).
The weighted average of these two variables is informative in much the same way that inferences about
readability are. Thus, measurement error related to (c) should only shift superficial interpretation of
observed gender differences—from “women are better writers” to “women use simpler words and write
shorter sentences”—but leave conclusions deduced from them intact.
Nevertheless, I try to minimise measurement error from (c) by using abstracts as textual input. Ab-
stracts are self-contained, universally summarise the research and are the first and most frequently read
part of an article (King et al., 2006). Additionally, they follow a more standardised layout compared
to other parts of a manuscript: they are generally surrounded by ample whitespace and most editorial
management systems anyway reproduce them in pre-formatted cover pages. These factors suggest a
relatively homogenous degree of review across journals and subject matter and limit the impact that
physical layout, figures and surrounding text have on readability.
Moreover, prior research suggests authors write in a stylistically consistent manner across the ab-
stract, introduction and discussion sections of a paper. According to an analysis of published education
and psychology articles, within-manuscript correlations of Flesch Reading Ease scores range from 0.64
(abstracts vs. introductions) to 0.74 (abstracts vs. discussions) (Hartley et al., 2003). Plavén-Sigray
et al. (2017) also found a strong positive correlation using full text articles from several scientific jour-
nals. Figure B.4 plots abstract readability against the readability of a passage from the introduction for
339 NBER Working Papers eventually published in a top-four journal. It suggests a similarly positive
relationship holds in economics, as well.13
In my opinion, non-classical measurement error from (a) and (b) poses a bigger concern to the
identification mapped out in this paper. I have taken several steps to reduce it. First, abstract text
is also ideal for calculating readability: 100–200 words containing few score-distorting features of
academic writing—e.g., citations, abbreviations and equations (Dale and Chall, 1948). Additionally,
most abstracts have been previously converted to accurate machine-readable text by digital libraries and
bibliographic databases, curbing errors in transcription.
Second, I carefully proofread the text in order to identify (and fix) remaining transcription er-
rors,14 eliminate non-sentence-ending full stops, and replace typesetting code—typically used to ren-
der equations—with equivalent unicode characters.15 Readability scores were determined using the
modified text.
13For comparison, I randomly assigned abstracts to introductions in 1,000 simulated samples. The average coefficient of
correlation between abstract text readability and the readability of a passage of text from a randomly selected introduction
was –0.0006 for the Gunning Fog score and 0.0007 for the Flesch-Kincaid score.
14E.g., words in transcribed text are often inappropriately hyphenated—typically because the word was divided at the end of
the line in the original text.
15When no exact replacement existed, characters were chosen that mimicked as much as possible the equation’s original
intent while maintaining the same character and word counts. (Equations in abstracts generally only occur in Econometrica







































15 20 25 30
Abstract readability
Gunning Fog
Figure B.: Abstract vs. article readability
Notes. Figures plot abstract readability against the readability of a 150–200 word passage of text from the introduction of the same paper. β is the slope of the
regression line (robust standard errors in parentheses). Sample only includes NBER Working Papers eventually published in a top-four economics journal
with a heading explicitly titled “Introduction” (339 abstract-article pairs). Data are grouped into roughly 20 equal-sized bins; each point represents the mean
(in both dimensions) of about 16–17 observations. Non-abstract text kindly provided by Henrik Kleven and Dana Scott (Kleven, 2018). Readability scores
calculated using the R readability package.
Finally, some programs that calculate scores rely on unclear, inconsistent and possibly inaccurate
algorithms to count words and syllables, identify sentence terminations and check whether a word is
on Dale-Chall’s easy word list (for a discussion, see Sirico, 2007). To transparently handle these issues
and eliminate ambiguity in how the scores were calculated, I wrote the Python module Textatistic.
Its code and documentation are available on GitHub; a brief description is provided in Appendix B.4.
For added robustness, I also re-calculate scores and replicate most results using the R readability
package (Appendix I). Coefficients are very similar to—and (to my chagrin) standard errors universally
smaller than—those presented in the body of the paper.
B.4 Textatistic
I wrote the Python module Textatistic to transparently calculate the readability scores in this study.
The code and documentation are available on GitHub; I provide a brief description here.
To determine sentence count, the program replaces common abbreviations with their full text,16
decimals with a zero and deletes question and exclamation marks used in an obvious, mid-sentence
rhetorical manner.17 The remaining full stops, exclamation and question marks are assumed to end a
sentence and counted.
Next, hyphens are deleted from commonly hyphenated single words such as “co-author” and the
rest are replaced with spaces, remaining punctuation is removed and words are split into an array based
on whitespace. Word count is the length of that array.18
An attempt is made to match each word to one on an expanded Dale-Chall list. The count of
difficult words is the number that are not found. This expanded list, available on GitHub, consists of
8,490 words. It is based on the original 3,000 words, but also includes verb tenses, comparative and
superlative adjective forms, plural nouns, etc. It was created by first adding to the Dale-Chall list every
conceivable alternate form of each word using Python’s Pattern library. To eliminate nonsense words,
the text of 94 English novels published online with Project Gutenberg were matched with words on
the expanded list. Words not found in any of the novels were deleted.
Syllable counts are based on the C library libhyphen, an implementation of the hyphenation algo-
rithm from Liang (1983). Liang (1983)’s algorithm is used by TEX’s typesetting system. libhyphen is
employed by most open source text processing software, including OpenOffice.
16Abbreviations which do not include full-stops are not altered. I manually replaced common abbreviations, such as “i.e.”
and “U.S.” with their abbreviated versions, sans full stops.
17For example, “?).” is replaced with “).”.
18Per Chall and Dale (1995), hyphenated words count as two (or more) words.
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B.5 Studies included in meta analysis
Below are the studies included in the analysis from Figure B.2, which summarises correlations between
readability scores and alternative measures of reading comprehension found in other research. A few
notes on the criteria for inclusion and how some correlations were determined:
• I include only documents produced for theU.S. government or published peer reviewed studies—
with the exception of the present paper, Benoit et al. (2017) and results from dissertations that
were presented and discussed in a peer reviewed manuscript.
• I include a small number of studies with correlations between alternative readability measures
and the number of words not listed on the Dale-Chall word list. In all other cases, however,
correlations with only parts of a score (e.g., syllables per words) are omitted.
• A few earlier studies calculated and listed various readability measures for many passages of
text, but did not report coefficients of correlation between them. I manually calculated these
correlations myself.
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C Description of control variables
Institutions. For every article I recorded authors’ institutional affiliations. Individual universities in
U.S. State University Systems were coded separately (e.g., UCLA and UC Berkeley) but think tanks
and research organisations operating under the umbrella of a single university were grouped together
with that university (e.g., the Cowles Foundation and Yale University). Institutions linked to multiple
universities are coded as separate entities (e.g., École des hautes études en sciences sociales).
In total, 1,039 different institutions were identified. For each institution, I count the number of
articles in which it was listed as an affiliation in a given year and smooth the average over a five-year
period.19 Institutions are ranked on an annual basis using this figure and then grouped to create fifteen
dynamic dummy variables. Institutions ranked in positions 1–9 are assigned individual dummy vari-
ables. Those in positions 10–59 are grouped in bins of 10 to form six dummy variables. Institutions
ranked 60 or above were collectively grouped to form a final dummy variable.20 When multiple institu-
tions are associated with an observation, only the dummy variable with the highest rank is used, i.e., the
highest-ranked institution per author when data is analysed at the author-level and the highest-ranked
institution for all authors when data is analysed at the article-level.
Citations. I use article citations from Web of Science. Unless otherwise mentioned, citation counts
are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine function (asinh).
Author prominence. I generate 37 dummy variables that group authors by their career-total top-
five journal (AER, Econometrica, JPE, QJE and REStud) publications as of December 2015 (denoted
by max. T5). For example, Jean Tirole forms one group (59 articles); James Heckman and Gene
Grossman form another (34 articles).21
Author seniority. To account for author seniority, I control for an author’s number of top-five (AER,
Econometrica, JPE, QJE and REStud) publications at the time a paper was published (denoted by
max. t5). For co-authored articles, only the data corresponding to the most prolific author is used.22
English fluency. To account for English fluency, most regressions include a dummy variable equal
to one if an article is co-authored by at least one native (or almost native) English speaker. I assume an
author is “native” if he: (i) was raised in an English-speaking country; (ii) obtained all post-secondary
eduction from English speaking institutions;23 or (iii) spoke with no discernible (to me) non-native
accent. This information was almost always found—by me or a research assistant—in authors’ CVs,
websites, Wikipedia articles, faculty bios or obituaries. In the few instances where the criteria were
ambiguously satisfied—or no information was available—I asked friends and colleagues of the author
or inferred English fluency from the author’s first name, country of residence or surname (in that
order).24
19Blank (1991) ranks institutions by National Academy of Science departmental rankings. Those and similar official rankings
are based largely on the number of papers published in the journals analysed here.
20In a December 2017 versions of this paper (see my website), I construct a more comprehensive—but static—set of institu-
tional controls. Results are very similar to those presented here. (See also Hengel (2016).)
21This quality/productivity control has several limitations: (i) it relies on publication counts—not necessarily an accurate
measure of “quality”; (ii) it discounts current junior economists’ productivity; and (iii) it generates somewhat inconsistent
groupings—for example, two authors have published 34 articles, but only one author has published 29 ( Joseph Stiglitz).
22In Hengel (2016, p. 42 and p. 44), I experiment with another measure of quality—the order an article appeared in an issue.
It has no noticeable impact on the coefficient of interest or its standard error.
23Non-native speakers who meet this criteria have been continuously exposed to spoken and written English since age 18.
This continuous exposure likely means they write as well as native English speakers. To qualify as an English-speaking
institution, all courses—not just the course studied by an author—must be primarily taught in English. E.g., McGill
University is classified as English-speaking; University of Bonn is not (although most of its graduate economics instruction
is in English).
24I also conducted a primitive surname analysis (see Hengel, 2016, pp. 35–36). It suggests that the female authors in my
data are no more or less likely to be native English speakers.
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Field. I create dummy variables corresponding to the 20 primary and over 700 tertiary JEL cate-
gories to control for subject matter. The JEL system was significantly revised in 1990; because exact
mapping from one system to another is not possible, I collected these data only for articles published
post-reform—about 60 percent of the dataset. Codes were recorded whenever found in the text of
an article or on the websites where bibliographic information was scraped. Remaining articles were
classified using codes from the American Economic Association’s Econlit database.
Editorial policy. To control for editorial policy, I recorded editor/editorial board member names
from issue mastheads. AER and Econometrica employ an individual to oversee policy. JPE and QJE do
not generally name one lead editor and instead rely on boards composed of four to five faculty members
at the University of Chicago and Harvard, respectively.25 REStud is also headed by an editorial board,
the size of which has been gradually increasing—from two members in the 1970s to 7–8 members
today. Members are also located all over the world.
Editor controls are based on distinct lead editor/editorial boards—i.e., they differ by at least one
member. Among top four journals, 74 groups are formed in this manner. REStud adds another 34.26
Family commitments. To control for motherhood’s impact on revision times, I recorded children’s
birth years for women with at least one entirely female-authored paper in Econometrica. I personally
(and, I apologise, rather unsettlingly) gleaned this information from published profiles, CVs, acknowl-
edgements, Wikipedia, personal websites, Facebook pages, background checks and local school dis-
trict/popular extra-curricular activity websites.27 Exact years were recordedwhenever found; otherwise,
they were approximated by subtracting a child’s actual or estimated age from the date the source ma-
terial was posted online. In several instances, I obtained this information from acquaintances, friends
and colleagues or by asking the woman directly.
If an exhaustive search turned up no reference to children, I assumed the woman in question did
not have any.28
25In recent years, JPE has been published under the aegis of a lead editor.
26Given the size of Restud ’s editorial board and the fact that members serve fixed 3–4 full-year terms, editorial controls are
highly correlated with year fixed effects. Moreover, unlike at JPE and QJE, editors are not located at the same institution.
Thus, editor fixed effects may be less informative about editorial policy at REStud than they are for the other four journals.
27While the information I found was publicly available, I apologise for the obvious intrusion.
28Given its sensitive nature, children’s birth years are not currently available on my website (unlike most of the other data in
this paper).
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D Section 3.1, suplemental output
D.1 Readability differences across journals
Table D.1 shows the coefficients on the journal dummies in column (2), Table 2. They compare AER’s
readability to the readability of Econometrica, JPE and QJE.










Econometrica −12.40*** −4.42*** −4.25*** −2.62*** −0.67***
(1.91) (0.41) (0.47) (0.38) (0.16)
JPE −5.62*** −3.99*** −3.41*** −1.83*** 0.18
(1.91) (0.41) (0.47) (0.38) (0.16)
QJE 1.54** −0.02 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.27***
(0.60) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
Notes. Figures are the estimated coefficients on the journal dummy variables from (2) in Table 2.
Each contrasts the readability of the journals in the left-hand column with the readability of AER.
Standard errors clustered on editor in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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D.2 Gender and readability, by JEL code
Figure D.1 displays results from an ordinary least squares regression on the Dale-Chall score; regressors
are: (i) ratio of female co-authors; (ii) dummies for each primary JEL code; (iii) interactions from (i)
and (ii); (iv) controls for editor, journal, year, institution and English fluency; and (v) quality controls—
citation count, max. T5 fixed effects (author prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority).29 Due to
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Figure D.: Gender differences in readability, by JEL classification
Notes. Sample 5,777 articles, including 561 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 12). Codes A, B, M and P dropped due to small sample sizes of
female-authored papers (see Footnote 29). Estimates from an OLS regression of:
Rj = β0 + β1female ratioj + β2 Jj + β3 female ratioj × Jj + θXj + εj ,
where Rj is the readability score for article j; female ratioj is paper j ’s ratio of female authors to total authors; Jj is a 15×1 column vector with kth entry a
binary variable equal to one if article j is classified as the kth JEL code; Xj is a vector of editor, journal, year, institution and English language dummies, Nj
(number of co-authors on paper j) and quality controls (citation count (asinh), max. T5 fixed effects (author prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority));
εj is the error term. Left-hand graph shows marginal effects of female ratio for each JEL code (β1 + βk3 ). The mean effect at observed JEL codes is 0.15
(standard error 0.049). Right-hand graph displays interaction terms (βk3 ). Horizontal lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals from standard errors
adjusted for clustering on editor.
Points reflect marginal effects across JEL classification; bars represent 90 percent confidence inter-
vals from standard errors clustered by editor. The mean effect at observed JEL codes is 0.15 (standard
error 0.049). This estimate coincides with results in Table H.1—women’s papers require six fewer
weeks of schooling to understand—and is highly significant.
Women earn higher marks for clarity in 11 out of 15 categories; only four are at least weakly signif-
icant: Q (Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics),
N (Economic History), J (Labour Economics) and D (Microeconomics). Men may be better writers
in C (Mathematical and Quantitative Methods), L (Industrial Organisation), O (Economic Develop-
ment, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth) and H (Public Economics); none, however,
are statistically different from zero. Figure D.1’s right-hand graph displays coefficients from inter-
acting the ratio of female co-authors with each JEL code. Q and N are (weakly) significantly above
the mean, H significantly below it. Remaining categories are not statistically different from the mean
effect.
In general, sample sizes are small and estimates imprecise—only Labour Economics and Microe-
conomics contain more than 100 papers written only by women (the others average 35). Nevertheless,
Figure D.1 suggests two things. First, the mostly insignificant interaction terms indicate outlier fields
are probably not driving journals’ gender readability gap—nor is any specific field bucking the trend.
29Codes A, B, M and P are dropped due to insufficient number of female-authored papers: each had fewer than 10 papers
authored only by women. No paper is classified under category Y.
30See Hengel (2016, pp. 42–43) for a version of Figure D.1 excluding AER Papers & Proceedings articles.
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Second, the number of women in a field appears to have little effect on the size of the gap: Agriculture/
Environment has one of the lowest concentrations of female-authored papers—but Economic History
has one of the highest (Labour Economics falls between the two). Of course, Economic History pa-
pers are still overwhelmingly—as in 74 percent—penned just by men. But given the readability gap is
present in subfields with both above- and below-average rates of sole female authorship, women may
need to be better writers even where more of them publish.
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E Section 3.2, suplemental output
E.1 Table 4, full output (first and final columns)
Table E.1 displays coefficients from estimating Equation (1) using OLS. The first row displays coef-
ficients on working paper score (RjW ); the second row shows the coefficient on female ratio (β1P ),
which is also shown in the first column of Table 4. Remaining rows present estimated coefficients
on the other (non-fixed effects) control variables: max. t5 (author seniority), max. T5 (author promi-
nence), number of citations (asinh) and a dummy variable equal to one if article j is authored by at
least one native English speaker.
Similarly, Table E.2 displays coefficients from estimating Equation (2). The coefficient on female
ratio corresponds to estimates presented in the final column of Table 4.
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, we do not observe the citations papers would have received had they
not undergone peer review. Nevertheless, Table E.1 suggests a negative and marginally significant re-
lationship between published readability conditional on draft readability; Table E.2 suggests a negative
relationship or no relationship between citations and the readability improvements authors make dur-
ing peer review.31 Thus, they tentatively point toward women being asked to makes changes to their
papers that do not ultimately improve their underlying quality.










RjW 0.834*** 0.756*** 0.774*** 0.791*** 0.841***
(0.022) (0.037) (0.036) (0.028) (0.016)
Female ratio 1.307** 0.515*** 0.513*** 0.304** 0.177***
(0.575) (0.174) (0.185) (0.128) (0.052)
Nj 0.204 0.084 0.110 0.073* 0.007
(0.175) (0.063) (0.070) (0.043) (0.013)
Max. t5 −0.006 0.001 0.003 0.002 −0.005
(0.058) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.003)
Max. T5 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003
(0.045) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.002)
No. citations (asinh) −0.334* −0.066* −0.071 −0.057* −0.007
(0.180) (0.039) (0.046) (0.030) (0.015)
Native speaker −0.238 0.000 0.011 −0.021 −0.039
(0.422) (0.141) (0.185) (0.113) (0.028)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Year×Journal effects 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,709 NBER working papers; 1,707 published articles. Estimates exclude 279 pre-internet
double-blind reviewed articles. Coefficients from OLS regression of Equation (1). First row is the coefficient
on RjW ; second row is β1P , and corresponds to results presented in the first column of Table 4. Coefficients
on quality controls (citation counts (asinh), max. T5 (author prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority)) also
shown. Standard errors clustered on editor (in parentheses). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
31The coefficients on citations is negative and marginally significant only when controlling for RjW or using at the change
in citations as the dependant variable. Otherwise, readability positively correlates with both working paper and published
paper readability (results available on request; see also Appendix B.3).
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Female ratio 0.941 0.437** 0.413** 0.237* 0.126**
(0.597) (0.189) (0.197) (0.122) (0.051)
Nj 0.254 0.096 0.116* 0.080* 0.010
(0.227) (0.062) (0.068) (0.046) (0.018)
Max. t5 −0.017 0.001 0.005 0.002 −0.008*
(0.059) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.005)
Max. T5 0.019 0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.005
(0.036) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003)
No. citations (asinh) −0.351 −0.073 −0.088 −0.067 −0.007
(0.224) (0.059) (0.069) (0.044) (0.017)
Native speaker −0.223 0.061 0.041 −0.021 −0.020
(0.458) (0.156) (0.172) (0.106) (0.032)
Constant 0.896 0.271 0.316 0.271 −0.054
(1.147) (0.304) (0.327) (0.194) (0.087)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Year×Journal effects 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,709 NBER working papers; 1,707 published articles. Estimates exclude 279 pre-internet
double-blind reviewed articles. Coefficients from OLS regression of Equation (2). First row corresponds to re-
sults presented in the final column of Table 4. Coefficients on quality controls (citation counts (asinh), max. T5
(author prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority)) also shown. Standard errors clustered on editor (in paren-
theses). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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E.2 Table 4, accounting for field
As argued in Section 3.2 using the change in score as the dependent variable washes out any impact
field may have on readability.32 Moreover, these results—reported in the final column of Table 4—are
almost identical to FGLS estimates—shown in the penultimate column—suggesting the latter are not
biased by excluding them, either.
For added robustness, however, I include them here. Table E.3 replicates the analysis including
dummy variables for each primary JEL category. As expected, figures are similar to—but standard
errors somewhat higher than—those presented in Table 4.










Flesch Reading Ease 1.27** 2.74*** 3.58*** 0.84 0.84
(0.57) (1.03) (1.17) (0.59) (0.60)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.54*** 0.46** 0.88*** 0.42** 0.42**
(0.18) (0.23) (0.30) (0.20) (0.20)
Gunning Fog 0.49*** 0.53** 0.90*** 0.37* 0.37*
(0.17) (0.23) (0.32) (0.22) (0.22)
SMOG 0.28** 0.38*** 0.58*** 0.20 0.20
(0.11) (0.15) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14)
Dale-Chall 0.14*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.10* 0.10*
(0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,505 NBER working papers; 1,503 published articles. Estimates exclude 198 pre-internet double-blind
reviewed articles (see ??). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 4, except that fixed effects for primary
JEL categories are included in all specifications. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
32As long as field only impacts the readability of a paper when it is first drafted—e.g., if concepts in certain areas are easier
to explain—then the change in readability between versions is independent of it.
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E.3 Semi-blind review
Table 5 suggests double-blind review may have successfully reduced peer review’s impact on the gender
readability gap before the internet. Unfortunately, it has been less effective after the internet. I dropped
NBER–published article pairs published pre-internet (i.e., before Google’s incorporation in 1998) and
replicated Table 5 with Blindj equal to 1 if article j was subjected to an official policy of double-blind
review after the internet. The results, presented in Table E.4, suggests a positive gender readability
gap in both samples. If anything, blinded peer review coupled with an easy alternative for determining
authors’ identities seems to exacerbate gender differences.










Blind post-internet 1.15 0.62** 0.61* 0.42* 0.02
(1.15) (0.31) (0.36) (0.24) (0.13)
Non-blind 0.74 0.28 0.22 0.08 0.15**
(0.94) (0.30) (0.32) (0.19) (0.07)
Difference 0.41 0.33 0.38 0.34 −0.13
(1.60) (0.45) (0.53) (0.34) (0.17)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,380 NBER working papers; 1,378 published articles. Table replicates Table 5 with Blindj equal to 1
if article j was subjected to an official policy of double-blind review after the internet. (NBER–published article pairs
published pre-internet are dropped.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Editors knew submitting authors’ identities—and therefore genders—both before and after the in-
ternet as well as under single- and double-blind review. Thus, the reversed gap in double-blind review
pre-internet (Table 5) and positive gap post-internet (Table E.4) suggest bias from referees—as op-
posed to editors—may drive observed gender differences in readability.33 Nevertheless, this conclusion
is based on noisy (often insignificant) estimates. Please make it with caution.
33Many thanks to an anonymous referee for suggested this idea.
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E.4 Time between working paper release and journal submission
Figure E.1 displays a histogram of the length of time between a working paper’s release and submission
to Econometrica. It suggests most manuscripts are submitted to peer review at the same time or before
they are released as NBER Working Papers. This is especially true of female-authored manuscripts.34
Assuming similar submission-release patterns at AER, JPE and QJE, timing independence appears to
be violated in only a small number of predominately male-authored papers.35
Figure E.: Distribution of months between NBER release and journal submission
Notes. Sample 228 articles published in Econometrica. Pink represents papers with at least one female co-author (41 articles); blue
are papers with no female co-authors (187 articles). Figure shows the distribution of the time difference (in months) between a
paper’s release as an NBER Working Paper and its submission to Econometrica (where it is eventually published). Observations on
the right-hand-side of the y-axis were submitted to peer review first and released as working papers second; observations on the
left-hand-side of the y-axis were released as working papers first and submitted to peer review second.
34Only 15 and 21 percent of female- and male-authored papers, respectively, were submitted to Econometrica after previously
being released as an NBER Working Paper.
35Additionally, most drafts have already been widely circulated prior to NBER Working Paper release. Average acknowledg-
ment length in NBER Working Papers is 133 words. Most authors thank at least one person for comments—indeed, the
vast majority thank several—and mention having previously presented the research in conferences and seminars. Com-
bined with evidence from Figure E.1, this suggests that gender differences in one’s propensity to receive non-peer-review
feedback only affects working paper readability and thus should not bias the results presented in Table 4.
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E.5 Abstract word limits
I attribute the change in readability between draft and final versions of a paper to the peer review
process.36 Yet NBER working paper abstracts can be of any length while abstracts published in Econo-
metrica and AER cannot—they are restricted to 150 and 100 words, respectively. Observed readability
gaps could consequently result from gender differences in how authors conform to these limits.
To test this hypothesis, I replicated the analysis described Section 3.2.3 (and shown in Table 4)
on the subset of articles with draft abstracts below the official minimum word limit of the journals in
which they were eventually published. Results are shown in Table E.5. Despite dropping about 40
percent of observations, coefficient magnitudes are similar to those reported in Table 4; standard errors
are somewhat larger.37










Flesch Reading Ease 0.82 2.33 2.78* 0.45 0.45
(0.86) (1.47) (1.56) (0.83) (0.86)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.53** 0.07 0.59* 0.52* 0.52*
(0.26) (0.34) (0.33) (0.27) (0.28)
Gunning Fog 0.55** 0.23 0.73** 0.50* 0.50*
(0.24) (0.38) (0.34) (0.26) (0.27)
SMOG 0.27* 0.23 0.45** 0.22 0.22
(0.15) (0.26) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16)
Dale-Chall 0.23*** 0.33*** 0.50*** 0.17** 0.17**
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,067 NBER working papers; 1,065 published articles. Estimates are identical to those in Table 4, except
that the sample includes only papers with an NBER abstract below the official minimum word limit of the journal in
which it was eventually published. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
36See Section 3.2.4 for a more detailed discussion and justification of the assumptions underpinning this claim.
37Results are similar if I also include a control for the number of words in the working paper version of the abstract (available
on request).
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F Section 3.3, supplemental output
F.1 Authors’ average readability scores for their first, mean and final papers
Table F.1 displays authors’ average readability scores for their first, mean and final top-four papers.
Grade-level scores (Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG and Dale-Chall) have been multiplied by
negative one (see Section 2.2). Sample excludes authors with fewer than three publications.
As their careers advance, women do write more clearly: their average readability scores are 1–5
percent higher than the readability of their first papers; their latest papers 1–7 percent. For a man,
however, his average and last paper may be more poorly written than the first.










Average first paper score
Men 39.37 −13.77 −17.54 −15.35 −11.00
(0.31) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03)
Women 39.20 −13.81 −17.36 −15.18 −11.00
(1.15) (0.24) (0.29) (0.21) (0.10)
Average mean score
Men 39.59 −13.69 −17.41 −15.26 −11.02
(0.19) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Women 41.20 −13.36 −16.92 −14.92 −10.91
(0.72) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14) (0.07)
Average final paper score
Men 39.54 −13.71 −17.41 −15.24 −11.08
(0.33) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03)
Women 41.99 −13.10 −16.58 −14.66 −10.90
(1.06) (0.21) (0.25) (0.18) (0.11)
Notes. Sample 1,675 authors; includes only authors with three or more publications. Figures are average
readability scores for authors’ first, mean and last published articles. Grade-level scores have been multiplied by
negative one (see ??). Standard errors in parentheses.
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F.2 Table 6, tests of coefficient equality
Table F.2 tests equality of coefficients in each column of Table 6. It rejects equality between coefficients
in the first and third columns at p < 0.01 for the Flesch Reading Ease, Flesch-Kincaid and SMOG
scores and p < 0.05 for the Gunning Fog and Dale-Chall scores.
Table F.: Table F.2, equality test statistics
t4 = 1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 1 vs. 4–5 1 vs. ≥ 6 2 vs. 3
Flesch Reading Ease 1.172 11.204 1.670 0.681 6.495
Flesch-Kincaid 0.074 11.996 1.672 0.744 9.607
Gunning Fog 0.181 11.394 2.036 0.804 8.764
SMOG 0.338 10.536 2.052 1.006 7.014
Dale-Chall 0.185 4.787 1.698 1.846 3.293
Notes. χ2 test statistics from Wald tests of β1 (Equation (H.1)) equality across estimation results in Table 6.
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F.3 Co-variate balance
Table F.3 compares co-variate balance pre- and post-match.38 The first column displays averages for
the 121 female authors with at least three publications in the data. The first column of the first panel
(“Pre-match means”) displays corresponding averages for the 1,554 male authors with three or more
publications. The first column of the second panel (“Post-match means”) displays (weighted) averages
for the 110 male authors matched with a female author. Table F.4, Table F.5 and Table F.6 compare
co-variate balance when restricted to matched pairs with Dik ̸= 0.
Gender differences are smaller post-match; t-statistics are likewise closer to zero. Moreover, co-
variates remain well balanced—and resemble averages in the matched sample—in both Dik > 0 (dis-
crimination against women) and Dik < 0 (discrimination against men) samples (not shown).
38Matches were generated in Stata using psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).
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Table F.: Pre- and post-matching summary statistics
Pre-match means Post-match means
Women Men Difference t Men Difference t
t = 1 inst. rank 18.47 15.26 3.22 1.85 15.26 1.89 0.79
Max. citations 406.33 267.07 139.27 1.78 267.07 −73.52 −2.00
Fraction of articles per decade
1950–59 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.57 0.00 0.00
1960–69 0.04 0.00 0.04 2.87 0.00 0.00 −0.12
1970–79 0.11 0.01 0.09 4.72 0.01 0.00 0.10
1980–89 0.18 0.08 0.10 4.37 0.08 0.01 0.55
1990–99 0.21 0.19 0.02 1.00 0.19 0.00 −0.07
2000–09 0.26 0.41 −0.15 −5.90 0.41 −0.01 −0.22
2010–15 0.20 0.31 −0.11 −4.19 0.31 0.00 −0.09
Fraction of articles per journal
AER 0.25 0.39 −0.14 −5.54 0.39 −0.01 −0.29
Econometrica 0.34 0.17 0.17 5.12 0.17 0.07 1.77
JPE 0.24 0.18 0.07 2.62 0.18 0.00 −0.10
QJE 0.17 0.27 −0.10 −4.79 0.27 −0.06 −1.85
Number of articles per JEL code
A General 0.02 0.04 −0.02 −1.59 0.04 0.00 0.00
B Methodology 0.02 0.00 0.02 1.44 0.00 0.00
C Quant. methods 0.81 0.64 0.17 1.03 0.64 −0.07 −0.44
D Microeconomics 1.79 1.64 0.15 0.68 1.64 −0.03 −0.15
E Macroeconomics 0.62 0.58 0.04 0.35 0.58 −0.07 −0.55
F International 0.31 0.39 −0.08 −0.85 0.39 −0.09 −0.75
G Finance 0.52 0.60 −0.07 −0.67 0.60 −0.13 −0.90
H Public 0.36 0.45 −0.10 −1.09 0.45 −0.17 −2.08
I Health, welfare, edu 0.34 0.88 −0.53 −5.40 0.88 −0.36 −2.01
J Labour 0.76 1.26 −0.49 −3.39 1.26 −0.41 −2.18
K Law and econ 0.14 0.20 −0.06 −1.14 0.20 −0.07 −1.03
L Industrial org 0.57 0.73 −0.16 −1.47 0.73 −0.23 −1.78
M Marketing/acct 0.13 0.17 −0.04 −0.93 0.17 −0.04 −0.65
N Economic history 0.14 0.29 −0.15 −2.74 0.29 −0.09 −0.97
O Development 0.52 0.86 −0.34 −2.60 0.86 −0.36 −2.21
P Economic systems 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.22 0.08 −0.02 −0.57
Q Agri., environment 0.12 0.18 −0.06 −1.20 0.18 −0.09 −1.51
R Regional, transport 0.16 0.17 −0.01 −0.16 0.17 −0.12 −2.67
Z Special topics 0.10 0.16 −0.06 −1.50 0.16 −0.01 −0.14
Notes. Sample restricted to authors with three or more publications. First panel shows pre-match summary statistics (1,554 female authors,
121 male authors). Second panel shows post-match summary statistics (109 male authors). t-values for differences reported in each panel’s final
column.
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Table F.: Co-variate post-match balance when Dik ̸= 0










t = 1 inst. rank 15.55 17.01 −1.46 −0.52 16.65 15.97 0.68 0.24
Max. citations 204.72 232.66 −27.94 −0.89 210.06 266.92 −56.86 −1.31
Fraction of articles per decade
1950–59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1960–69 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.20
1970–79 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.08
1980–89 0.07 0.08 −0.01 −0.26 0.09 0.09 0.00 −0.01
1990–99 0.18 0.20 −0.02 −0.50 0.17 0.18 −0.01 −0.31
2000–09 0.43 0.43 −0.01 −0.12 0.41 0.40 0.00 0.11
2010–15 0.30 0.27 0.03 0.72 0.32 0.31 0.01 0.20
Fraction of articles per journal
AER 0.38 0.39 −0.01 −0.34 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.01
Econometrica 0.23 0.16 0.07 1.47 0.24 0.19 0.05 0.98
JPE 0.16 0.19 −0.03 −0.95 0.14 0.17 −0.03 −1.02
QJE 0.23 0.26 −0.02 −0.61 0.22 0.24 −0.02 −0.43
Fraction of articles per JEL code
A General 0.04 0.05 0.00 −0.12 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.11
B Methodology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C Quant. methods 0.49 0.41 0.08 0.46 0.53 0.55 −0.02 −0.10
D Microeconomics 1.54 1.55 −0.02 −0.07 1.60 1.59 0.01 0.05
E Macroeconomics 0.43 0.49 −0.06 −0.44 0.42 0.48 −0.06 −0.42
F International 0.26 0.38 −0.12 −0.81 0.26 0.33 −0.07 −0.48
G Finance 0.45 0.49 −0.04 −0.23 0.47 0.60 −0.14 −0.75
H Public 0.31 0.39 −0.08 −0.83 0.36 0.40 −0.03 −0.30
I Health, welfare, edu 0.70 0.88 −0.18 −0.80 0.77 0.81 −0.04 −0.19
J Labour 0.84 1.08 −0.24 −1.14 0.87 1.09 −0.22 −1.03
K Law and econ 0.12 0.16 −0.05 −0.67 0.12 0.21 −0.08 −1.07
L Industrial org 0.58 0.66 −0.08 −0.49 0.55 0.72 −0.17 −1.08
M Marketing/acct 0.12 0.13 −0.01 −0.16 0.11 0.13 −0.01 −0.20
N Economic history 0.22 0.36 −0.15 −1.18 0.19 0.29 −0.10 −0.89
O Development 0.40 0.62 −0.23 −1.64 0.40 0.62 −0.22 −1.59
P Economic systems 0.05 0.09 −0.04 −0.76 0.06 0.10 −0.04 −0.75
Q Agri., environment 0.06 0.14 −0.08 −1.37 0.04 0.09 −0.05 −1.23
R Regional, transport 0.06 0.12 −0.05 −1.10 0.07 0.16 −0.09 −1.73
Z Special topics 0.17 0.18 0.00 −0.06 0.15 0.17 −0.03 −0.42
Notes. Sample restricted to authors with three or more publications. Panels show post-match summary statistics for pairs in which Dik ̸= 0. t-values
for differences reported in each panel’s final column.
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t = 1 inst. rank 16.37 18.10 −1.73 −0.59 14.84 16.93 −2.09 −0.71
Max. citations 193.79 245.42 −51.62 −1.55 198.31 240.97 −42.66 −1.23
Fraction of articles per decade
1950–59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1960–69 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.13
1970–79 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.18 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08
1980–89 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.39
1990–99 0.16 0.17 −0.01 −0.26 0.16 0.18 −0.02 −0.55
2000–09 0.40 0.39 0.00 0.05 0.40 0.42 −0.02 −0.38
2010–15 0.32 0.31 0.01 0.17 0.33 0.31 0.02 0.48
Fraction of articles per journal
AER 0.40 0.38 0.01 0.25 0.39 0.40 −0.01 −0.19
Econometrica 0.22 0.21 0.02 0.31 0.21 0.17 0.04 0.88
JPE 0.15 0.18 −0.03 −0.79 0.16 0.20 −0.04 −1.19
QJE 0.23 0.23 0.00 −0.01 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.25
Fraction of articles per JEL code
A General 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.12 0.03 0.03 0.00 −0.01
B Methodology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C Quant. methods 0.46 0.51 −0.05 −0.31 0.44 0.45 −0.01 −0.04
D Microeconomics 1.43 1.45 −0.02 −0.09 1.43 1.52 −0.09 −0.37
E Macroeconomics 0.49 0.45 0.04 0.28 0.52 0.45 0.07 0.48
F International 0.29 0.26 0.03 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.04 0.36
G Finance 0.42 0.52 −0.10 −0.58 0.48 0.48 −0.01 −0.03
H Public 0.40 0.42 −0.02 −0.16 0.41 0.40 0.01 0.06
I Health, welfare, edu 0.70 0.85 −0.15 −0.66 0.61 1.02 −0.41 −1.76
J Labour 0.93 1.14 −0.21 −0.99 0.99 1.10 −0.11 −0.51
K Law and econ 0.09 0.16 −0.07 −1.15 0.11 0.16 −0.05 −0.73
L Industrial org 0.42 0.56 −0.14 −0.97 0.56 0.51 0.05 0.35
M Marketing/acct 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.20
N Economic history 0.28 0.41 −0.13 −1.01 0.30 0.41 −0.12 −0.88
O Development 0.40 0.59 −0.19 −1.48 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.04
P Economic systems 0.06 0.09 −0.03 −0.56 0.05 0.08 −0.04 −0.71
Q Agri., environment 0.06 0.10 −0.04 −0.83 0.07 0.10 −0.04 −0.65
R Regional, transport 0.05 0.14 −0.09 −1.96 0.09 0.13 −0.04 −0.71
Z Special topics 0.13 0.14 −0.01 −0.08 0.15 0.15 0.00 −0.02
Notes. Sample restricted to authors with three or more publications. Panels show post-match summary statistics for pairs in which Dik ̸= 0. t-values
for differences reported in each panel’s final column.
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t = 1 inst. rank 14.54 16.70 −2.17 −0.83
Max. citations 214.67 278.53 −63.85 −1.41
Fraction of articles per decade
1950–59 0.00 0.00 0.00
1960–69 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.15
1970–79 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04
1980–89 0.08 0.09 0.00 −0.08
1990–99 0.16 0.19 −0.03 −0.79
2000–09 0.42 0.43 −0.01 −0.25
2010–15 0.31 0.27 0.04 0.95
Fraction of articles per journal
AER 0.38 0.38 0.00 −0.06
Econometrica 0.22 0.16 0.07 1.47
JPE 0.18 0.20 −0.02 −0.61
QJE 0.22 0.26 −0.04 −1.13
Fraction of articles per JEL code
A General 0.04 0.04 0.00 −0.06
B Methodology 0.00 0.00 0.00
C Quant. methods 0.45 0.36 0.09 0.72
D Microeconomics 1.74 1.57 0.17 0.68
E Macroeconomics 0.64 0.55 0.09 0.54
F International 0.29 0.30 0.00 −0.01
G Finance 0.51 0.54 −0.03 −0.18
H Public 0.42 0.35 0.07 0.67
I Health, welfare, edu 0.51 0.97 −0.46 −2.15
J Labour 0.95 1.22 −0.27 −1.15
K Law and econ 0.19 0.22 −0.03 −0.36
L Industrial org 0.64 0.57 0.07 0.47
M Marketing/acct 0.13 0.14 −0.02 −0.24
N Economic history 0.27 0.35 −0.08 −0.63
O Development 0.58 0.75 −0.17 −0.91
P Economic systems 0.07 0.11 −0.04 −0.63
Q Agri., environment 0.08 0.14 −0.06 −0.88
R Regional, transport 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.10
Z Special topics 0.16 0.19 −0.03 −0.42
Notes. Sample restricted to authors with three or more publications. Panels show post-match
summary statistics for pairs in which Dik ̸= 0. t-values for differences reported in each panel’s
final column.
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F.4 List of authors in each matched pair
Table F.: Matched pairs
Matched pairs Matched pairs
Female Male Female Male
Abraham, Katharine G. Kahn, Charles M. Kuziemko, Ilyana Deming, David J.
Admati, Anat R. Huang, Chi-Fu La Ferrara, Eliana Krebs, Tom
Amiti, Mary Broda, Christian Landes, Elisabeth M. Carlton, Dennis W.
Anderson, Siwan Baland, Jean-Marie Levy, Gilat Razin, Ronny
Ashraf, Nava Avery, Christopher N. Lewis, Karen K. Backus, David K.
Athey, Susan Haile, Philip A. Li, Wei Roland, Gérard
Baicker, Katherine Shafir, Eldar Lleras-Muney, Adriana Kessler, Daniel P.
Bailey, Martha J. Paserman, M. Daniele Løken, Katrine Vellesen Mogstad, Magne
Bandiera, Oriana Rasul, Imran Madrian, Brigitte C. Lee, David S.
Barwick, Panle Jia Winston, Clifford Maestas, Nicole Bettinger, Eric P.
Baxter, Marianne Backus, David K. Malmendier, Ulrike Agarwal, Sumit
Bedard, Kelly Lefgren, Lars Matzkin, Rosa L. Hahn, Jinyong
Bertrand, Marianne Mullainathan, Sendhil McConnell, Sheena LaLonde, Robert J.
Black, Sandra E. Kessler, Daniel P. McGrattan, Ellen R. Williams, Noah
Blank, Rebecca M. Laband, David N. Meyer, Margaret A. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas
Boustan, Leah Platt Abramitzky, Ran Molinari, Francesca Hansen, Peter Reinhard
Brown, Jennifer Vogel, Jonathan Moser, Petra Sunde, Uwe
Busse, Meghan R. Zettelmeyer, Florian Nakamura, Emi Steinsson, Jón
Case, Anne C. Scholz, John Karl Ng, Serena Muller, Ulrich K.
Casella, Alessandra Snyder, James M. ( Jr.) Niederle, Muriel Wolfers, Justin
Chen, Xiaohong Hahn, Jinyong Oster, Emily Fang, Hanming
Chen, Yan Lange, Andreas Pande, Rohini Dean, Mark
Chevalier, Judith A. Lamont, Owen A. Paxson, Christina H. Boldrin, Michele
Chichilnisky, Graciela Engers, Maxim Perrigne, Isabelle Schmedders, Karl
Correia, Isabel Leeper, Eric M. Piazzesi, Monika Schneider, Martin
Costa, Dora L. Kahn, Matthew E. Qian, Nancy Ok, Efe A.
Cropper, Maureen L. Halvorsen, Robert Quinzii, Martine Magill, Michael J. P.
Currie, Janet Lavy, Victor Ramey, Valerie A. Salanié, Bernard
Dafny, Leemore S. Kolstad, Jonathan T. Reinganum, Jennifer F. Daughety, Andrew F.
De Nardi, Mariacristina Silverman, Dan Reinhart, Carmen M. Taylor, Alan M.
Demange, Gabrielle Anderson, Robert M. Rey, Hélène Jeanne, Olivier
Duflo, Esther Burgess, Robin Romer, Christina D. Williams, John C.
Dupas, Pascaline Urquiola, Miguel Rose-Ackerman, Susan Miyazaki, Hajime
Dynan, Karen E. Ljungqvist, Lars Rose, Nancy L. Snyder, James M. ( Jr.)
Eberly, Janice C. Sunder, Shyam Rosenblat, Tanya S. Möbius, Markus M.
Eckel, Catherine C. Dufwenberg, Martin Rouse, Cecilia Elena Fishman, Arthur
Edlund, Lena Smith, Jeffrey Sapienza, Paola Wacziarg, Romain
Eyigungor, Burcu Kaboski, Joseph P. Schennach, Susanne M. Guggenberger, Patrik
Fan, Yanqin Rahbek, Anders Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie Leeper, Eric M.
Fernández, Raquel Spolaore, Enrico Schwartz, Nancy L. Kuga, Kiyoshi
Field, Erica Donald, Stephen G. Shannon, Chris Safra, Zvi
Finkelstein, Amy Einav, Liran Shaw, Kathryn L. Anderson, Simon P.
Flavin, Marjorie A. Garber, Peter M. Spier, Kathryn E. Ausubel, Lawrence M.
Forges, Françoise Hong, Chew Soo Stokey, Nancy L. Smith, Bruce D.
Fortin, Nicole M. Hyslop, Dean R. Tenreyro, Silvana Lloyd-Ellis, Huw
Freund, Caroline Rose, Andrew K. Tertilt, Michèle Doepke, Matthias
Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola Woodruff, Christopher Tesar, Linda L. Blonigen, Bruce A.
Garfinkel, Michelle R. Bertola, Giuseppe Thomas, Julia K. Khan, Aubhik
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou Levinsohn, James A. Todd, Petra E. Flinn, Christopher J.
Goldin, Claudia D. Abramitzky, Ran Vissing-Jørgensen, Annette Veronesi, Pietro
Gopinath, Gita Itskhoki, Oleg Voena, Alessandra Sunde, Uwe
Griffith, Rachel Broda, Christian Washington, Ebonya L. Paserman, M. Daniele
Guerrieri, Veronica Khan, Aubhik White, Lucy Yılmaz, Bilge
Hanna, Rema Foster, Andrew D. Whited, Toni M. Sun, Ning
Hastings, Justine S. Pope, Devin G. Williams, Heidi L. Budish, Eric
Ho, Katherine Kremer, Ilan Wooders, Myrna Holtz Gallant, A. Ronald
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Table F.7 (continued)
Matched pairs Matched pairs
Female Male Female Male
Hoxby, Caroline Minter Kessler, Daniel P. Yariv, Leeat Lange, Andreas
İmrohoroğlu, Ayşe Casari, Marco Yellen, Janet L. Freeman, Richard B.
Jayachandran, Seema Pop-Eleches, Cristian Zeiler, Kathryn van Soest, Arthur
Kowalski, Amanda E. Schrimpf, Paul Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina Kuhn, Peter
Kranton, Rachel E. Kosfeld, Michael
Notes. Table lists the names of the matched pairs from Section 3.3.2. In each panel, female members are listed first; male members second.
See Section 3.3.2 for details on the matching process.
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F.5 R̂it regression output
Table F.8 displays output from time- and gender-specific regressions used to generate R̂it (Equa-
tion (13)).
Table F.: Regression output generating R̂it (Equation (13))
Women Men
t4 = 1 t4 = 3 t4 = 1 t4 = 3
Flesch Reading Ease
Female ratio 1.36 2.99 −6.02 6.34
(4.16) (3.88) (8.54) (5.80)
Constant 38.24*** 41.17*** 37.57*** 38.02***
(3.15) (2.47) (1.15) (1.22)
Flesch Kincaid
Female ratio −0.13 0.48 0.34 2.41*
(0.86) (0.78) (1.90) (1.26)
Constant −13.72*** −13.33*** −14.14*** −14.36***
(0.65) (0.50) (0.25) (0.26)
Gunning Fog
Female ratio −0.30 1.01 −0.88 2.51
(1.04) (0.97) (2.11) (1.52)
Constant −17.15*** −17.22*** −17.97*** −18.00***
(0.79) (0.62) (0.28) (0.32)
SMOG
Female ratio −0.15 0.74 −0.45 1.56
(0.76) (0.72) (1.46) (1.10)
Constant −15.07*** −15.19*** −15.72*** −15.63***
(0.57) (0.46) (0.20) (0.23)
Dale-Chall
Female ratio −0.06 0.48 −2.02** 0.37
(0.35) (0.39) (0.82) (0.42)
Constant −10.96*** −11.11*** −11.11*** −11.16***
(0.26) (0.25) (0.11) (0.09)
Notes. Sample 121 female authors; 109 male authors. Sample restricted to matched authors. See Sec-
tion 3.3.2 for details on how matches were made. Regressions weighted by the frequency observations
are used in a match. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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F.6 Table 7, Equation (11) and Condition 3
Table F.9 estimates Dik with Equation (11). Table F.10 estimates Dik with a rough attempt to control
for acceptance rates—it requires T5i ≤ T5k or T5k ≤ T5i before categorising matched pairs as discrim-
ination against i or k, respectively. Conclusions from both tables are are similar to those presented in
Section 3.3.2.
Table F.: Dik, Equation (11)
Discrimination against
women (Dik > 0)
Discrimination against
men (Dik < 0)
Mean, all
observations
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (1) (2)
Flesch Reading Ease 9.01 7.44 60 −5.80 5.85 20 3.38*** 2.34***
(0.77) (0.89)
Flesch Kincaid 1.76 1.29 65 −1.52 1.49 19 0.75*** 0.61***
(0.16) (0.17)
Gunning Fog 2.32 1.82 62 −1.60 1.80 21 0.95*** 0.76***
(0.20) (0.23)
SMOG 1.82 1.38 54 −0.94 1.16 24 0.61*** 0.46***
(0.15) (0.17)
Dale-Chall 0.88 0.65 62 −0.68 0.48 22 0.32*** 0.23***
(0.08) (0.09)
Notes. Table displays estimates identical to those in Table 7, except that Dik is determined by Equation (11). ***, ** and * statistically
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table F.: Dik, proxying for acceptance rates (Condition 3)
Discrimination against
women (Dik > 0)
Discrimination against
men (Dik < 0)
Mean, all
observations
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (1) (2)
Flesch Reading Ease 13.64 10.99 35 −7.90 7.22 14 3.63*** 2.21*
(1.18) (1.32)
Flesch Kincaid 2.77 2.30 39 −2.33 2.19 16 0.74*** 0.55*
(0.27) (0.28)
Gunning Fog 3.25 2.99 40 −2.44 2.86 16 0.91*** 0.66*
(0.32) (0.35)
SMOG 2.73 2.14 33 −1.45 2.07 16 0.63*** 0.42*
(0.23) (0.25)
Dale-Chall 1.35 0.98 35 −1.01 0.77 16 0.35*** 0.21
(0.13) (0.14)
Notes. Table displays estimates identical to those in Table 7, except that a matched pair is categorised as discrimination against i (k)
only if T5i ≤ T5k (T5k ≤ T5i) holds as well. Otherwise, Theorem 1 is inconclusive. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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F.7 R̂it, controlling for JEL category
Table F.11 and Figure F.1 replicate the analysis in Section 3.3.2 but Equation (13) controls for primary
JEL category. R̂it was reconstructed at female ratio equal to 1 for women, 0 for men and for a paper
classified in JEL categories D (microeconomics) and J (labour and demographic economics).
Table F.: Dik, controlling for JEL category
Discrimination against
women (Dik > 0)
Discrimination against
men (Dik < 0)
Mean, all
observations
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (1) (2)
Flesch Reading Ease 18.27 11.92 50 −7.59 7.96 6 9.75*** 9.13***
(2.57) (2.72)
Flesch Kincaid 3.87 2.71 45 −1.46 1.05 8 1.84*** 1.65***
(0.54) (0.59)
Gunning Fog 4.49 2.98 40 −2.14 2.45 13 1.76*** 1.51**
(0.63) (0.68)
SMOG 3.22 2.19 41 −1.81 1.87 11 1.30*** 1.15**
(0.46) (0.49)
Dale-Chall 1.80 1.11 32 −1.09 0.76 5 0.61*** 0.53**
(0.22) (0.23)
Notes. Sample 88 matched pairs (79 and 88 distinct men and women, respectively). Table displays estimates identical to those
in Table 7, except that Equation (13) includes primary JEL classification dummies; R̂it was reconstructed at female ratio equal to

































Dale-Chall Pairs suggesting discrimination against:
Men Women
Notes. Estimates identical to those
in Figure 4, except that Equation (13)
includes primary JEL dummies. 
Figure F.: Distributions of Dik, controlling for JEL category
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F.8 Unadjusted Rit
Table F.12 and Figure F.2 replicate the analysis in Section 3.3.2 but Equation (13) does not adjust for
the ratio of female authors on a paper. (Thus, Rit = R̂it).
Table F.: Dik, without adjusting for the ratio of female authors
Discrimination against
women (Dik > 0)
Discrimination against
men (Dik < 0)
Mean, all
observations
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (1) (2)
Flesch Reading Ease 14.52 10.73 48 −8.09 8.53 25 3.76*** 2.51**
(1.08) (1.17)
Flesch Kincaid 2.74 2.29 55 −2.29 2.49 23 0.81*** 0.63**
(0.24) (0.25)
Gunning Fog 3.82 2.70 45 −2.39 2.84 27 0.90*** 0.65**
(0.29) (0.31)
SMOG 2.77 1.99 41 −1.53 1.91 27 0.51** 0.30
(0.20) (0.22)
Dale-Chall 1.37 0.90 52 −0.90 0.75 28 0.36*** 0.24**
(0.11) (0.12)
Notes. Sample 121 matched pairs (109 and 121 distinct men and women, respectively). Table displays estimates identical to those
in Table 7, except that Rit is not adjusted for the ratio of female co-authors on a paper. (Thus, Rit = R̂it). ***, ** and * statistically
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Dale-Chall Pairs suggesting discrimination against:
Men Women
Notes. Estimates identical to those
in Figure 4, except that Equation (13)
is not adjusted for the ratio of female
authors on a paper. 
Figure F.: Distributions of Dik, without adjusting for the ratio of female authors
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G Section 3.4, supplemental output
G.1 Table 8, alternative year fixed effects
Table G.1 and Table G.2 replicate Table 8, replacing acceptance year fixed effects with fixed effects for
submission and publication years, respectively.
Table G.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), submission year effects
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female ratio 2.644** 4.006*** 4.035*** 3.080** 4.050*** 4.570** 4.430**
(1.294) (1.419) (1.419) (1.429) (1.417) (1.742) (1.800)
Max. t5 −0.097*** −0.099*** −0.098*** −0.098*** −0.097*** −0.099** −0.100**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039)
No. pages 0.158*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.161*** 0.153***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.028)
Nj 1.013*** 0.961*** 0.957*** 0.991*** 0.964*** 0.890*** 0.802**
(0.244) (0.240) (0.243) (0.240) (0.241) (0.285) (0.305)
Order 0.125** 0.120* 0.120* 0.123** 0.120* 0.102 0.125
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.118) (0.125)
No. citations (asinh) −0.472*** −0.486*** −0.482*** −0.470*** −0.491*** −1.254*** −1.281***
(0.164) (0.165) (0.164) (0.164) (0.165) (0.283) (0.273)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.026** −0.025* −0.025* −0.026** −0.024* −0.041* −0.046**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.022)
Mother −7.160*** −10.697*** −20.405*** −20.261***
(2.189) (3.075) (2.244) (2.774)
Birth −3.838 5.912 16.786*** 16.677***
(3.134) (4.118) (3.019) (3.026)
Constant 16.050*** 16.191*** 16.191*** 16.093*** 16.195*** 24.408*** 24.994***
(1.144) (1.167) (1.168) (1.156) (1.168) (2.147) (2.201)
R2 0.573 0.575 0.575 0.574 0.575 0.577 0.584
No. observations 2,620 2,605 2,620 2,620 2,620 1,278 1,278
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sub. year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Estimates are identical to those in Table 8 except that
submission year effects are used instead of acceptance year effects. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table G.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), publication year effects
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female ratio 5.409*** 6.786*** 6.783*** 5.797*** 6.802*** 8.999*** 9.040***
(1.578) (1.929) (1.931) (1.847) (1.928) (2.398) (2.462)
Max. t5 −0.137*** −0.141*** −0.139*** −0.138*** −0.137*** −0.137*** −0.143***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.046) (0.045)
No. pages 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.230*** 0.216***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.039) (0.041)
Nj 1.148*** 1.105*** 1.095*** 1.129*** 1.102*** 1.415*** 1.293***
(0.310) (0.307) (0.311) (0.305) (0.309) (0.419) (0.427)
Order 0.212*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.210*** 0.207*** 0.463*** 0.452***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.148) (0.147)
No. citations (asinh) −0.336* −0.360* −0.348* −0.334* −0.358* −0.553 −0.576
(0.195) (0.193) (0.194) (0.196) (0.194) (0.430) (0.411)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.020 −0.019 −0.019 −0.020 −0.019 −0.040 −0.042
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.026) (0.027)
Mother −7.088** −11.096*** −19.205*** −19.162***
(3.218) (3.254) (5.214) (5.509)
Birth −3.429 6.689 13.651** 13.336**
(4.020) (4.095) (5.238) (5.480)
Constant 13.756*** 13.888*** 13.896*** 13.791*** 13.907*** 16.334*** 17.275***
(1.244) (1.258) (1.258) (1.251) (1.254) (2.715) (2.508)
R2 0.280 0.281 0.281 0.280 0.281 0.109 0.127
No. observations 2,622 2,607 2,622 2,622 2,622 1,278 1,278
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Pub. year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Estimates are identical to those in Table 8 except that
publication year effects are used instead of acceptance year effects. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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G.2 Table 8, alternative thresholds for motherj
Table G.3 repeats the regression presented in Table 8 column (5), using alternative age thresholds to
define motherhood: motherj equals 1 if paper j ’s co-authors are all mothers to children younger than
three (first column), four (second column), etc. Changing this threshold has little effect on female ratio’s
coefficient. The coefficients on motherj and birthj are persistently negative and positive (respectively),
although magnitudes and standard errors vary. Remaining coefficients are unaffected.
Table G.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), alternative thresholds for motherj
Age < 3 Age < 4 Age < 5 Age < 10 Age < 18
Female ratio 5.964*** 6.288*** 6.922*** 6.792*** 6.502***
(2.101) (2.079) (2.085) (2.121) (2.220)
Mother −4.957* −10.511* −12.299*** −9.380** −5.160
(2.661) (5.284) (3.625) (3.850) (3.660)
Birth 0.977 6.161 7.362 4.569 0.630
(3.839) (6.112) (4.912) (5.281) (4.668)
Max. t5 −0.132*** −0.131*** −0.130*** −0.130*** −0.131***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
No. pages 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.195***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Nj 1.137*** 1.132*** 1.111*** 1.110*** 1.116***
(0.288) (0.288) (0.292) (0.291) (0.292)
Order 0.206*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.203***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
No. citations (asinh) −0.398** −0.403** −0.420** −0.414** −0.407**
(0.197) (0.197) (0.196) (0.196) (0.197)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.017 −0.017 −0.016 −0.017 −0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 13.911*** 13.952*** 14.018*** 14.030*** 13.973***
(1.206) (1.209) (1.212) (1.210) (1.213)
R2 0.288 0.289 0.290 0.290 0.289
No. observations 2,622 2,622 2,622 2,622 2,622
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review. Coefficients from OLS estimation of Equation (16) at different
age thresholds for motherj . In column one, motherj equals one for papers authored exclusively by women with children younger than three;
in column two, the age threshold is four; etc. Column three corresponds to results presented in Table 8. Standard errors clustered by year in
parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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G.3 Quantile regression
The distribution of review times appears right-skewed (Figure 5). To account for this, I re-estimate
gender differences in time spent under review using a quantile regression model. Results are shown in
Table G.4: the first panel replicates Table 8, column (5) at the 25th, median and 75th percentiles of
review times; the second panel similarly replicates the third column of Table 9.
The coefficient on female ratio is positive and significant across all three percentiles, indicating that
the results presented in Section 3.4 are not driven by outliers. Its magnitude is greatest in right-tail of
Econometrica’s distribution but is similarly sized across all percentiles when estimated using observations
from both Econometrica and REStud.
Table G.: Revision duration at Econometrica and REStud, quantile regression
Econometrica Econometrica+REStud
25th pc. Median 75th pc. 25th pc. Median 75th pc.
Female ratio 3.01** 4.39*** 6.97*** 2.36*** 2.32*** 2.43**
(1.18) (1.11) (1.60) (0.53) (0.55) (1.17)
Max. t5 −0.14*** −0.16*** −0.10 −0.13*** −0.17*** −0.13**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
No. pages 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Nj 0.64*** 0.83*** 0.79** 0.47*** 0.68*** 0.81***
(0.19) (0.24) (0.34) (0.08) (0.14) (0.20)
Order 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.01 0.08** 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
No. citations (asinh) −0.33*** −0.46*** −0.60*** −0.38*** −0.34*** −0.41***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13)
Mother −5.40 −11.09 −10.53**
(34.79) (11.47) (4.20)
Birth 5.80 7.02 13.60***
(34.76) (14.65) (4.15)
Constant 42.27*** 40.74** 39.84** 41.06*** 37.67*** 35.58
(13.01) (20.20) (17.29) (6.91) (11.63) (34.55)
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20
No. observations 2,623 2,623 2,623 4,435 4,435 4,435
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). First panel replicates results shown in
Table 8, column (5) across different percentiles of the distribution using quantile regressions; second panel similarly replicates results




In this appendix, I analyse readability at the author-level. To disaggregate the data, each article is
duplicated Nj times, where Nj is article j ’s number of co-authors; observation jk ∈ {1, . . . , Nj} is
assigned article j ’s kth author. I then estimate the dynamic panel model in Equation (H.1):
Rjit = β0Rit−1 + β1 female ratioj + β2 female ratioj × malei + θXj + αi + εit. (H.1)
Rjit is the readability score for article j—author i’s tth top-four publication; Rit−1 is the correspond-
ing value of author i’s t − 1th top-four paper. Gender enters twice—the binary variable malei and
female ratioj—to account for author i’s sex and the sex of his co-authors, respectively. Xj is a vector
of observable controls. It includes: editor, journal, year, journal × year, institution, English fluency
dummies and quality controls—citation count (asinh), max. T5 fixed effects (author prominence) and
max. t5 (author seniority). I also includeNj to control for author i’s proportional contribution to paper
j.
αi are author-specific effects and εit is an idiosyncratic error. αi are eliminated by first-differencing.
For each time period, endogeneity in the lagged dependant variable is instrumented with up to five
earlier lags (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).39 To account for duplicate articles,
the regression is weighted by 1/Nj .40 Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering on editor
and author.
Table H.1 displays results. Rows one and two present contemporaneous marginal effects on co-
authoring with women for female (β1) and male (β1 + β2) authors, respectively. Both estimates are
positive—everyone writes more clearly when collaborating with women—although statistically signif-
icant only for female authors. Marginal effects for women are twice as large as those shown in Table 2;
they suggest women write 2–6 percent better than men.41
Men and women co-authoring together experience an identical rise (or fall) in readability, so the
effect for one should mirror the other. Yet, Table H.1 suggests they don’t. While the interaction terms
(β2) are insignificant, the presence of a difference could indicate an increasing, convex relationship
between female ratio and readability.42 Thus, men’s smaller effect potentially reflects their dispropor-
tionate tendency to co-author exclusively with other men—i.e., precisely where the marginal impact
of an additional woman is low.43
Coefficients on the lagged dependant variables are small, suggesting readability is mostly deter-
mined contemporaneously. Nevertheless, their uniform positivity and significance indicate modest
persistence.
Table H.1’s second panel report test statistics of model fit. The first two rows test for serial cor-
relation; they indicate no model misspecification. p-values on the overall Hansen test statistic hover
between 0.35–0.72. Additional tests (available on request) suggest results are not sensitive to including
the full set of (non-collapsed) instruments or to reductions in the number of instruments.
39Results are robust to not collapsing instruments and instrumenting only with one up to all earlier lags (available on request).
40Assigning equal weight to all observations results in quantitatively and qualitatively similar results (see Hengel, 2016, pp.
44–45).
41Quotient of β1 divided by the total effect for men co-authoring with no women (female ratio of zero) estimated at other
co-variates’ observed values.
42I re-estimated Equation (H.1) replacing female ratioj × malei with female ratio2j . The results—which are available on
request—tentatively support this conclusion.
43On average, the female ratio formen is 0.04 (0.05 excluding solo-authored papers). When excluding articles written entirely
by men, their average ratio is still only 0.39. By default, women always author with at least one woman—themselves; the
average female ratio of their papers is 0.6 (0.46 and 0.53 excluding articles written entirely by women and solo-authored
papers, respectively).
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Female ratio for women (β1) 2.31** 0.27 0.52** 0.39** 0.26***
(0.93) (0.20) (0.24) (0.17) (0.09)
Female ratio for men (β1 + β2) 0.44 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.10
(1.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.22) (0.11)
Female ratio×male (β2) −1.87 −0.19 −0.40 −0.33 −0.16
(1.50) (0.31) (0.37) (0.27) (0.14)
Lagged score (β0) 0.04* 0.04* 0.03 0.03 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.35 0.72 0.34 0.71 0.34
z-test for no serial correlation
Order 1 −18.53 −13.61 −14.97 −17.57 −18.76
Order 2 0.72 −0.27 0.28 0.52 0.28
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3 3 3 3
Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,180 observations (2,826 authors, 121 female). Figures from first-differenced, IV estimation of Equa-
tion (H.1) (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) where instruments have been collapsed to create 186
total instrument: one instrument for each variable and lag distance (see Footnote 39). Female ratio (women): contempo-
raneous marginal effect of a paper’s female co-author ratio for female authors (β1); female ratio (men): analogous effect
for male authors (β1 + β2). z-statistics for first- and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors (Arel-
lano and Bond, 1991); null hypothesis no autocorrelation. Quality controls denoted by 32 include citation count (asinh),
max. T5 (author prominence) and max. t5 (author seniority); to reduce the number of instruments, institutions are en-
tered as levels. Standard errors clustered on author (in parentheses). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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I Alternative program for calculating readability scores
In this section, I replicate Table 2, Table 4, Table H.1 and Table 6 using readability scores generated
by the R readability package, an alternative program for calculating Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog
and SMOG readability scores.44 Replications for other tables and figures presented in the paper are
not shown, but will be made available on request.
Textatistic and readability employ different strategies to adapt the scores to automated calculation—
e.g., readability counts semi-colons and dashes as sentence-ending terminations; Textatistic does
not.45 Results appear robust to these (and other) small discrepancies: coefficients are similar to those
presented in the body of the paper; standard errors are usually smaller.
Table I.: Table 2, alternative program for calculating readability
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.19* 0.19* 0.18* 0.20* 0.22* 0.25* 0.27** 0.28*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Gunning Fog 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.33**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
SMOG 0.21** 0.21** 0.22** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.24** 0.24** 0.21*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3
Year effects 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 31 31 31 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
JEL (tertiary) effects 3
Notes. 9,117 articles in (1)–(5); 5,211 articles in (6) and (7); 5,774 articles—including 563 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 12)—in (8).
Figures are identical to those in Table 2, except readability scores were calculated using the R readability program. ***, ** and * statistically significant
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
44The program does not calculate the Flesch Reading Ease or Dale-Chall scores.
45Readability scores were originally developed to be calculated by hand. Automating their calculation requires slightly adapt-
ing the algorithms. For example, all five scores define sentences as grammatically independent units of thoughts—e.g., two
independent clauses connected by a dash or semi-colon count as two separate sentences. Unfortunately, semi-colons and
dashes are frequently used in other ways and it is difficult to programmatically distinguish between contexts.
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Flesch-Kincaid 0.51*** 0.48** 0.87*** 0.40** 0.40**
(0.17) (0.22) (0.29) (0.19) (0.19)
Gunning Fog 0.51*** 0.63** 1.00*** 0.38** 0.38*
(0.18) (0.25) (0.28) (0.19) (0.19)
SMOG 0.37** 0.42*** 0.69*** 0.27** 0.27**
(0.14) (0.16) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,709 NBER working papers; 1,707 published articles. Figures are identical to those in Table 4, except
readability scores were calculated using the R readability program. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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Table I.: Table 6, alternative program for calculating readability
t4 = 1 t4 = 2 t4 = 3 t4 = 4–5 t4 ≥ 6 All
Flesch-Kincaid 0.12 0.18 0.91*** 0.57 0.52 0.22
(0.14) (0.22) (0.27) (0.43) (0.37) (0.16)
Gunning Fog 0.31** 0.27 1.19*** 0.75 0.71 0.44**
(0.16) (0.25) (0.37) (0.51) (0.47) (0.19)
SMOG 0.20* 0.18 0.77*** 0.50 0.50 0.31**
(0.12) (0.18) (0.25) (0.37) (0.33) (0.13)
No. observations 6,875 2,826 1,675 1,906 2,773 12,006
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 33 33 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Figures are identical to those in Table 6, except readability scores were calculated using the R readability program.
***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Female ratio for women (β1) 0.30 0.49** 0.31*
(0.21) (0.25) (0.18)
Female ratio for men (β1 + β2) 0.13 0.27 0.17
(0.27) (0.31) (0.22)
Female ratio×male (β2) −0.17 −0.22 −0.14
(0.33) (0.38) (0.27)
Lagged score (β0) 0.05** 0.04* 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.47 0.30 0.29
z-test for no serial correlation
Order 1 −12.66 −13.49 −16.97
Order 2 0.42 0.68 0.51
Editor effects 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3 3
Year effects 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,180 observations (2,826 authors, 121 female). Figures are identical to those
in Table H.1, except readability scores were calculated using the R readability program. ***,
** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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J Alternative proxies for article gender
The following sections replicate Table 2, Table 4, Table 6, Table 8, Table 9 and Table H.1 using
alternative proxies for article gender.46 Replications using additional proxies are available on request
(subject to feasibility).
• In Appendix J.1, the sample is restricted to solo-authored papers.
• In Appendix J.2, article gender is represented by a binary variable equal to one if the author
with the (weakly) greatest number of top-five papers at the time of publication is female; mixed-
gendered articles without a senior female co-author are excluded.
• In Appendix J.3, article gender is represented by a binary variable equal to one if at least half of
all authors are female; mixed-gendered articles below this threshold are excluded.
• In Appendix J.4, a paper is considered “female” if at least one author is female.
• In Appendix J.5, papers authored entirely by women are compared to papers authored entirely
by men. Co-authored mixed-sex articles are excluded.
• In Appendix J.6, the sample includes only articles written by non-experienced authors (defined
as having two or fewer previous top-five articles) and article gender is represented by a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as her co-authors at
the time the paper was published.47
The estimation strategy in Section 3.3 relies on within-author differences in readability scores at
two specific t4 (t4 = 1 and t4 = 3). Because only a small number of women have majority and
exclusively female-authored papers for both t4, I reproduce instead results from Table 6 using the
alternative proxies for article gender.
In general, standard errors are smaller and coefficients larger in Appendix J.2, Appendix J.3 and
Appendix J.4; the reverse is usually—but not always—true for Appendix J.5 (which includes a much
smaller number of female-authored papers); coefficients are similar in Appendix J.1, but standard errors
are also larger (again, possibly due to small sample sizes).
46In order to generate within-author variation, mixed-sex co-authored articles that do not satisfy the relevant “female” defi-
nition are included—but classified as male—when estimating Table H.1. Otherwise, these observations are excluded.
47Note that Table 6 and Table H.1 cannot be estimated given the sample restriction on author experience. Additionally, the
results in tables Table J.33 and Table J.34 contain very few female observations with experienced senior female authors and
are therefore similar to the results shown in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively. See Figure 7 for a breakdown of review times
between junior and senior women where “junior” is defined as having at most only one previous top-five publication.
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J.1 Solo-authored
Table J.: Table 2, solo-authored papers
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.49 0.41 0.34 0.51 0.79 0.52 0.61 0.75
(0.57) (0.56) (0.57) (0.60) (0.60) (0.66) (0.71) (0.90)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.21
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
Gunning Fog 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.27* 0.31* 0.41** 0.41** 0.35*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20)
SMOG 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.21* 0.25** 0.25** 0.22
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
Dale-Chall 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.13** 0.13* 0.15**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3
Year effects 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 31 31 31 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
JEL (tertiary) effects 3
Notes. 4,014 articles in (1)–(5); 1,540 articles in (6) and (7); 1,666 articles—including 126 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 12)—in (8).
Estimates are identical to those in Table 2, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the paper is solo-authored by
a woman and 0 if it is solo-authored by a man. (Co-authored papers are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Flesch Reading Ease 1.72 1.37 2.88 1.50 1.50
(1.67) (2.08) (2.38) (1.19) (1.29)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.64 0.31 0.92* 0.61* 0.61*
(0.50) (0.43) (0.54) (0.33) (0.36)
Gunning Fog 0.71 0.37 1.03* 0.66* 0.66
(0.56) (0.49) (0.61) (0.38) (0.41)
SMOG 0.41 0.27 0.63 0.36 0.36
(0.33) (0.34) (0.39) (0.25) (0.27)
Dale-Chall 0.25 0.26* 0.47*** 0.21 0.21
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 345 NBER working papers; 344 published articles (37 female-authored). Columns display estimates
identical to those in Table 4, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the paper
is solo-authored by a woman and 0 if it is solo-authored by a man. (Co-authored papers are excluded.) ***, ** and *
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 6, solo-authored papers
t4 = 1 t4 = 2 t4 = 3–5 t4 ≥ 6 All
Flesch Reading Ease −0.31 0.85 2.64 9.40* 0.47
(1.01) (1.54) (2.60) (4.83) (0.84)
Flesch-Kincaid −0.01 −0.06 0.45 2.32*** 0.05
(0.24) (0.36) (0.74) (0.54) (0.19)
Gunning Fog 0.10 −0.23 0.79 2.90*** 0.15
(0.27) (0.44) (0.84) (0.79) (0.22)
SMOG 0.06 −0.18 0.63 1.99*** 0.11
(0.18) (0.30) (0.59) (0.76) (0.15)
Dale-Chall −0.09 0.28** 0.29 0.99** 0.01
(0.10) (0.13) (0.21) (0.45) (0.07)
No. observations 2,025 758 772 459 4,013
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 33 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 6, except that female ratio has been replaced with
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the paper is solo-authored by a woman and 0 if it is solo-authored by a man.
(Co-authored papers are excluded.) Due to small sample sizes, final column estimates are clustered on author,
only. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), solo-authored papers
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Solo female 6.375** 9.417** 9.200** 7.218** 9.291** 11.526* 12.658**
(2.886) (3.989) (3.951) (3.498) (3.952) (5.661) (5.893)
Max. t5 −0.314*** −0.309*** −0.311*** −0.315*** −0.307*** −0.286*** −0.274**
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.098) (0.105)
No. pages 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.195*** 0.191*** 0.265*** 0.265***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.064) (0.068)
Order 0.168* 0.168* 0.163* 0.166* 0.164* 0.545* 0.428
(0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.306) (0.318)
No. citations (asinh) −0.735*** −0.775*** −0.741*** −0.726*** −0.760*** −1.306** −1.209**
(0.180) (0.176) (0.178) (0.182) (0.178) (0.594) (0.554)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.011 −0.010 −0.009 −0.011 −0.007 −0.006 0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.062) (0.067)
Mother −8.880* −13.676*** −28.084*** −28.926***
(4.604) (5.026) (8.465) (8.537)
Birth −4.407 7.496 22.305*** 24.844***
(5.011) (4.668) (6.871) (7.477)
Constant 15.864*** 16.031*** 15.925*** 15.871*** 15.945*** 19.926*** 19.486***
(1.800) (1.761) (1.793) (1.806) (1.780) (5.598) (5.392)
R2 0.336 0.341 0.340 0.337 0.341 0.211 0.242
No. observations 1,223 1,209 1,223 1,223 1,223 417 415
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 8,
except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the paper is solo-authored by a woman and 0 if it is solo-authored by
a man. (Co-authored papers are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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+ REStud Econometrica REStud
Econometrica
+ REStud
Solo female 6.34** 2.15 3.95** 10.43** 4.25 6.55***
(2.90) (1.68) (1.54) (4.72) (2.64) (2.23)
Max. t5 −0.29*** −0.38*** −0.33*** −0.31*** −0.39*** −0.35***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07)
No. pages 0.20*** 0.24** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.06 0.20***
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.16) (0.05)
Order 0.15* −0.05 0.03 0.41 0.05 0.24
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.32) (0.25) (0.21)
No. citations (asinh) −0.60*** −0.42 −0.51*** −0.90* −1.41** −1.23**
(0.19) (0.28) (0.17) (0.48) (0.64) (0.49)
Constant 14.91*** 20.28*** 17.30*** 19.11*** 32.55*** 24.83***
(1.36) (2.19) (1.09) (4.29) (4.81) (3.03)
R2 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.21 0.25 0.22
No. observations 1,223 850 2,073 415 374 790
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Accepted year effects 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3 3 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in
Table 9, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the paper is solo-authored by a woman and 0 if it is
solo-authored by a man. (Co-authored papers are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Female ratio for women (β1) 1.96 0.17 0.41 0.35 0.30**
(1.38) (0.30) (0.37) (0.27) (0.12)
Lagged score (β0) 0.04* 0.05** 0.03 0.03 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.32 0.68 0.04 0.65 0.47
z-test for no serial correlation
Order 1 −18.47 −13.69 −14.90 −17.52 −18.58
Order 2 0.70 −0.17 0.27 0.51 0.30
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3 3 3 3
Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,132 observations (2,812 authors, 121 female). Estimates identical to those in Table H.1, except that
female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the paper is solo-authored by a woman and 0 if it is
solo-authored by a man. (Co-authored mixed-sex papers are included and classified as male (see Footnote 46).) ***, ** and
* statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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J.2 Senior female author
Table J.: Table 2, senior female author
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.84* 0.79 0.73 0.82 1.04** 0.83 0.82 0.82
(0.50) (0.49) (0.51) (0.52) (0.52) (0.55) (0.56) (0.64)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.17* 0.16 0.16 0.18* 0.20* 0.24** 0.25** 0.21
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Gunning Fog 0.29** 0.29*** 0.29** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.33**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
SMOG 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.21** 0.23** 0.26** 0.23** 0.20**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Dale-Chall 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.11* 0.10* 0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3
Year effects 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 31 31 31 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
JEL (tertiary) effects 3
Notes. 8,917 articles in (1)–(5); 5,045 articles in (6) and (7); 5,557 articles—including 512 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 12)—in (8).
Estimates are identical to those in Table 2, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as
many top-five papers as her co-authors at the time the paper was published. (Mixed-gendered papers with a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, **
and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Flesch Reading Ease 1.62*** 1.81** 3.12*** 1.31** 1.31**
(0.62) (0.78) (0.95) (0.64) (0.65)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.53*** 0.29** 0.75*** 0.46** 0.46**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19)
Gunning Fog 0.57*** 0.41*** 0.89*** 0.48** 0.48**
(0.14) (0.15) (0.24) (0.20) (0.21)
SMOG 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.59*** 0.27** 0.27**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
Dale-Chall 0.10 0.24** 0.30*** 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,655 NBER working papers; 1,653 published articles (119 female-authored). Columns display estimates
identical to those in Table 4, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author
had at least as many top-five papers as her co-authors at the time the paper was published. (Mixed-gendered papers with
a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 6, senior female author
t4 = 1 t4 = 2 t4 = 3 t4 = 4–5 t4 ≥ 6 All
Flesch Reading Ease −0.01 1.22 2.93** 2.82* 1.76 1.57**
(0.80) (0.82) (1.18) (1.47) (1.63) (0.74)
Flesch-Kincaid −0.03 0.19 0.58** 0.53* 0.32 0.23
(0.17) (0.15) (0.27) (0.32) (0.35) (0.15)
Gunning Fog 0.07 0.39** 0.85** 0.88** 0.42 0.49***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.37) (0.35) (0.40) (0.19)
SMOG 0.04 0.25* 0.56** 0.70*** 0.28 0.35***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.26) (0.26) (0.30) (0.13)
Dale-Chall 0.00 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.14*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.08)
No. observations 6,539 2,749 1,646 1,871 2,766 11,472
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 33 33 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 6, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as her co-authors at the time the paper was published.
(Mixed-gendered papers with a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Table J.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), senior female author
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senior female 4.978** 6.790** 6.786** 5.496** 6.805** 8.310** 8.368**
(2.314) (2.888) (2.869) (2.690) (2.871) (3.585) (3.503)
Max. t5 −0.129*** −0.129*** −0.127*** −0.129*** −0.126*** −0.124** −0.129***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.047)
No. pages 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.192*** 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.233*** 0.219***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.041) (0.044)
Nj 1.284*** 1.275*** 1.264*** 1.274*** 1.272*** 1.663*** 1.521***
(0.310) (0.305) (0.310) (0.305) (0.307) (0.413) (0.438)
Order 0.211*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.210*** 0.207*** 0.480*** 0.468***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.149) (0.145)
No. citations (asinh) −0.368* −0.386* −0.375* −0.364* −0.386* −0.553 −0.545
(0.199) (0.198) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.406) (0.393)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.018 −0.016 −0.016 −0.017 −0.016 −0.036 −0.038
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.030)
Mother −7.887** −12.042*** −20.959*** −21.075***
(3.792) (3.944) (6.580) (7.057)
Birth −3.837 6.910 15.510** 15.231**
(4.795) (4.852) (6.404) (6.658)
Constant 13.645*** 13.709*** 13.725*** 13.663*** 13.734*** 15.798*** 16.628***
(1.241) (1.255) (1.250) (1.245) (1.248) (2.541) (2.381)
R2 0.287 0.290 0.288 0.287 0.289 0.124 0.143
No. observations 2,588 2,573 2,588 2,588 2,588 1,253 1,253
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 8,
except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as her co-authors
at the time the paper was published. (Mixed-gendered papers with a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.
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+ REStud Econometrica REStud
Econometrica
+ REStud
Senior female 4.87** 1.58 3.08*** 6.41** 3.08 4.35***
(2.34) (1.54) (1.11) (3.04) (2.08) (1.48)
Max. t5 −0.12*** −0.10 −0.12*** −0.12*** −0.05 −0.09**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
No. pages 0.20*** 0.13** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.05 0.17***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Nj 1.29*** −0.07 0.80*** 1.46*** 0.27 1.11***
(0.31) (0.51) (0.28) (0.45) (0.68) (0.37)
Order 0.20*** −0.06 0.09* 0.47*** 0.06 0.23**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11)
No. citations (asinh) −0.27 −0.60** −0.39** −0.32 −1.20** −0.78**
(0.19) (0.23) (0.16) (0.39) (0.45) (0.31)
Constant 12.51*** 23.51*** 16.67*** 14.40*** 30.52*** 21.27***
(1.20) (1.85) (0.95) (2.11) (3.15) (1.57)
R2 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.14 0.13
No. observations 2,588 1,778 4,366 1,253 1,040 2,294
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Accepted year effects 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3 3 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in
Table 9, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as
her co-authors at the time the paper was published. (Mixed-gendered papers with a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Female ratio for women (β1) 2.02** 0.33* 0.58** 0.40** 0.15*
(0.94) (0.20) (0.23) (0.16) (0.09)
Female ratio for men (β1 + β2) 2.48 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.03
(1.76) (0.39) (0.46) (0.32) (0.14)
Female ratio×male (β2) 0.46 0.10 −0.08 −0.07 −0.12
(1.97) (0.43) (0.51) (0.36) (0.17)
Lagged score (β0) 0.04** 0.05** 0.03 0.03 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.35 0.72 0.46 0.71 0.05
z-test for no serial correlation
Order 1 −18.53 −13.74 −14.89 −17.56 −18.77
Order 2 0.73 −0.17 0.21 0.52 0.25
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3 3 3 3
Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,180 observations (2,826 authors, 121 female). Estimates identical to those in Table H.1, except that
female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as




Table J.: Table 2, majority female-authored
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.93*** 0.91*** 0.89*** 0.93*** 1.10*** 0.91** 0.95** 1.13**
(0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.45)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.16** 0.16* 0.16* 0.17** 0.19** 0.23** 0.26*** 0.26**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Gunning Fog 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.34***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
SMOG 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.23**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Dale-Chall 0.09** 0.09** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.11**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3
Year effects 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 31 31 31 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
JEL (tertiary) effects 3
Notes. 8,800 articles in (1)–(5); 4,913 articles in (6) and (7); 5,403 articles—including 490 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 12)—in (8).
Estimates are identical to those in Table 2, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a weak majority (50% or more)
of authors are female. (Papers with a minority—but positive—number of female authors are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Flesch Reading Ease 1.34*** 1.30** 2.43*** 1.12*** 1.12***
(0.43) (0.66) (0.72) (0.41) (0.42)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.44*** 0.16 0.56*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12)
Gunning Fog 0.46*** 0.21 0.62*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13)
SMOG 0.28*** 0.14 0.40*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
Dale-Chall 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.27*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,567 NBER working papers; 1,565 published articles (235 female-authored). Columns display estimates
identical to those in Table 4, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a weak majority
(50% or more) of authors are female. (Papers with a minority—but positive—number of female authors are excluded.)
***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 6, majority female-authored
t4 = 1 t4 = 2 t4 = 3 t4 = 4–5 t4 ≥ 6 All
Flesch Reading Ease 0.58 1.42** 3.63*** 1.97 2.36* 2.04***
(0.51) (0.59) (1.03) (1.41) (1.27) (0.65)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.08 0.16 0.71*** 0.56** 0.42 0.32**
(0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.30) (0.14)
Gunning Fog 0.20 0.26 0.95*** 0.69** 0.53 0.45***
(0.13) (0.18) (0.24) (0.28) (0.34) (0.17)
SMOG 0.13 0.19 0.60*** 0.46** 0.36 0.31***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.22) (0.24) (0.12)
Dale-Chall 0.08* 0.07 0.22** 0.18 0.27 0.15**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.06)
No. observations 6,402 2,679 1,557 1,777 2,577 9,587
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 33 33 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 6, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a weak majority (50% or more) of authors are female. (Papers with a minority—but positive—number of
female authors are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), majority female-authored
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Majority female 3.347*** 3.799*** 3.786*** 3.414*** 3.802*** 5.849*** 5.826***
(1.151) (1.291) (1.288) (1.268) (1.286) (1.677) (1.735)
Max. t5 −0.168*** −0.172*** −0.170*** −0.169*** −0.168*** −0.174*** −0.170***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047)
No. pages 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.244*** 0.229***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.044) (0.046)
Nj 1.200*** 1.186*** 1.171*** 1.194*** 1.179*** 1.590*** 1.398***
(0.324) (0.317) (0.321) (0.315) (0.318) (0.421) (0.434)
Order 0.197*** 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.446*** 0.441***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.144) (0.141)
No. citations (asinh) −0.412** −0.430** −0.418** −0.411** −0.429** −0.709* −0.666
(0.200) (0.199) (0.199) (0.200) (0.199) (0.415) (0.405)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.014 −0.013 −0.013 −0.014 −0.013 −0.032 −0.036
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.029)
Mother −4.391 −8.632*** −16.519*** −16.708***
(2.935) (2.837) (4.285) (4.990)
Birth −1.164 7.063 14.384*** 14.815**
(4.118) (4.443) (5.173) (5.503)
Constant 13.824*** 13.904*** 13.919*** 13.837*** 13.931*** 16.450*** 17.214***
(1.239) (1.257) (1.255) (1.245) (1.252) (2.623) (2.404)
R2 0.287 0.288 0.287 0.287 0.288 0.120 0.139
No. observations 2,543 2,528 2,543 2,543 2,543 1,211 1,211
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 8,
except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a weak majority (50% or more) of authors are female. (Papers with a
minority—but positive—number of female authors are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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+ REStud Econometrica REStud
Econometrica
+ REStud
Majority female 3.22*** 0.89 1.98*** 5.14*** 2.14** 3.51***
(1.16) (0.83) (0.74) (1.56) (0.99) (0.89)
Max. t5 −0.16*** −0.10 −0.14*** −0.16*** −0.05 −0.11**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
No. pages 0.21*** 0.13* 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.04 0.17***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Nj 1.22*** −0.18 0.72** 1.35*** 0.20 1.04**
(0.33) (0.48) (0.29) (0.46) (0.67) (0.38)
Order 0.18*** −0.07 0.08 0.44*** 0.05 0.21*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12)
No. citations (asinh) −0.32* −0.62** −0.43*** −0.45 −1.23** −0.84**
(0.19) (0.23) (0.16) (0.39) (0.46) (0.31)
Constant 12.80*** 23.97*** 16.96*** 15.02*** 31.11*** 21.68***
(1.18) (1.84) (0.92) (2.04) (3.11) (1.54)
R2 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.12 0.14 0.13
No. observations 2,543 1,745 4,288 1,211 1,002 2,214
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Accepted year effects 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3 3 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number ofmonths spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those inTable 9,
except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a weak majority (50% or more) of authors are female. (Papers with
a minority—but positive—number of female authors are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Female ratio for women (β1) 1.81*** 0.26 0.36* 0.23* 0.13*
(0.69) (0.16) (0.19) (0.13) (0.07)
Female ratio for men (β1 + β2) 0.52 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.02
(0.70) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.07)
Female ratio×male (β2) −1.29 −0.15 −0.26 −0.21 −0.11
(0.96) (0.21) (0.25) (0.17) (0.10)
Lagged score (β0) 0.04* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.34 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.49
z-test for no serial correlation
Order 1 −18.53 −13.32 −14.90 −17.51 −18.77
Order 2 0.74 −0.52 0.22 0.51 0.25
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3 3 3 3
Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,180 observations (2,826 authors, 121 female). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table H.1,
except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a weak majority (50% or more) of authors
are female. Otherwise, it is 0. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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J.4 At least one female author
Table J.: Table 2, at least one female author
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.64* 0.39 0.36 0.35
(0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.44)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13* 0.13 0.14* 0.10
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Gunning Fog 0.20** 0.20** 0.20** 0.20** 0.21** 0.21** 0.19** 0.14
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
SMOG 0.12* 0.12* 0.13* 0.13* 0.14** 0.13* 0.11* 0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Dale-Chall 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08* 0.07* 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3
Year effects 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 31 31 31 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
JEL (tertiary) effects 3
Notes. 9,117 articles in (1)–(5); 5,211 articles in (6) and (7); 5,774 articles—including 563 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 12)—in (8).
Estimates are identical to those in Table 2, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one author on a paper
is female. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Flesch Reading Ease 0.63* 1.36** 1.76*** 0.40 0.40
(0.34) (0.58) (0.67) (0.27) (0.28)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.26** 0.27** 0.46*** 0.20** 0.20**
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09)
Gunning Fog 0.24** 0.33** 0.50*** 0.17* 0.17*
(0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.09) (0.10)
SMOG 0.16** 0.21** 0.33*** 0.11* 0.11*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
Dale-Chall 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,709 NBER working papers; 1,707 published articles (377 female-authored). Columns display estimates
identical to those in Table 4, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one
author on a paper is female. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 6, at least one female author
t4 = 1 t4 = 2 t4 = 3 t4 = 4–5 t4 ≥ 6 All
Flesch Reading Ease 0.46 0.33 3.09*** 1.87* 0.95 0.87
(0.41) (0.56) (0.83) (1.05) (1.35) (0.56)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.09 −0.09 0.57*** 0.54** 0.18 0.09
(0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.22) (0.29) (0.12)
Gunning Fog 0.18* 0.01 0.74*** 0.69*** 0.23 0.19
(0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.34) (0.14)
SMOG 0.12 0.02 0.48*** 0.47** 0.19 0.15
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19) (0.25) (0.10)
Dale-Chall 0.07** 0.03 0.22*** 0.16* 0.12 0.09*
(0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.05)
No. observations 6,875 2,826 1,675 1,906 2,773 12,006
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 33 33 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 6, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy
variable equal to 1 if at least one author on a paper is female. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), at least one female author
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1+ female 2.721*** 3.028*** 3.019*** 2.761*** 3.032*** 4.300*** 4.298***
(0.932) (0.999) (1.001) (1.000) (0.999) (1.173) (1.146)
Max. t5 −0.138*** −0.141*** −0.140*** −0.139*** −0.139*** −0.138*** −0.145***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.043) (0.044)
No. pages 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.239*** 0.226***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.043)
Nj 1.016*** 0.981*** 0.969*** 1.009*** 0.977*** 1.159*** 1.033**
(0.304) (0.298) (0.300) (0.294) (0.299) (0.398) (0.420)
Order 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.204*** 0.207*** 0.204*** 0.470*** 0.468***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.144) (0.142)
No. citations (asinh) −0.395* −0.411** −0.400** −0.394* −0.411** −0.633 −0.640
(0.197) (0.196) (0.197) (0.197) (0.196) (0.404) (0.389)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.017 −0.016 −0.016 −0.017 −0.016 −0.035 −0.037
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028)
Mother −4.147 −8.478*** −17.264*** −17.212***
(2.827) (3.123) (5.288) (5.495)
Birth −0.966 7.214 15.925** 15.581**
(4.062) (4.920) (6.370) (6.599)
Constant 14.100*** 14.199*** 14.212*** 14.114*** 14.225*** 16.689*** 17.517***
(1.190) (1.211) (1.208) (1.199) (1.205) (2.428) (2.294)
R2 0.287 0.288 0.287 0.287 0.288 0.122 0.140
No. observations 2,622 2,607 2,622 2,622 2,622 1,278 1,278
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 8,
except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one author on a paper is female. ***, ** and * statistically
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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1+ female 2.53** 0.77 1.64*** 3.79*** 1.55* 2.65***
(0.95) (0.72) (0.59) (1.13) (0.85) (0.69)
Max. t5 −0.13*** −0.12* −0.13*** −0.14*** −0.07 −0.11**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
No. pages 0.20*** 0.14** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.06 0.17***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Nj 1.02*** −0.16 0.61** 1.03** 0.02 0.77*
(0.31) (0.49) (0.28) (0.44) (0.66) (0.38)
Order 0.19*** −0.07 0.08 0.46*** 0.04 0.22*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
No. citations (asinh) −0.30 −0.64*** −0.42*** −0.42 −1.20** −0.83***
(0.19) (0.23) (0.15) (0.38) (0.44) (0.30)
Constant 12.97*** 24.01*** 17.12*** 15.33*** 31.07*** 22.01***
(1.16) (1.81) (0.91) (2.02) (3.01) (1.45)
R2 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.12 0.14 0.13
No. observations 2,622 1,812 4,434 1,278 1,068 2,347
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Accepted year effects 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3 3 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in
Table 9, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one author on a paper is female. ***, ** and *
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Female ratio for women (β1) 1.15* 0.17 0.25 0.18 0.12*
(0.67) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.06)
Female ratio for men (β1 + β2) −0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05
(0.54) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) (0.05)
Female ratio×male (β2) −1.18 −0.16 −0.23 −0.16 −0.07
(0.81) (0.17) (0.20) (0.15) (0.07)
Lagged score (β0) 0.04* 0.05** 0.03 0.03 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.36 0.72 0.68 0.71 0.48
z-test for no serial correlation
Order 1 −18.54 −13.74 −14.97 −17.57 −18.76
Order 2 0.69 −0.18 0.26 0.50 0.26
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3 3 3 3
Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,180 observations (2,826 authors, 121 female). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table H.1,
except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one author on a paper is female. ***,
** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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J.5 Exclusively female-authored
Table J.: Table 2, 100% female-authored
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.49 0.41 0.34 0.51 0.79 0.52 0.61 0.75
(0.57) (0.56) (0.57) (0.60) (0.60) (0.66) (0.71) (0.90)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.21
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
Gunning Fog 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.27* 0.31* 0.41** 0.41** 0.35*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20)
SMOG 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.21* 0.25** 0.25** 0.22
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
Dale-Chall 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.13** 0.13* 0.15**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3
Year effects 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 31 31 31 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
JEL (tertiary) effects 3
Notes. 8,260 articles in (1)–(5); 4,455 articles in (6) and (7); 4,840 articles—including 385 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 12)—in (8).
Estimates are identical to those in Table 2, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if all authors on a paper are
female. (Papers written by authors of both genders are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Flesch Reading Ease 0.44 1.97 2.09 0.12 0.12
(0.95) (1.38) (1.70) (0.97) (0.99)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.37 0.18 0.51 0.33 0.33
(0.28) (0.24) (0.38) (0.30) (0.31)
Gunning Fog 0.41 0.33 0.67* 0.34 0.34
(0.27) (0.29) (0.39) (0.31) (0.32)
SMOG 0.19 0.33 0.45* 0.12 0.12
(0.16) (0.24) (0.26) (0.19) (0.19)
Dale-Chall 0.11 0.34** 0.40*** 0.06 0.06
(0.08) (0.16) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,386 NBER working papers; 1,384 published articles (54 female-authored). Columns display estimates
identical to those in Table 4, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if all authors on
a paper are female. (Papers written by authors of both genders are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 6, 100% female-authored
t4 = 1 t4 = 2 t4 = 3 t4 = 4–5 t4 ≥ 6 All
Flesch Reading Ease −0.18 1.66 4.71*** 1.97 1.77 3.08***
(0.80) (1.09) (1.21) (2.55) (3.28) (1.19)
Flesch-Kincaid −0.01 0.25 1.01*** 0.07 0.45 0.47
(0.19) (0.23) (0.31) (0.58) (0.55) (0.28)
Gunning Fog 0.07 0.47* 1.50*** 0.43 0.87* 0.72**
(0.21) (0.27) (0.42) (0.63) (0.50) (0.34)
SMOG 0.02 0.33* 1.01*** 0.49 0.56* 0.50**
(0.15) (0.20) (0.29) (0.51) (0.30) (0.23)
Dale-Chall −0.02 0.19** 0.38*** 0.42 0.64*** 0.25**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.28) (0.21) (0.12)
No. observations 5,880 2,449 1,453 1,642 2,384 8,079
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 33 33 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 6, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy
variable equal to 1 if all authors on a paper are female. (Papers written by authors of both genders are excluded.) ***, ** and *
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), 100% female-authored
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exclusively female 6.382** 9.611** 9.540** 7.284** 9.574** 11.787** 12.165**
(2.641) (3.619) (3.621) (3.198) (3.620) (4.999) (4.986)
Max. t5 −0.174*** −0.173*** −0.172*** −0.174*** −0.170*** −0.173*** −0.169***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.056) (0.058)
No. pages 0.210*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.254*** 0.242***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038) (0.038)
Nj 1.267*** 1.294*** 1.275*** 1.263*** 1.285*** 1.633*** 1.441***
(0.319) (0.317) (0.321) (0.318) (0.319) (0.436) (0.427)
Order 0.177*** 0.175*** 0.173*** 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.422** 0.409**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.157) (0.158)
No. citations (asinh) −0.430** −0.454** −0.440** −0.426** −0.452** −0.767* −0.688
(0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.195) (0.193) (0.423) (0.419)
Flesch Reading Ease −0.016 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.014 −0.034 −0.035
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.033) (0.032)
Mother −10.086** −14.522*** −23.032*** −23.988***
(4.444) (4.518) (6.575) (7.430)
Birth −4.903 7.360 15.319*** 16.065***
(5.082) (4.586) (5.428) (5.645)
Constant 13.739*** 13.777*** 13.791*** 13.747*** 13.803*** 16.570*** 17.017***
(1.316) (1.336) (1.330) (1.322) (1.327) (3.032) (2.782)
R2 0.291 0.295 0.293 0.291 0.294 0.133 0.150
No. observations 2,443 2,428 2,443 2,443 2,443 1,140 1,140
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 8,
except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if all authors on a paper are female. (Papers written by authors of both
genders are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Exclusively female 6.42** 2.46 4.22*** 9.04** 4.62* 6.27***
(2.62) (1.58) (1.36) (3.75) (2.40) (1.93)
Max. t5 −0.17*** −0.12* −0.15*** −0.16*** −0.07 −0.13***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
No. pages 0.21*** 0.13* 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.03 0.19***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03)
Nj 1.30*** 0.07 0.87*** 1.38*** 0.65 1.19***
(0.33) (0.50) (0.29) (0.44) (0.69) (0.37)
Order 0.17** −0.03 0.09 0.41** 0.14 0.25**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12)
No. citations (asinh) −0.34* −0.45* −0.38** −0.47 −0.95* −0.76**
(0.18) (0.23) (0.15) (0.39) (0.47) (0.33)
Constant 12.58*** 22.38*** 16.20*** 14.86*** 28.93*** 20.58***
(1.28) (1.77) (0.99) (2.50) (3.10) (1.80)
R2 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.13 0.16 0.15
No. observations 2,443 1,636 4,079 1,140 914 2,055
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Accepted year effects 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3 3 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in
Table 9, except that female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if all authors on a paper are female. (Papers written by
authors of both genders are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Female ratio for women (β1) 1.71 0.11 0.41 0.36* 0.31***
(1.04) (0.23) (0.28) (0.20) (0.10)
Lagged score (β0) 0.04** 0.05** 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.30 0.68 0.56 0.67 0.42
z-test for no serial correlation
Order 1 −18.52 −13.74 −14.96 −17.56 −18.64
Order 2 0.72 −0.18 0.27 0.51 0.12
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3 3 3 3
Year effects 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,180 observations (2,826 authors, 121 female). Estimates identical to those in Table H.1, except that
female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if all authors on a paper are female. (Co-authored mixed-
sex papers are included and classified as male (see Footnote 46).) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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J.6 Inexperienced senior female author
Table J.: Table 2, inexperienced senior female author
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.67 0.66 0.53 0.63 0.73 0.35 0.40 0.20
(0.54) (0.51) (0.52) (0.55) (0.58) (0.65) (0.63) (0.86)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.13
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20)
Gunning Fog 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.22
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20)
SMOG 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14)
Dale-Chall 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal effects 3 3
Year effects 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 31 31 31 31
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
JEL (tertiary) effects 3
Notes. 4,984 articles in (1)–(5); 2,163 articles in (6) and (7); 2,411 articles—including 248 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 12)—in (8).
Estimates are identical to those in Table 2, except that only papers by junior authors (defined as having two or fewer previous top-five articles) are
included in the sample and female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as her
co-authors at the time the paper was published. (Mixed-gendered papers with a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Flesch Reading Ease 1.97* 0.99 2.74 1.75 1.75
(1.12) (1.67) (1.98) (1.12) (1.19)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.76** 0.11 0.84** 0.72** 0.72**
(0.32) (0.34) (0.42) (0.32) (0.34)
Gunning Fog 0.77** 0.12 0.85** 0.74** 0.74**
(0.32) (0.38) (0.43) (0.35) (0.37)
SMOG 0.46** 0.12 0.55* 0.43* 0.43*
(0.20) (0.27) (0.29) (0.22) (0.23)
Dale-Chall 0.18 0.22 0.35* 0.13 0.13
(0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11)
Editor effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year effects 3 3 3 3
Nj 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 32 32 32 32
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 473 NBER working papers; 472 published articles (54 female-authored). Columns display estimates
identical to those in Table 4, except that only papers by junior authors (defined as having two or fewer previous top-five
articles) are included in the sample and female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author
had at least as many top-five papers as her co-authors at the time the paper was published. (Mixed-gendered papers with
a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table J.: Table 8 (dependent variable: revision duration), inexperienced senior female author
1970–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senior female 5.261* 7.476** 7.391** 6.206* 7.402** 9.200 9.003
(2.899) (3.621) (3.604) (3.293) (3.608) (5.485) (5.672)
Max. t5 0.702* 0.672* 0.681* 0.679* 0.688* 1.031 0.897
(0.385) (0.385) (0.383) (0.387) (0.384) (0.720) (0.774)
No. pages 0.174*** 0.177*** 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.175*** 0.181***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.059) (0.057)
Nj −0.039 −0.024 −0.045 −0.040 −0.046 −0.268 −0.258
(0.484) (0.487) (0.485) (0.483) (0.485) (0.999) (1.112)
Order 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.145 0.041
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.234) (0.267)
No. citations (asinh) −0.327 −0.359 −0.339 −0.318 −0.348 0.010 0.072
(0.218) (0.218) (0.218) (0.220) (0.219) (0.707) (0.721)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 −0.012 −0.006
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.055) (0.055)
Mother −9.097** −11.534** −18.565* −19.418*
(4.402) (4.476) (9.355) (9.727)
Birth −6.584 3.899 6.811 8.006
(5.008) (4.224) (8.265) (9.233)
Constant 12.483*** 12.519*** 12.607*** 12.528*** 12.614*** 17.258*** 17.551***
(1.486) (1.498) (1.481) (1.492) (1.478) (3.567) (3.843)
R2 0.327 0.332 0.330 0.328 0.330 0.138 0.180
No. observations 1,340 1,329 1,340 1,340 1,340 468 464
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 8,
except that only papers by junior authors (defined as having two or fewer previous top-five articles) are included in the sample and female ratio has
been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as her co-authors at the time the paper was
published. (Mixed-gendered papers with a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Senior female 4.92* 2.70 3.72** 6.24 4.10* 5.07**
(2.86) (1.76) (1.48) (4.65) (2.32) (2.09)
Max. t5 0.66* 0.75 0.69*** 0.65 0.59 0.72
(0.37) (0.48) (0.25) (0.79) (0.72) (0.52)
No. pages 0.17*** 0.18* 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.05 0.15***
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05)
Nj −0.13 −1.57*** −0.67* −0.52 −1.62* −0.93
(0.47) (0.54) (0.40) (1.04) (0.82) (0.64)
Order 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.18 0.16
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.26) (0.16) (0.15)
No. citations (asinh) −0.32 −0.52* −0.40** 0.02 −1.46** −0.88*
(0.22) (0.28) (0.17) (0.73) (0.62) (0.50)
Constant 13.42*** 21.38*** 16.63*** 17.76*** 32.54*** 24.71***
(1.37) (2.13) (1.18) (3.58) (3.99) (2.49)
R2 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.15 0.19 0.15
No. observations 1,340 1,006 2,346 464 499 965
Editor effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accepted year effects 3 3 3 3
Journal×Accepted year effects 3 3
JEL (primary) effects 3 3 3
Notes. Dependent variable is the number of months spent in peer review (see Section 3.4). Columns display estimates identical to those in
Table 9, except that only papers by junior authors (defined as having two or fewer previous top-five articles) are included in the sample and
female ratio has been replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as her co-authors at the
time the paper was published. (Mixed-gendered papers with a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.
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K Discussion of potential alternative explanations
A gender readability gap exists. It’s still there after including editor, journal and year effects—meaning
it’s hard blame specific policies or attitudes in the fifties, long since overcome. The gap is unaffected
by field controls—i.e., it unlikely results from women researching topics that are easier to explain.
Nor does it appear to be caused by factors correlated with gender but actually linked to authors’ (or
co-authors’) competence as economists and fluency in English—if so, institution, native speaker and
citation controls would reduce it. They do not.48
The gap grows between first draft and final publication and over the course of women’s careers, pre-
cluding inborn advantage and one-off improvements in response to external circumstances unrelated
to peer review. This likewise rules out gender differences in (i) biology/behaviour—e.g., sensitivity to
referee criticism49—or (ii) knowledge about referee expectations. If diligently addressing every ref-
eree concern has no apparent upside—acceptance rates are unaffected—and a very clear downside—
constant redrafting takes time—even the most oversensitive, ill-informed woman would eventually
re-examine initial beliefs and start acting like a man.50 Yet this is not what we observe. The largest
investments in writing well are made by female economists with greatest exposure to peer review—i.e.,
those with the best opportunity to update their priors.
Women’s papers are more likely assigned female referees (Abrevaya and Hamermesh, 2012; Gilbert
et al., 1994).51 If women are more demanding critics, clearer writing could reflect their tougher
reviews.52 Women concentrate in particular fields, so it’s natural female referees more often review
female-authored papers. Nevertheless, for the readability gap to exist only because of specialisation,
controlling for JEL classification should explain it.53 It does not: including 20 primary or 731 tertiary
JEL category dummies has little effect. So if referee assignment is causing the gap, it’s only because
journals disproportionately refer female-authored papers to the toughest critics.54 Meaning it isn’t
referees who are biased—it’s editors.55
Section 3.2 directly links an increase in the gender readability gap to peer review; Section 3.3
establishes that factors outside women’s control—assumed, at this point, entirely peer-review-related—
drive it. Yet oversensitivity and/or poor information could create the former gap while another gender
bias unconnected to peer review generates the latter. One in particular comes to mind: the feedback
48I also conducted a primitive surname analysis (see Hengel, 2016, pp. 35–36). It suggests that the female authors in my
data are no more or less likely to be native English speakers.
49While women do appear more internally responsive to feedback—criticism has a bigger impact on their self-esteem—
available evidence suggests they aren’t any more externally responsive to it, i.e., women and men are equally likely to change
behaviour and alter performance after receiving feedback (Johnson and Helgeson, 2002; Roberts and Nolen-Hoeksema,
1989).
50This statement is especially relevant if the opportunity cost to women for “wasting” time on needless tasks is higher—e.g.,
because of family responsibilities.
51Note that women are only a fraction of all referees—8 percent in 1986 (Blank, 1991), 10 percent in 1994 (Hamermesh,
1994) and 14 percent in 2013 (Torgler and Piatti, 2013). Abrevaya and Hamermesh (2012) report female-authored papers
were only slightly more likely to be assigned a female referee between 1986–1994; matching increases between 2000–2008.
52It’s not clear whether women’s reports are more critical. A study specific to post-graduate biologists suggests yes (Borsuk
et al., 2009); another analysing past reviews in an economics field journal does not (Abrevaya and Hamermesh, 2012).
53Specifically, men and women publishing in the same field face the same pool of referees. Controlling for that pool would
account for gender differences in readability.
54Relatedly, perhaps female-authored research is more provocative and therefore warrants more scrutiny. Yet if this ex-
plained the gap, controlling for JEL classification should reduce (or eliminate) it—unless women’s work is systematically
more provocative even among researchers in very narrow fields. There is some evidence for this hypothesis—provocative
work is (presumably) highly cited work and recent female-authored papers published in top economics journals are cited
more (Hengel2018a). Yet more provocative, cited research would probably be published at higher rates—and there is no
evidence women’s paper’s are more frequently accepted (Ceci et al., 2014). In any case, women respond to incentives just
like men; if we could get boring papers published, we’d write them.
55This is a form of biased referee assignment identified in Theorem 1. It would also apply if the readability gap reflects referees’
apathy for women’s work. Readability is particularly relevant when interest in—and knowledge about—the topic is low (Fass
and Schumacher, 1978; Klare, 1976). Thus, a gap could emerge if editors fail to assign interested and knowledgable referees
to female-authored papers.
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women receive in conferences and seminars. Perhaps experienced female economists tighten prose
(before or after submission) in response to audience member remarks.
Anecdotal evidence suggests female speakers are given a harder time, although I could find no sci-
entific analysis to support (or refute) this claim. Nevertheless, sensible, experienced economists should
ignore random suggestions that won’t actually improve a manuscript’s probability of acceptance. Do
well-published female economists really lack this sensibility? In any case, most conference and semi-
nar participants are also current (or future) journal referees. Neutral peer review feedback is inconsis-
tent with non-neutral conference/seminar feedback when originating from the same group—especially
since gender neutrality is emphasised in both environments.
Perhaps women focus on writing at the expense of some other aspect of a paper due to a comparative
advantage? Not likely. Women’s chosen publication strategy results in similar (or lower) acceptance
rates and longer review times compared to the one employed by men. But if men and women are
equally capable researchers then writing well cannot be a comparative advantage and at the same time
be strictly dominated by another strategy.56
In the universe of straightforward alternatives, this leaves us with one: female economists are less
capable researchers. As mentioned earlier, factors correlated with gender but actually related to compe-
tency should decline when appropriate proxies are included. The sample itself is one such proxy—these
are, after all, only articles published in the top four economics journals. Adding other controls—author
seniority, institution, total article count, citations and published order in an issue—has no effect.57 The
gap is widest for the most productive economists and even exists among articles originally released as
NBER working papers—both presumably very clear signals of merit. Indeed, contemporary female-
authored papers published in a top-four economics journal are, in fact, cited more than male-authored
papers (Hengel and Moon, 2019).
Yet I cannot rule out the possibility that women’s work is systematically worse than men’s in a way
that is somehow not full captured by citations, proxies for author prominence and seniority or author-
specific fixed effects—or that the female and male authors in Section 3.3.2 are not really equivalent.
(To decide for yourself, see Appendix F.4.) And if this is true, editors and referees should select and
peruse our papers more carefully—a byproduct of which could be better written papers after-the-fact
or more attractive prose compensating for structural weaknesses before it.
“Quality” is subjective; measurement, not easy. Nevertheless, attempts using citation counts and
journal acceptance rates do not indicate that men’s research is any better: as discussed in Section 3.3.1,
gender has very little impact on the latter;58 a review of past studies on male vs. female citations
find four in which women’s papers received fewer, six where they were cited more and eight with no
significant difference (Ceci et al., 2014). Recent research specific to economics suggests female-authored
papers get cited more (Card et al., 2019; Grossbard et al., 2018; Hengel and Moon, 2019).
More complicated, multi-factor explanations could resolve inconsistencies present when each is
analysed in isolation. Perhaps female economists are perfectionists, and it gets stronger with age?59
Maybewomen actually enjoy being poorly informed, overconfident and sensitive to criticism—or (more
likely) I could have otherwise misspecified the author’s objective function in Section 3.3.1. Mean-
while, a preference for writing well coupled with unaccounted for exogenously determined co-author
characteristics could combine to cause women’s more readable papers and their increasing readabil-
56Assuming men and women are equally capable researchers, women would only emphasise a particular aspect of a paper at
the expense of others if doing so achieved a similar outcome/effort trade-off as the one employed by men. The outcome/
effort combination women currently experience, however, is strictly worse than men’s.
57Published order in an issue was introduced as a set of indicator variables in an earlier version of this paper (Hengel, 2016,
pp. 42 and 44).
58Journals may have a policy of publishing female-authored research over equal (or even better) male work. If so, acceptance
rates are not an unbiased indicator of quality.
59While women score higher on maintaining order (Feingold, 1994)—a trait including organisation and perfectionism—
significant differences are not universally present in all cultures (Costa et al., 2001); differences that are present decline—or
even reverse—as people age (Weisberg et al., 2011).
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ity60—although restricting the analysis to solo-authored papers, those co-authored by members of the
same sex or with a senior female co-author results in similar figures and identical conclusions (see Ap-
pendix J.5, Table J.27 and the robustness discussion in Section 3.3.2).61 Alternatively, measurement
error and/or co-variate controls could have interacted with gender in ways I did not anticipate.62 And
of course, the statistically significant relationships this paper documents may simply be unfortunate
(particularly for me!) flukes.63
Still, no explanation matches the simplicity and believability of biased referees and/or editors. Co-
herence and economy do not establish fact, but they are useful guides. This single explanation neatly
accounts for all observed patterns. If reviewers apply higher standards to female-authored papers, they
will be rejected more often and/or subject to tougher review. Added scrutiny should improve exposi-
tion but prolong publication. The rewards from clearer writing are presumably internalised, explaining
gradual increases in women’s readability.
Moreover, several studies document a gender difference in critical feedback of similar form—
employee performance reviews and student evaluations. Ongoing research suggests female workers
are held to higher standards in job assessments. They are acknowledged less for creativity and techni-
cal expertise, their contributions are infrequently connected to business outcomes; guidance or praise
supervisors do offer is vague (Correll and Simard, 2016).64
Students display a similar bias. Data from Rate My Professors suggest female lecturers should
be “helpful”, “clear”, “organised” and “friendly”. Men, instead, are praised (and criticised) for be-
ing “smart”, “humble” or “cool” (Schmidt, 2015).65 A study of teaching evaluations similarly finds
students value preparation, organisation and clarity in female instructors; their male counterparts are
considered more knowledgable, praised for their “animation” and “leadership” and given more credit
for contributing to students’ intellectual development (Boring, 2017).
60This might occur if senior women are excluded from male networks as t increases; consequently, they are more likely to
co-author with other women than junior female economists. As I show in an earlier version of this paper, however, the
reverse is true: as t increases, women are more likely to co-author with men, while men are more likely to co-author with
women (Hengel, 2016, Table 12, p. 25).
61Relatedly, women may have preferred to have written their t4 = 1 publication more clearly, but senior male co-authors
held them back; at t4 = 3, they enjoy more freedom to achieve their desired (higher) readability by writing on their own
or with other women. This runs counter to the observation in Footnote 60, however. Moreover, women are more likely to
co-author with more senior men at t4 = 3 than they were at t4 = 1.
62Appendix B.3 outlines principle sources of measurement error as well as steps I have taken to minimise their impact.
Meanwhile, coefficient magnitude and standard errors remain relatively stable when gradually introducing controls (Ta-
ble 2), reducing the likelihood of “collider” bias (see Footnote 14).
63This is a form of “file drawer bias”—other studies showing no effect weren’t published. Nevertheless, at least one recent paper
found similar results: the readability of disclosure documents in audit reports is positively correlated with the proportion
of women and underrepresented minorities on an audit committee (Velte, 2018).
64A similar phenomenon exists in online fora. The Guardian commissioned researchers to study 70 million comments on its
website. It found female and black writers attract disproportionately abusive threads (Gardiner et al., 2016).
65These conclusions are based on my own observational account of the data.
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